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Today technical web standards have become one of the most important mechanisms of 
internet governance, impinging on a wide range of areas of public policy from privacy and 
to freedom of speech. Despite their importance, however, the processes through which 
web standards are developed are not well understood, and to date, very little empirical 
research has been conducted to examine the procedural legitimacy of web standards 
consortia. To address this gap in the literature, this thesis develops and applies an 
analytical framework inspired by deliberative democratic theory to assess the procedural 
legitimacy of the World Wide Web Consortium in the context of its development of the 
highly controversial Encrypted Media Extension specification. In doing so, the thesis 
argues that the W3C is characterised by a lack of procedural legitimacy. Specifically, it will 
be shown how the framing of the W3C as a purely coordinative and technical organisation 
acted to marginalise principle based objections to the EME proposal and undermine 
participant’s attempts to engage fully with the public policy questions raised by the 
specification. The thesis also raises concerns about the consortium’s diversity and 
outlines several practical recommendations for how the procedural deficits identified by 
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How the code regulates, who the code writers are, and who controls the code 
writers—these are the questions on which any practice of justice must focus in 
the age of cyberspace.  The answers reveal how cyberspace is regulated.  
Lawrence Lessig (2009, p. 182) 
Choice manifests itself in society in small increments and moment-to-moment 
decisions as well as in loud dramatic struggles… [H]e who does not see 
choice in the development of the machine merely betrays incapacity to 
observe cumulative effects until they are bunched together so closely that they 
seem completely external and impersonal." 
Lewis Mumford (1934, p. 6) 
 Today standards are ubiquitous to almost all aspects of modern life. From railway 
gauges and AC power to plugs and MP3s, standards provide technicians and engineers 
with the technical blueprints required to ensure interoperability and compatibility between 
heterogeneous technological products, generating economies of scale and achieving the 
kinds of efficiencies necessary to produce sustained economic growth. Though commonly 
perceived as a mundane and esoteric aspect of global governance, the ways in which 
standards are designed and implemented, play a critical role in the modern economy, 
enabling the integration of large-scale technical systems, and facilitating the development 
and maintenance of increasingly complex networks of socio-economic activity (Bowker & 
Starr, 2000; Hanseth & Monteiro, 1998). 
Nowhere is the role of standards more evident than on the web1. Whether users are 
aware of it or not, even the simplest of online tasks, such as sending an email, watching a 
video on YouTube or making a purchase on Amazon, involves engagement with myriad 
                                                             
1  A note on terminology: This thesis uses the term “standard” synonymously with “protocol”. 
Protocols are usually used to refer to a subset of standards which deal principally with networking. 
“Specification” and “recommendation” are other terms used to refer to standards at the W3C.  
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technical standards and protocols. Some like Wi-Fi, enable devices to connect to the 
internet, others such as HTML and CSS pertain to the structure and appearance of web 
pages, while standards such as TCP/IP facilitate the exchange of data packages across 
the network. Regardless of their specific application, all web standards ultimately seek to 
provide a common set of rules by which software and hardware developers can build 
open and accessible systems, ensuring the interoperability of devices and providing 
common platforms for the exchange of information (DeNardis, 2011). Simply put, web 
standards are the technological artefacts that enable two users on opposite sides of the 
world, using devices produced by different manufacturers, and running different types of 
software and operating systems to communicate and share information. Standards are as 
such, a fundamental component of the web’s technical infrastructure, without which the 
notion of the web as a decentralised global information network, open and accessible to 
all, would be simply inconceivable.  
In addition to their technical coordinative role, recent internet scholarship has increasingly 
begun to acknowledge the importance of web standards as powerful modalities of 
regulation (DeNardis, 2009; Lessig, 1999; Morris & Davidson, 2003). Though mostly 
obscure to the casual user, the way in which standards are designed and implemented is 
increasingly understood as having an enormous bearing on the everyday operation and 
character of the web, instantiating political and economic tensions and impinging upon a 
wide range of policy issues from counter-terrorism and privacy to copyright enforcement 
and free speech. As was observed by the European Commission (1996, p. 1), ‘standards 
are not only technical questions. They determine the technology that will implement the 
Information Society, and consequently the way in which industry, users, consumers and 
administrations will benefit from it’. 
At the same time that scholars have begun to recognise the social, economic and political 
effects of standards, many are also beginning to challenge long-held deterministic notions 
about how standards themselves come to be. Contrary to the traditional view of standards 
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as the inevitable or predetermined product of some objective logic of technical efficiency, 
today many scholars interpret the standards which comprise the underlying technical 
infrastructure of the web, as reflective of the technological, economic and political context 
of their creation as well as the interests and intentions of their designers. From this 
perspective, standards are no longer viewed as technologically determined but instead 
socially constructed, or as Ken Adler (1995, p. 39) put it ‘at the core of “universal 
standards” commonly taken to be products of objective science lies the historically 
contingent... these seemingly “natural” standards express the specific, if paradoxical, 
agendas of specific social and economic interests’. In this way, it is argued, 
standardisation processes should not be interpreted merely as the apolitical pursuit of 
technical compatibility, but rather as among some of the most critical and dynamic sites of 
political and economic contestation of contemporary politics.  
This dual recognition of standards as both politically consequential and socially 
constructed inevitably raises important normative questions regarding the openness and 
transparency of the processes and procedures through which techno-policy standards are 
designed and implemented as well as the legitimacy of the standards development 
organisations themselves. Since as Hamlett (2003, p. 115) observed; ‘it seems only a 
small step from asserting that technologies are socially constructed… to asking more 
normative questions: How should technologies be constructed’.    
Despite the growing awareness of the importance of web standards development to digital 
rights, security and the global economy, the political architecture and legitimation claims of 
the institutions which produce many of the world most essential web standards, remain 
largely misunderstood. This confusion regarding the status and legitimacy of web 
standards organisations as institutions of global governance, can in part be explained by 
their apparent resistance to definition using conventional models of legitimacy grounded in 
liberal democratic concepts such as accountability and representation. As with a growing 
number of other technocratic transnational institutions, the complex networks of informal 
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standards bodies and consortia that comprise the contemporary web standards 
ecosystem, are characterised by their highly privatised and decentralised nature and 
operate almost entirely beyond the narrow institutional parameters of traditional nation-
state bureaucracies. As a result, web standards organisations typically lack the kinds of 
formal democratic mechanisms of legitimation usually associated with national policy-
making bodies (Hawkins, 1999).  
The absence of democratic sources of legitimacy raises the question of how the 
legitimacy of standards bodies can be conceptualised. Until recently, scholars have noted 
how the legitimation claims of web standards organisations have been almost entirely 
dependent upon the adoption or use of their standards by relevant stakeholders. From this 
perspective, the legitimacy of standards organisations has been interpreted mainly in 
terms of the perceived technical quality of their substantive outputs as well as their 
procedural efficiency (substantive legitimacy) - both of which contribute considerably to 
the overall likelihood of a standard's acceptance by the marketplace.  
However, as the political consequences of standards development have become 
increasingly apparent, some scholars have begun to question the appropriateness of 
measuring the legitimacy of standards organisations in purely substantive terms (Fuchs et 
al., 2011). Specifically, they observe how the increasingly interconnected relationship 
between standards development and policy-making requires designers and engineers to 
make a growing number of value-based judgements regarding the social effects of their 
standards. In contrast to purely technical questions concerning compatibility or technical 
performance, commentators observe how these judgements are by their very nature 
contested, and so inevitably necessitate greater critical consideration of the processes 
through which consensus regarding the technical and policy objectives of standards is 
achieved. From this perspective, it is necessary not only to evaluate the legitimacy of web 
standards organisations in terms of the quality or acceptance of their technical outputs but 
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also in terms of the openness and transparency of the procedures through which 
consensus regarding the desired effects of those outputs is determined.   
Although the precise nature of the procedures used to develop standards varies from 
organisation to organisation, most web standards processes can today be characterised 
as sharing a ‘rough consensus and running code’ ethos of standards development.  
Tracing its origins back to the academic roots of the early internet, this highly pragmatic 
approach to standardisation combines meritocratic work practices and rigorous testing 
with a strong commitment to open, deliberative and consensus-led development 
processes which facilitate and encourage the participation of a broad range of 
stakeholders (Iversen et al., 2004).  
In recent decades, the ethos of ‘rough consensus and running code’ has emerged as the 
dominant model of standards development and is today often heralded by practitioners 
and scholars alike as a paragon of legitimate self-regulation and an exemplar of effective 
multi-stakeholder governance (Froomkin, 2003; Russell, 2006; Doty and Mulligan, 2013). 
Among the most notable plaudits, are those who identify a close correspondence between 
the informal and consensus-led practices of contemporary standards organisations and 
the principles of deliberative democratic theory – which holds at its centre a belief in the 
legitimising power of rational discourse (Froomkin, 2003; Umpathy et al., 2012). For 
scholars such as Michael Froomkin (2003), contemporary standards bodies can thus, not 
only be considered as procedurally legitimate but as amongst the best contemporary 
examples of deliberative governance in practice.   
Others, however, remain far more sceptical about the legitimising potential of the ‘rough 
consensus’ ethos, noting for example, how the rapid growth and commercialisation of the 
web over the past two decades has resulted in the domination of most major standards 
bodies by powerful corporate actors motivated by a narrow range of commercial interests 
(Halpin, 2013; King, Grinter, & Pickering, 1997; Schoechle, 2009). In such circumstances, 
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scholars argue the pressure exerted on standards bodies to pursue the economic 
objectives of their members and to remain responsive to the technical needs of the 
market, undermine their capacity to facilitate the kinds of rigorous, inclusive and 
consensus-orientated deliberative processes needed to legitimise their technical outputs 
(Davidson, Morris, & Courtney, 2002; Garfinkel, 1998; Schoechle, 2003). Furthermore, 
others have also questioned the extent to which the communities of engineers and 
computer scientists which comprise most technical working groups, can realistically be 
expected to comprehend the complex socio-economic implications of their work or to 
competently contribute to policy debates about which they have no specific expertise 
(Malcolm, 2013). Finally, some scholars have also raised concerns about the significant 
western bias that is a feature of many contemporary standards organisations as well as 
the underrepresentation of women in standards development internationally.   
Thus, at a time when the ever-increasing encroachment of standards bodies into areas of 
public policy has made the openness and inclusivity of standards development more 
important than ever, serious questions remain regarding the suitability and legitimacy of 
the ‘rough consensus’ model of standardisation as well as the willingness and capacity of 
standards bodies to adequately consider the social and political implications of their 
technical outputs (Garfinkel, 1998; Halpin, 2013; King, Grinter, & Pickering, 1997; 
Schoechle, 2009). 
Nowhere has the urgency of these questions been more clearly demonstrated than at the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). Founded in 1992 by the inventor of the web Tim 
Berners-Lee, the W3C is today one of the world’s largest and most influential web 
standards organisations; responsible for the development of some of the web’s most well-
known and widely implemented standards including, HTML and CSS (Berners-Lee, 2000). 
Often described as adopting a ‘rough consensus and running code’ model of 
standardisation, over the years the W3C has been widely praised for what many perceive 
to be its open and consensus-driven process as well as its leadership on a range of 
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issues including accessibility and more recently privacy (Jaffe, 2014; Russell, 2003). As 
commercial pressures on the standards community have gradually increased, however, 
the consortium has - like very many other web standards organisations – found it 
increasingly difficult to balance its responsibility to efficiently address the technical 
requirements of its membership with the growing calls for greater public participation, 
transparency and due process.   
Between 2012 and 2017 these tensions were brought into sharp focus by the W3C’s 
development of the Encrypted Media Extension specification (EME) – an extension to the 
W3C’s flagship HTML standard – which aimed to provide a standardised means by which 
web applications could discover, select and interact with Digital Rights Management 
technologies (DRM), to allow for the playback of encrypted content within web browsers. 
For its authors and proponents, the specification was necessary to protect online video 
content from copyright infringement and to promote the continued growth of the nascent 
streaming services industry (Jaffe, 2013). For its opponents, the proposal represented a 
cynical attempt by the content industries and their commercial partners to protect their 
business interests and posed a severe threat to a wide range of open web principles 
including, accessibility, interoperability, security, and user rights (O’Brien, 2013).  
In late 2017, following over five years of negotiations and development the EME 
specification was finally approved as an official W3C recommendation. Although 
supporters of the specification maintained that the process had been open and 
transparent, the controversy nevertheless caused the W3C substantial reputational 
damage, with many commentators accusing the consortium of subservience to corporate 
interests and of failing to adequately consider the concerns of the specifications critics 
(Lunduke, 2017). More broadly, the controversy also renewed the debate concerning the 
status of web standards organisations as institutions of internet governance as well as the 
legitimacy of their role in the technical arbitration of public policy disputes.  
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Despite the seriousness and urgency of the questions raised by the development of EME 
and other techno-policy standards, the political architecture of the web standards 
organisations which shape their development remains under-analysed, and to date, 
surprisingly few  empirical studies of the procedural legitimacy of standards bodies have 
been conducted (Doty & Mulligan, 2013; Hahn & Weidtmann, 2016; Umapathy et al., 
2012). Moreover, although allusions to affinities between the ‘rough consensus’ model of 
standardisation and the ideals of deliberative democratic governance are common within 
much of the scholarly literature, to the researcher's knowledge no in-depth empirical 
analysis of a techno-policy standards development process has yet been completed to 
test the validity of these claims (Froomkin, 2003). 
To address this gap in the research, this thesis develops and applies an original analytical 
framework inspired by deliberative democratic theory to assess the procedural legitimacy 
of the W3C in the context of its development of the highly controversial EME specification. 
Using an innovative form of content analysis inspired by previous empirical studies of 
deliberative fora, the research produces an in-depth analysis of the W3C mailing lists as 
well as other aspects of the W3C development process, in order to assess the quality of 
the consortium’s deliberations and decision-making procedures against several metrics of 
deliberative procedural legitimacy including; inclusivity, transparency, deliberativeness, 
constructiveness, respect, and justification.  By examining the development of the EME 
specification in this way, the research will not only describe the deliberative quality and 
procedural legitimacy of the W3C as a whole but also provide valuable insights into the 
cause of any procedural deficiencies2. Variation in the performance of the W3C process 
across the several policy issues affected by the development of EME will also be analysed 
to provide further insights into the W3C’s management of techno-policy standards 
                                                             
2 It is important to note that this thesis does not attempt to address the effectiveness or impact of 
W3C recommendations. Instead, the focus of the thesis is purely the procedural legitimacy of the 
W3C process and the lessons this can teach us about the development of techno-policy standards. 
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development. Together the findings of the research will be used to develop 
recommendations for improvements to the W3C process. 
The primary research question which this thesis seeks to address can be summarised as 
follows:   
1) To what extent can the W3C’s development of the Encrypted Media Extension 
specification be described as procedurally legitimate?   
In the process of answering this primary research question, this thesis will also address 
the following secondary research questions. 
2) With which indicators of deliberative procedural legitimacy (if any), does the W3C 
process comply?   
3) To what extent does the deliberative quality of the discussions vary between 
different policy issues? If so, why?  
4) What lessons can be learned regarding best practice for the development of 
techno-policy standards?  
 To address these questions, I begin in chapter one by establishing the rationale 
and motivation for the thesis. Using Yochai Benkler’s (1999) layer model of the internet 
governance, I demonstrate how by virtue of their privileged position within the technical 
infrastructure of the web, standards can function as effective modalities of control. 
Drawing on literature from Science and Technology Studies (STS), I then argue that - in 
contrast to deterministic accounts of technological development - the regulatory role of 
standards should be interpreted not as the inevitable product of some objective  technical 
rationality, but rather as the outcome of intentional design; reflecting the interests and 
values of the proximate designers who create them (Bijker et al., 2012; Jasanoff, 2004; 
Winner, 1980). Together I argue, these two claims, draw our attention to the importance of 
standards bodies as key sights of political and economic contestation, and consequently 
10 
 
to questions regarding the openness and legitimacy of the processes through which 
standards are developed.  
In chapter two, I proceed to examine how the legitimacy of web standards consortia such 
as the W3C can be conceptualised. Highlighting the ways in which the development of 
techno-policy standards has necessitated increased scrutiny of development processes, I 
argue in favour of a normative approach to legitimacy which emphasises the need for 
standards bodies to exhibit both substantive and procedural legitimacy. In the second half 
of the chapter, I then propose deliberative democratic theory as a model of procedural 
legitimacy which is particularly well suited to describing the informal, meritocratic, 
collaborative, and deliberative processes of standards bodies – and highlight some of the 
parallels that previous scholars have drawn between deliberative theory and 
contemporary web standards development processes.  
In chapter three, I outline an original analytical framework for the assessment of the 
W3C’s development process inspired by deliberative democratic theory. Through a review 
of the existing literature on deliberative democratic theory, I identify several normative 
indicators of deliberative procedural legitimacy (inclusivity, transparency, deliberativeness, 
justification, respectfulness, and constructiveness), and demonstrate how each of these 
can be interpreted and operationalised in the context of standardisation (Cohen, 1989; 
Dryzek, 2012; Habermas, 1985). 
In chapter four, I draw upon existing empirical studies of the procedural legitimacy of 
deliberative fora, to demonstrate how the analytical framework outlined in chapter 3 can 
be an applied empirically to assess the procedural legitimacy of the W3C in the context of 
its development of the EME specification. I begin by justifying the choice of EME as the 
case study, before describing how data from the W3C mailing lists as well as other 
relevant information about the W3C process was selected, sampled and collated. Finally, I 
explain how an innovative form of content analysis was applied to the mailing list data in 
11 
 
order to measure the performance of the W3C in relation to each of the indicators 
specified in the analytical framework.  
In chapter five, I establish the context for the EME case study by providing a brief 
overview of the W3C’s origins, process and political culture. Specifically, I demonstrate 
how the consortium’s development of techno-policy standards has highlighted key 
tensions between competing interpretations of the W3C’s role as an institution of internet 
governance and raised concerns about its capacity and willingness to acknowledge and 
address the public policy implications of its standards. 
Finally, in chapter six I present the results of the empirical analysis of the W3C’s 
development of the EME specification, including an in-depth discussion of the EME 
development process as well as a summary of some of the research's key findings. In the 
chapter, it will be argued that although the W3C exhibited many of the institutional 
features needed to demonstrate procedural legitimacy, - including, for example, a 
discursively inclusive and transparent development process - concerns nonetheless 
remain regarding the consortium’s capacity and willingness to adequately consider the 
effects of its standards on policy issues, including most notably those related to user rights 
and content protection. Specifically, it will be shown how the framing of the W3C as a 
purely coordinative and technical organisation acted to marginalise principle and value-
based concerns regarding the social and political implications of the EME specification, 
thereby limiting the scope of the deliberations and thus the potential outcomes of the 
process. In addition, it will be demonstrated how in contrast to popular perceptions of the 
W3C as an active and influential advocate for digital rights and open web principles, the 
gradual domination of the W3C process by a narrow range of powerful incumbent 
commercial interests has limited the influence that the W3C can feasibly be expected to 
exert on standardisation processes.  
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Given these findings, the thesis concludes by raising concerns about the procedural 
legitimacy of the W3C and outlines several practical recommendations for how some of 




1. “Code is Law”: Standards as technologies of internet governance 
 
‘Standards are politics by other means’ 
Janet Abbate (2000, p.179) 
 In 1996, the founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) John Perry 
Barlow (1996) famously declared the ‘independence of cyberspace’. In a polemic widely 
distributed online, Barlow condemned what he perceived to be the growing interference of 
Western governments in internet affairs, claiming that those whom he poetically termed 
the ‘weary giants of flesh and steel’ lacked either the moral right or means to govern. 
Addressing the subjects of his diatribe directly, Barlow (1996) boldly proclaimed;   
‘I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask 
you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have 
no sovereignty where we gather… Governments derive their just powers from 
the consent of the governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. We 
did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world. 
Cyberspace does not lie within your borders.’  
While undoubtedly utopian, Barlow's comments were nonetheless reflective of a more 
widely-held view of the internet as a fundamentally emancipatory and anarchic space 
(Dyson, 1996; Rheingold, 2000).  Even to this day, the web is often portrayed as an 
intrinsically open domain of frictionless connectivity, whose global scope and 
decentralised structure make it naturally resistant to statutory regulation or hierarchical 
forms of control (Drissel, 2006). For Barlow and others, therefore, the underlying 
architecture of the web can be conceived of as a complex and adaptive system; ‘treat[ing] 
censorship like damage’ as John Gilmore put it, and ‘rout[ing] around it’ (as cited in Elmer-
Dewitt & Jackson, 1993, p.63).   
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Although it is often tempting to romanticise the web’s architecture as somehow inherently 
anarchic, such idealistic and reified accounts of the web often neglect the manifold ways 
in which it is governed. From the coordination of critical infrastructure to the monitoring 
and regulation of content, the practice of internet governance is today enacted by a 
bewildering and ever-growing array of public and private entities operating within a 
‘technologically concealed and institutionally complex ecosystem of governance’ 
(DeNardis, 2014, p. 1). 
Among the most important threads of this complex tapestry of governance, I argue, are 
the processes and institutions of technical standardisation that dictate the terms upon 
which information can be exchanged via the network. By providing a common set of rules 
with which developers can make their products interoperable, key standards such as 
HTTP, HTML and CSS have, since the web’s early development, allowed disparate 
elements to be combined into a cohesive yet flexible network capable of supporting and 
sustaining increasingly complex technical and social interactions (Jakobs, 1999; 
Updegrove, 2008). In addition to their essential technical coordinative role web standards 
have in recent years increasingly been interpreted as playing a highly regulative role, 
instantiating political and economic tensions and impinging upon a wide range of policy 
issues from counter-terrorism and privacy to copyright enforcement and free speech 
(DeNardis, 2009, 2011; Kahin & Abbate, 1995).  
But how can the policy-making role of standards be understood within the broader context 
of internet governance? How can the regulatory power of standards themselves be 
conceptualised? And what questions do such conceptualisations raise for the legitimacy of 
standardisation processes? 
In this chapter, I make two claims which together constitute the motivation for this thesis. 
Firstly, I argue that technical web standards can today be thought of as some of the most 
effective and important technologies of online regulation. Secondly, in contrast to 
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deterministic accounts of technological development, I claim that this regulatory role 
should be interpreted not as the inevitable product of technical rationality, but rather as 
reflective of the interests and values of the proximate designers who create them. 
Together I argue, these claims, draw our attention to the importance of standards bodies 
as key sights of political and economic contestation, and as such raise questions 
regarding the openness and legitimacy of the processes through which standards are 
developed.  
Beginning with a brief discussion of some of the various definitions of standards and 
standardisation processes, I argue that to comprehend the regulatory function of 
standardisation fully, we must first understand the role of web standards within the 
broader context of internet governance. Adopting Benkler’s (1999) layer model of internet 
governance, I then show how by virtue of their intermediary position within the technical 
architecture of the web, standards can exert a powerful influence over openness and 
freedom online. Following a brief discussion of some recent examples of standards which 
have impacted issues of public policy, I then proceed - through an overview of some 
existing theories of the politics of technology - to demonstrate how far from being 
politically neutral, standardisation is a highly contested process through which technical 
standards come to reflect the interests and intentions of their designers. I conclude by 
highlighting some of the normative questions that this raises for standards bodies. 
Standards and standardisation 
 Today standards and standardisation processes are becoming an increasingly 
important object of study in International Relations as scholars and researchers have 
begun to acknowledge the economic, social and political effects that standards can have 
on an increasingly interconnected and networked society. Despite this recognition, 
precisely what standards are, why they are produced, and what they achieve; are all 
questions to which the literature on standardisation has ironically failed to provide a 
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uniform answer. Definitions of standards range from the very general, for example 
‘standards are pieces of general advice offered to a large number of potential adopters’ 
(Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000, p. 2), to the specific, ’a [standard is] a document, 
established by consensus and approved by a recognised body, that provides, for common 
and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed 
at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context’ (De Vries, 2013, p. 
149) 
In part, this indeterminism within the literature on standardisation is a testament to the 
heterogeneity of the phenomenon itself. Web standards can be used to specify almost 
anything online from accessibility guidelines and processes, to file formats and browser 
plugins. They can be enforced by law or be voluntary, anticipatory or reactive, produced 
by institutions or by the marketplace (Jakobs, 2003; Updegrove, 2008). For the purposes 
of this thesis, we are exclusively concerned with standards produced by the World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C)1. Thus, to speak more precisely about the role of W3C standards 
as apparatuses of internet governance it is useful, to begin by making some important 
distinctions between different types of standards, including their purpose, mode of 
production, and effects. 
Firstly, when considering different kinds of standards, it is useful to acknowledge the 
various roles that standards can play. Although almost anything can be subject to 
standardisation, the purpose of standardisation will usually fall into one of three 
categories; performance, measurement, or compatibility (Russell, 2014). Performance 
standards specify certain ways of carrying out tasks with the intention of achieving a 
desired outcome or minimum level of quality. The international standard ISO 140001 for 
example, specifies a standard process for the implementation of an environmental 
management system with the aim of generating efficiencies and minimising carbon 
                                                          
1 In W3C parlance standards are referred to as “Recommendations”. A choice of phraseology that 
acknowledges the organisations own the lack of regulatory power to enforce its standards. For the 
purpose of this thesis the more widely used term “standard” will be used.   
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emissions (ISO, 2004). Measurement standards, on the other hand, specify quantifiable 
units of measurement such as kilograms, centimetres, or watts. In doing so, they make it 
possible to accurately compare the physical properties of objects or devices such as 
weight, length or power. Finally, compatibility standards specify interface procedures 
between discrete technical objects and are typically used to enable interoperability 
between disparate technical systems. Given that the existence of the web is itself 
predicated on the capacity of computers and other devices to interface seamlessly, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that most standards developed at the W3C are designed first and 
foremost to maximise compatibility (Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000; Jakobs, 2003; 
Updegrove, 2008).  
In addition to their purpose, standards can also be distinguished by the means of their 
production. Within the literature three types of standardisation processes are identified; de 
facto, de jure and voluntary-consensus (Russell, 2014). De facto standards are typically 
produced as a result of common usage or market dominance. Well-known examples of de 
facto standards include the PDF file format, the QWERTY keyboard, and the MP3 audio 
format, all of which monopolised their respective markets making their use effectively 
mandatory for producers and users alike (Ghosh, 2011). In contrast to de facto standards, 
so-called de jure standards are mandated and enforced by regulatory bodies operating at 
the local, national or international level and can often involve the use of legal sanction to 
punish non-compliance. Examples of existing de jure standards include various 
environmental regulations, which set limits for among other things levels of CO2 
emissions or the flammability of building materials. More recently standardisation scholars 
have also begun to use the term “voluntary-consensus” to describe a third category of 
standard, produced by informal standards bodies and industry consortia. “Consensus”, is 
here used to indicate that in contrast to de facto standards, voluntary-consensus 
standards are intentionally developed through a cooperative and collaborative process 
which, in theory at least, is inclusive of all relevant stakeholders. The term “voluntary” 
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meanwhile is used to denote the fact that unlike de jure standards, voluntary-consensus 
standards are not legally enforceable, and therefore rely on the economic self-interest of 
stakeholders for their adoption. In the case of W3C, the standards produced can most 
accurately be described as voluntary-consensus standards, since on the one hand, they 
are intentionally developed through a structured process but on the other are not enforced 
by the W3C (Jakobs, Procter, & Williams, 2001; Updegrove, 1995a, 1995b).  
Next, while standardisation is commonly understood as a reactive process of selecting 
one among many existing practices or specifications, standards may also be distinguished 
by the extent to which their development is undertaken prior to the widespread adoption of 
a technology or in anticipation of future market requirements or technical innovation. Such 
standards will typically involve substantial design elements, and therefore often require 
authors to make normative judgements about the capabilities and features that must be 
inherited by future systems (Umapathy, 2010; Werle & Iversen, 2006). Anticipatory 
standards, such as these can thus be more controversial than reactive standards since 
they require designers to make predictions and normative judgements about how a given 
technology should develop in the future. While the W3C may occasionally seek to 
standardise existing technologies, more often than not the work of the consortium involves 
the development of standards in response to an explicit set of requirements submitted by 
interested stakeholders. As a result, the majority of standards produced by the W3C can 
most accurately be described as being anticipatory.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, standards can also be differentiated by their 
effects, that is, the extent to which they regulate or merely coordinate the development of 
new technologies. As discussed above, standards have long been acknowledged to play 
an important coordinative role in the development of the internet, providing a common set 
of guidelines by which developers can make their products interoperable and so prevent 
the fragmentation or monopolisation of the network. As the web has grown in both size 
and scope, however, processes of standardisation have increasingly become entangled in 
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matters of public interest that extend far beyond those of mere technical coordination. As 
a result, standards are today increasingly interpreted as playing an important regulative 
role in internet governance, restricting or facilitating particular configurations and 
mediating tensions between order and disorder, freedom and control.  
While historically, the vast majority of W3C standards could be described as coordinative, 
in recent years, there has been an increased awareness of the manifold ways in which the 
work of the W3C is becoming enmeshed in public policy issues2.  Thus, though mostly 
opaque to end-users, the ways in which W3C standards are developed are today 
increasingly vital to the public interest, mediating civil liberties and impinging upon a wide 
range of policy issues from the protection of intellectual property rights and national 
security to the promotion of innovation and digital commerce (Doty & Mulligan, 2013; 
Russell, 2003; Umapathy, 2010). 
As I will argue below, this regulative role of standards raises some critical normative 
questions about the nature of standardisation processes. To address these questions, 
however, it is first necessary to place the role of standards within the broader context of 
internet governance. As such, in what follows, I utilise Yochai Benkler’s (1999) layer model 
of the internet to demonstrate how by virtue of their privileged position within the technical 
infrastructure of the web, standards can function as effective modalities of control. 
 
The layer model of internet governance 
 
 Today internet governance is an increasingly important and crowded field of 
political research. Despite its popularity, however, the lack of any kind of unitary oversight 
                                                          
2 In the late 1990s the W3C created a the “Technology and Society Domain” to explicitly consider 
matters related to the overlap between standards development and public policy as the domain’s 
mission statement reads: “Working at the intersection of Web technology and public policy, the 
Technology and Society Domain’s goal is to augment existing web infrastructure with building 
blocks that assist in addressing critical public policy issues affecting the web. Our expectation is not 
to solve policy problems entirely with technology, but we do believe that well-designed technical 




of the web combined with the sheer quantity and diversity of policy issues associated with 
internet governance, has meant that it has often been difficult for scholars and 
practitioners to agree on the meaning of the term, much less to demarcate it as a discrete 
field of inquiry. Attempts to adequately disaggregate the various practices of internet 
governance have filled volumes, and dozens of taxonomies exist for describing the 
complex relationships between different stakeholder groups (DeNardis, 2014; DeNardis & 
Raymond, 2013; Raymond & DeNardis, 2015).  
Amongst the most popular and useful of these frameworks is a conceptualisation of the 
web in terms of several ‘layers’ of governance organised in a vertical hierarchy (Benkler, 
1999; Berners-Lee, 2000; Lessig, 2002)3. Initially developed by Yochai Benkler (1999), the 
so-called ‘layer model’ of internet governance, rejects conceptualisations of web as a 
monolithic unity and instead suggests that the complex arrangements of institutions, 
technologies and practices should instead be interpreted as being comprised of three 
distinct layers of governance; the physical layer, the code layer, and the content layer. As 
Lawrence Lessig (2002, p. 23) describes; 
 
“At the bottom is a ‘physical’ layer, across which communication travels.  This 
is the computer, or wires, that link computers on the Internet.  In the middle is a 
‘logical’ or ‘code’ layer – the code that makes the hardware run.  Here we might 
include the protocols that define the Internet and the software upon which 
those protocols run.  At the top is a ‘content’ layer – the actual stuff that gets 
transmitted across the wires. Here we include digital images, texts, online 
movies and the like.”  
 
                                                          
3 Benkler’s layer model, builds upon Tim Berner-Lee’s (2000) earlier four-layer model of internet 
governance,  which was itself a simplified versions of the seven-layer open system interconnection 
reference model (OSI) commonly used in network architecture design (Zimmermann, 1980). A 
similar three-layer model has also since been used by Lawrence Lessig (2002). 
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For Benkler (1999), each of these layers constitutes a distinct domain of governance, 
intersecting with different kinds of policy issues, involving different stakeholder groups, 
and as such requiring different modes of governance.  
Governance of the physical layer - the vast network of cable, servers, routers and devices 
that comprise the core infrastructure of the web – is principally undertaken by the 
governments or telecommunication companies who own the infrastructure itself. 
Governance at this level will most commonly involve considerations related to the 
development, maintenance and security of the physical infrastructure, but may also 
involve attempts to limit or regulate physical access to the network (Benkler, 1999; Lessig, 
2002).  
Figure 1.1: Layer model of internet governance 
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 Above the physical layer, governance of the code layer4 – the complex 
arrangements of protocols and technical standards which facilitate the exchange of 
information across the network – is for the most part conducted by a wide array of private 
transnational multi-stakeholder institutions, including various standards development 
organisations such as the W3C and IETF (Rutkowski, 1995; Updegrove, 1995a; Weiser, 
2001). Most commonly governance of this layer relates to issues concerning the 
maintenance of technical interoperability and compatibility of technological products. Such 
work is vital to ensure that the network operates optimally and devices interface 
seamlessly. 
Finally, governance of the ‘content layer' – the images, audio, video and text transmitted 
online – has historically been enacted through the enforcement of well-established 
national and international laws, including those pertaining to copyright, the distribution of 
child pornography, defamation as well as any others deemed relevant to the types of 
content available online. Notably, this layer of governance has in recent years also 
increasingly been regulated by the policies and terms of use adopted by individual 
websites and platforms, many of whom, under pressure from regulators have taken a 
more proactive approach to the monitoring and moderation of their content5. Given that 
the object of governance at this layer is the content of the web itself, the range of policy 
issues affected by content layer regulation is as one might expect vast, including 
everything from freedom of expression, decency, piracy, censorship, defamation, 
competition, cyber-bully and online abuse to name just a few. Furthermore, given that the 
content layer is that with which users most directly and frequently interact, the 
mechanisms of governance enacted at this layer including, geo-blocking, terms of service, 
                                                          
4 Benkler (1999) uses the term ‘logical layer’ to describe the layer between the physical and the 
content layers. Here we have chosen to use the more commonly used term ‘code layer’ introduced 
by Lessig (2002).   
5 The sheer volume of web traffic currently being generated has meant that governments are 
increasingly unable to effectively monitor national networks, a fact, which in recent years has seen 
growing attempts by governments to delegate responsibility for identifying and reporting illegal 
content to internet platforms such as Google, Facebook and Twitter.  
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and privacy policies tend to be those with which the majority of users are most familiar 
(Benkler, 1999; Lessig, 2002). 
By establishing such demarcated divisions between these three distinct domains of 
internet governance, Benkler’s layer model, on the one hand, enables theorists to 
disaggregate the various activities and operations of internet governance as well as 
describe the distribution of roles and responsibilities among the web’s many stakeholders. 
On the other hand, by arranging these domains into a layered array, Benkler’s model also 
acts to demonstrate how the regulation of each layer is deeply connected. Specifically, by 
arranging these layers hierarchically, Benkler shows how it is possible to govern the 
internet vertically such that regulation introduced at one layer is effective in all layers 
above. Put another way, by highlighting the reliance of the content layer on the viability 
and functionality of the code and physical layers above it, Benkler demonstrates how 
despite their apparent mundanity, these layers can operate as effective mechanisms of 
content control (Benkler, 1999). Thus, in addition to providing a useful taxonomy of the 
various aspects of internet governance, the layer model also highlights the way in which 
material infrastructures can operate as powerful regulatory modalities, restricting or 
facilitating particular configurations and mediating liberty and freedom online6 (DeNardis, 
2011; Morris, J. & Davidson, 2003).  
Until recently, the best-known examples of layer-crossing regulation have occurred at the 
physical layer. Most notably in Burma and China, where tight regulation of access points 
and cross-border servers respectively have been used to restrict access to online content 
(Solum & Chung, 2003). In recent years, however, there has been a growing recognition 
                                                          
6 In part this emphasis on the importance of material infrastructure can be viewed within the context 
of a broader ‘material turn’ within the field of Politics and IR, which seeks to investigate the 
mediating and constitutive role of artefacts in the creation and shaping of networks, tracing the 
complex ecologies of human and non-human relations inherent within social phenomena (Aradau, 
2010; Coward, 2012). Such approaches argue Bowker and Starr (1996, p. 197), ‘necessitate an 
inversion of our common sense notion of infrastructure… taking what have often been seen as 
behind the scenes, boring, background processes to the real work of politics and knowledge 
production and bringing their contribution to the foreground’. 
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of how the code layer also regulates. As with governance of the physical layer, 
interventions at the code layer are effective vertically, meaning that control over standards 
and protocols can be used to exert influence over a wide range of policy issues usually 
associated with the governance of the content layer, including; freedom of expression, 
access to knowledge and privacy. Unlike regulation enacted at the physical layer, which 
may vary by jurisdiction, the inherently universal nature of technical standards and 
protocols mean that measures enacted at the code layer can often have effects that scale 
globally.  
This notion of code as a regulatory modality was famously captured by Lawrence Lessig 
(2009) in his much-quoted maxim ‘code is law’. For Lessig, code is the architecture of the 
digital. In much the same way that architecture can facilitate or constrain our actions in the 
material world, the ways in which code is written can dramatically influence the freedoms 
and choices we have in cyberspace. As Lessig (2000, p. 4) himself described: 
 ‘This code, or architecture, sets the terms on which life in cyberspace is 
experienced. It determines how easy it is to protect privacy, or how easy it is to 
censor speech. It determines whether access to information is general or 
whether information is zoned. It affects who sees what, or what is monitored. In 
a host of ways that one cannot begin to see unless one begins to understand 
the nature of this code, the code of cyberspace regulates’. 
Within the literature on standardisation, discussions concerning the regulatory effects of 
standards, have until recently been primarily confined to questions regarding the potential 
effects of a standard’s openness on issues such as innovation, interoperability and 
competition. It is commonly observed, for example, that standards which are openly 
published and which can be freely implemented are more likely to generate greater levels 
of innovation and competitive markets for technologies since companies and 
entrepreneurs can develop products based on those standards without fear of infringing 
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patents. Conversely, it is argued that standards which are not published freely or which 
are encumbered with intellectual property restrictions may create barriers to innovation as 
well as trade in global markets (DeNardis, 2011).  
 
Although the effects of standards on innovation and marketplace competition are 
undoubtedly significant, as the web has become ever more enmeshed in the everyday 
lives of users there has been a growing recognition of the ways in which standards also 
impact a wider range of policy issues such as safeguarding and privacy. The W3C’s 
Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) standard for example, was developed to 
enable parents and guardians to control what content their children access online by 
allowing the authors of web pages to self-label the age appropriateness of their content. 
At the time of its development, the standard was seen by many as a direct response to the 
passage of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) by the U.S. Congress as well as 
broader public and regulator concerns about the lack of parental controls online. In a more 
recent example, the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P), which enables 
websites to specify the intended uses of information they collect about web browser users, 
was developed by the W3C amid growing concerns about the abuse of personal data by 
advertisers.  
Together these examples, are demonstrative of a growing trend of what Nick Doty and 
Deirdre Mulligan (2013) term ‘techno-policy standards’ – that is, standards which as a 
consequence of their design and implementation, display substantive public policy 
implications. While historically only a small minority of the multitude of standards produced 
annually can be said to exert a significant impact on public policy, the recent growth of the 
web as a social and political space means that the potential policy implications of ‘techno-
policy standards’ are only likely to increase.  
While techno-policy standards offer an efficient and effective means of achieving specific 
public policy objectives without the need for intrusive government regulation, theorists 
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note how the pursuit of policy goals by technical means also raises a number of significant 
concerns regarding the legitimacy of the technical bodies that preside over their 
development (Werle and Iversen, 2006).   
 
Firstly, unlike traditional nation-state policy-making processes, which typically receive an 
extensive public hearing, the technical and esoteric nature of these forms of technological 
enforcement place development processes beyond the comprehension of most casual 
users and so necessarily preclude them from broader participation or scrutiny. As Susan 
Struble put it, “Standards are invisible, they are shadow policymaking, shadow 
governance” (as cited in Ermert, 2007). Indeed, while Benkler himself acknowledges that 
the nation-state continues to play an important role in many aspects of internet 
governance including, for example; the enactment of privacy laws, regulation of anti-trust 
and enforcement of statutes related to information policy, contrary to the concerns of 
Barlow’s and his contemporaries, national governments are nevertheless viewed by many 
scholars as increasingly peripheral to the day-to-day governance of the web (Benkler, 
1999). Instead, control over almost all aspects of technical governance from the 
maintenance of critical internet resources such as the DNS to the development of web 
standards is today mostly handled by networks of private companies and other non-state 
entities. These transnational institutions of private ordering operate beyond the 
parameters of traditional nation-state bureaucracy. As such, they are not accountable to 
an electorate, nor bound by the same commitments to democratic standards of openness 
or transparency as national policy-makers7.   
Secondly, unlike other forms of policy-making, whose legislative outputs may be reformed 
or nullified as new evidence comes to light, scholars observe how technological measures 
                                                          
7 Their positioning at the nexus of technology and policy means that informal standards bodies 
such as the W3C can appropriately be conceptualised as what David Guston (2001) described as 




often exhibit a certain obduracy, imposing through their material intransigence, the 
discrimination of their design for generations or as Bruno Latour put it, ‘technology is 
society made durable’ (Latour, 1990). In the case of standardisation, in particular, 
commentators note how technical standards can have a naturally conservative 
momentum, such that once they are implemented, they can be difficult to dislodge. As 
Bowker and Starr (1996, p. 197) observed, ‘there is no natural law that the best 
(technically superior) standard shall win - the QWERTY keyboard, lotus 123, DOS and 
VHS are often cited in this context. Standards have significant inertia and can be very 
difficult to change’.  
 
Taking each of these points into consideration, in recent years scholars have begun to 
raise questions regarding the legitimacy and openness of standards development 
processes as well as the fidelity of techno-policy standards to the public interest (Morris, 
2011; Haplin, 2013). How these normative questions should be addressed, however, will 
depend primarily upon how the power of standards is conceptualised. Although, the 
political and economic importance of standards has been widely acknowledged, within the 
literature most accounts of standardisation nonetheless remain mostly agnostic on the 
question of how politics becomes embedded within standards themselves; often treating 
their regulatory effects as the inevitable product of technical efficiency (Harbers, 2005; 
Wyatt, 2008). To address the normative questions raised by techno-policy standards, 
therefore, it is first necessary to develop a more nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between technology and society. Developing such an understanding will, I 
argue, help us to comprehend the political agency of standards better, and thus help to 
inform our discussion of the procedural quality and legitimacy of standards development 
processes.  
In what follows I examine some of the various ways in which the relationship between 
technology and society has been conceptualised. Drawing on literature from the field of 
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Science and Technology Studies (STS), I reject both social and technological determinist 
accounts of technological development and instead argue for an understanding of 
technical artefacts as being co-produced. In doing so, I argue studies of the legitimacy of 
standards bodies should focus on the role of proximate designers during the design phase 
of standardisation. 
Do standards have politics?  
 The notion that ‘code is law' has been widely accepted within the field of internet 
studies (Lessig, 2009). However, this recognition, how the power of code can be 
conceptualised remains an open question and has been largely underexplored within the 
literature. All too often standards and protocols are treated as the straightforward 
application of scientific rationality to technical problems. As such they are often interpreted 
as developing in-line with an objective logic of technical efficiency irrespective of their 
social or political context. In part, of course, this form of essentialism is not unique to the 
field of standardisation, but is, in fact, reflective of a much broader trend of technological 
determinism that has dominated public and academic perceptions of technological 
development and ICT more generally for most of the past century (Ellul, Wilkinson, & 
Merton, 1964).  
By treating technology as a ‘black-box’- that is, as an independent variable that can be 
used to explain social or political phenomena, but which is itself taken for granted or 
exempted from further analysis - such accounts of technological development are usually 
divorced from studies of how and why particular technologies are created. Furthermore, 
by linking the pace of technological developments to the relative progress of scientific 
knowledge, such vague instrumentalist and determinist theories of technology only 
succeed in presenting us with a narrow ontological slice of the technological design 
process, and as such, prevent us from analysing the historical and political situatedness of 
technologies or the controversies surrounding their design and implementation. As 
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Langdon Winner (1986, p. 21) jested, ‘those who have not recognised the ways in which 
technologies are shaped by social and economic forces have not gotten very far’.  
In order to develop a response to the normative questions raised by the development of 
techno-policy standards, here it is argued that accounts of standards and standardisations 
cannot simply stop with the realisation that code has political consequences, but must 
also seek to unveil the political and social tensions and contingencies hidden beneath the 
apparent objectivity of their design. As Janet Abbate (1994, p. 10) observed, 
‘network design decisions have never been purely technical or purely social. 
System builders choose techniques on the basis of their perceptions of 
technical and economic constraints, as well as their own tacit or explicit social 
goals. Understanding the history behind the networks we use today can help 
us evaluate and participate in the choices that must be made in building 
networks for the future’. 
Emerging partly in response to technological determinist approaches to technology, 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) has over the past 40 years developed into a fertile 
field of study, seeking to better explain the powerful role of technology in society through 
the careful examination of the processes innovation and design. Initially emerging out of 
the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), STS sought to draw attention to the role of 
social experience and practice in the development of ‘objective science’, through the study 
of the ‘social world’ of scientists in laboratories (Jasanoff, 2004b; Latour, 2005; Pinch & 
Bijker, 1984). The 1970s saw the expansion of the field to include the analysis of social 
aspects of technological innovation and development, since which time, STS has 
continued to develop strategies to investigate the social and cultural processes that shape 
the design, production and implementation of technology (Bijker & Law, 1992; Hughes, 
1994; Pinch & Bijker, 1984; Winner, 1978).  
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Taking as their point of departure a rejection of the essentialist ontology of deterministic 
accounts of technology, STS adopts a broadly constructivist ontology interpreting 
technology as embodying and internalising the values and norms of the social and political 
context of its creation. In doing so, STS theorists seek to move beyond the claims of 
objectivity and universality offered by traditional philosophers of technology, to an 
understanding of technology as a complex historically and culturally situated process8.  
Having formulated this as their point of departure, another series of important questions 
present themselves. For example, if technological artefacts can be said to be reflective of 
the interests, norms and ideologically commitments of their designers, then who can be 
said to be involved in the design process? At what level (micro, meso, or macro) are these 
‘inscriptions’ made and to what extent are they ‘interpretively flexible’?  Modern 
standardisation processes, typically take place over an extended period, involving a broad 
range of actors operating at different levels and phases of development, from the initial 
design and development of the standard through to its implementation and use. 
Developing a conceptual understanding of how technical standards come to be political, 
therefore, is crucial to determining the stage at which any analysis of processes of 
standardisation should focus. 
A review of existing STS literature on technological design, reveals a broad range of 
perspectives on the politics of technology, from those who view proximate designers as 
the principal arbiters of the design process; to those who emphasise the role of 
negotiations between ‘relevant social groups’ and those who see design as a function of 
broader cultural and historical factors (Bijker et al., 2012). While all approaches share a 
                                                          
8 Although some branches of STS have in the past strayed dangerously close to what might be 
called social determinism, most maintain an understanding of society and technology as being ‘co-
produced'. From this perspective technology both ‘embeds and is embedded in social practice, 
identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments, and institutions – in short, all the building 
blocks of what we term the social’(Jasanoff, 2004a, p. 3). By taking this approach, theorists are 
able to avoid the extremes of both technological and social determinism, recognising the ways in 




constructivist ontology, they nevertheless differ in the temporal frame and granularity of 
their analysis, and as such offer slightly different answers to the normative questions 
raised by the development of techno-policy standards.  
 
Firstly, the Social Construction of Technology perspective (SCOT) takes a broad view of 
the politics of technology, emphasising the fluid and transient nature of technical artefacts 
as well as the importance of social context and interpretation. Much influenced by the 
‘Strong Programme’ of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Bloor, 1981; MacKenzie, 
1981), the SCOT perspective, became popularised in the 1980s, and  today remains the 
most popular and well-known approaches to the politics of technology within STS (Bijker, 
1997; Pinch & Bijker, 1984).  
For many SCOT theorists, the micro-level focus of the intentionalist perspective on the 
individual interests of proximate designers neglects how, despite their material 
intransigence and intentional design, the social implications of technologies are often 
dependent upon their adoption and use within a specific social and cultural context. For 
them, neither the symbolic meaning nor the practical application of an artefact is ever 
fixed but is rather continually reinterpreted and renegotiated by competing social groups. 
Thus, like the sociology of science - which through its exploration of the social world of 
laboratories drew attention to the role of culture in the production of “objective” science – 
SCOT theorists seek to unpack the so-called 'black boxes' of technological systems 
(Bijker et al., 2012; Pinch & Bijker, 1984).  
By studying ‘relevant social groups’ – actors involved in the design and use of 
technologies, often embodying specific interpretations of those artefacts – SCOT scholars 
aim to demonstrate how the perceived symbolic meanings and applications of 
technologies are dependent, as much on the social context into which they are 
embedded, as the narrow interests of proximate designers or the intrinsic materiality of the 
technology itself. For SCOT, in spite of their purposeful design and material longevity, the 
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set of cultural meanings associated with technologies in the early stages of their 
development are in a state of continuous flux as political, social and economic conditions 
change and as the technology is interpreted differently by diverse audiences or what 
SCOT theorists call, ‘interpretive flexibility’ (Bijker et al., 2012; Bijker & Law, 1992; Pinch & 
Bijker, 1984)9. According to the SCOT perspective, the design process does not cease 
because the artefact achieves some ‘objective' standard; instead, technologies become 
stabilised through the resolution of controversies between competing social groups. This 
process of ‘closure' gradually diminishes the interpretive flexibility of the technology in 
question, solidifying it in its final form (Bijker et al., 2012). 
Since its popularisation in the 1980s, many theorists have sought to augment and extend 
the insights offered by SCOT. The most notable of these has been Andrew Feenberg 
(1991; 2000), whose synthesis of SCOT with critical theory emphasised the role of 
broader cultural values and practices rather than relevant social groups in the shaping and 
adoption of new technologies. As Feenberg himself put it, ‘our focus is less on specific 
social groups or the strategies they employ, and more on what cultural resources (i.e., 
values and practices) were brought into play in the design of a specific technology’ (Feng 
& Feenberg, 2008, p. 111). 
Together these macro approaches to the politics of technology, attempt to draw attention 
away from the micro-practices of technological development to a much broader 
perspective that examines the contrasting ways in which technologies are interpreted and 
given meaning within a particular socio-cultural context. In adopting such an approach, 
researchers seek to look beyond the initial design phase to examine the ways in which 
                                                          
9 These ideas were illustrated in Bijiker’s classic example of the development of the modern 
bicycle. Bijiker shows how during the early stages of its development, a number of different designs 
competed for the public’s acceptance, each representing a different interpretation of the 
possibilities that the bicycle offered; from an exciting new sport to a vehicle for “proper” ladies. 
These users formed ‘relevant social groups’, each of whom had their own understanding of how a 
bicycle should be used and the nature of the problems to be solved (Bijker, 1997). Bijiker then 
demonstrates how these interpretations informed the further development and refinement of the 
bicycle's design, ultimately leading towards the creation of the bicycle we know today. 
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technologies are implemented and used. In particular, they seek to demonstrate how 
despite the intentions of designers, the politics and effects of a given technology may vary 
within different contexts.    
Such accounts of the relationship between society and technology have been incredibly 
influential within the field of STS and undoubtedly have much to tell us about the politics of 
technology. However, for the purposes of studying processes of standardisation the utility 
of such macro approaches is less clear since standards are by their very nature resistant 
to contextual interpretation. Indeed, although every phase of standardisation, from design, 
through to implementation, and use, is in some way relevant to the overall public interest 
implications of a given standard, standardisation scholars note that standards often exhibit 
a ‘conservative momentum’ such that, once created the effects of a standard can be 
difficult to change. John Morris (2011, p. 9) for example, observes how web standards can 
typically take anywhere between 18 and 36 months (or longer) to reach maturity, by which 
point ‘legislative or regulatory fiat cannot inject into a service or product technical 
capabilities that were not designed in the first place, and can often at best only restart a 
lengthy standards design process’. Using the terminology of STS, therefore, standards are 
by their very nature ‘interpretively inflexible’, that is they are prescriptive and reach a high 
level of closure before the implementation or use phase of their development. For Morris 
and others, therefore, any attempt to inject public interest into the standards must be 
made at an early stage, since, as Morris (2011, p. 9) notes, ‘in many cases, post-design 
regulation is powerless to put a harmful technological genie back in the bottle’. 
Given their inherently immutable nature, a more accurate interpretation of the power 
standards may be found in an alternative account of the politics of technology, sometimes 
referred to as the ‘intentionalist’ perspective.  In contrast to SCOT and other macro 
approaches, intentionalist scholars emphasise the role of proximate designers or “system 
builders”, that is, those individuals or organisations directly involved in the design and 
development of a given technology at the initial design phase (Feenberg, 1991; Harbers, 
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2005; Hughes, 1994). While acknowledging that design decisions may be constrained by 
economic or technical factors, intentionalists ascribe strong intentionality to designers 
themselves, insisting that the social effects of technical artefacts will to a greater or lesser 
extent reflect the intentions of those most closely involved with their development (Winner, 
1980).  
This perspective on the politics of technology was perhaps most famously illustrated by 
Langdon Winner’s (1980) example of city planner Robert Moses’ plan to construct 
overpasses connecting New York and Long Island. Winner recalls how the initial design of 
the overpasses led to them being constructed too low to permit public buses to pass 
beneath them. In doing so, the design of the underpasses acted to effectively prevent 
poor working class families from accessing the beaches of Long Island, and so had the 
effect of reinforcing existing social inequalities in the city, an outcome which for Winner, 
was consistent with the racial prejudice and elitist intentions of Moses.    
Considering the importance intentionalists ascribe to the role of proximate designers, such 
a perspective inevitably leads researchers to carefully examine the design phase of a 
given technology’s development. As Winner put it, any critical examination of 
technological design processes using an intentionalist perspective requires ‘a rigorously 
critical perspective and normative commitments that enable analysts to identify not only 
social processes that negotiate and shape technology, but also first, which technological 
choices are actually made and implemented, and second how members of democratic 
societies can participate and intervene in those choices’ (cited in Lievrouw, 2014, p. 28).   
Given the importance of the design phase of standardisation, the focus of the intentionalist 
approach on the role of proximate designers makes it particularly useful for 
conceptualising the power of technical standards. As such, while not dismissing the 
importance of competing socio-cultural interpretations of standards at the implementation 
or use phases, this thesis will adopt an intentionalist perspective to technological 
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development, which seeks to analyse the practices and processes through which 
standards are developed and designed.  
Such an approach will on the one hand, of course, involve engagement with a range of 
descriptive questions including, for example, who are the designers? What are their 
interests or intentions? How are these expressed within the process? At the same time, 
however, in attempting to unpack the ‘black-box’ of standards development, this research 
will also seek to address the inevitable range of normative questions which follow from 
such an analysis, including for example, to what extent are the views of all relevant 
stakeholders included as part of the process? Does the process achieve consensus? To 
what extent is the outcome consistent with the values of those affected?  
Conclusion 
 Lawrence Lessig (2000, p. 1) once observed that; 
 
 ‘Our choice is not between "regulation" and "no regulation." The code 
regulates. It implements values, or not. It enables freedoms, or disables them. 
It protects privacy, or promotes monitoring. People choose how the code does 
these things. People write the code. Thus the choice is not whether people will 
decide how cyberspace regulates. People--coders--will. The only choice is 
whether we collectively will have a role in their choice--and thus in determining 
how these values regulate--or whether collectively we will allow the coders to 
select our values for us’.  
 
In taking as its premise the dual claim that standards are political and that this politics is 
reflective of the values and intentions of their proximate designers, this thesis seeks not 
only to describe the technical and political processes through which the W3C develops 
techno-policy standards but also assess the extent to which those processes can be said 
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to be legitimate and appropriate for the arbitration of public policy disputes. 
If as a consequence of their highly contested and political nature, standards bodies are in 
need of legitimation, however, then this raises the question of how this legitimacy be 
conceptualised in the context of standardisation? What sorts of institutional arrangement 
could be considered appropriate for the development of techno-policy standards and what 
sorts of metrics could be used to assess this? These are the questions that I will address 




2. “Rough consensus and running code”: Conceptualising the legitimacy of 
web standards consortia  
 
‘We reject: kings, presidents and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running 
code’. 
David D. Clark (1992)  
 For much of the past century, the legitimacy of technical standards bodies - to the 
extent that they have been considered to require legitimacy at all – has most commonly 
been interpreted in terms of the technical quality of their substantive technical outputs. 
However, as awareness of the political effects of standardisation has increased, 
expectations regarding the forms of legitimacy that standards bodies are expected to 
enact have begun to change. While historically, the pursuit of narrow technical objectives 
such as interoperability has been uncontroversial, the pursuit of policy objectives such as 
privacy, security or user rights through the development of techno-policy standards has 
proved to be far more contested. In the absence of consensus on the values that should 
be reflected in standards, scholars observe how standards bodies must today not only 
demonstrate legitimacy in terms of the quality of their technical outputs but also in terms of 
the rigour, openness and transparency of their procedures (Fuchs et al., 2011).  
Over the past two decades, the development processes of consortia-based standards 
organisations have been characterised by a so-called ‘rough consensus and running 
code’ approach to standardisation, which emphasises the importance of informal 
discussions and meritocratic decision-making practices. For some, these deliberative and 
consensus-led processes have come to be regarded as exemplars of effective self-
governance and legitimate multi-stakeholderism in practice (Froomkin, 2003; Russell, 
2003, 2006). For critics, however, questions remain regarding the inclusivity of standards 
development processes as well as the willingness and capacity of technocratic 
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organisations to adequately consider the public policy implications of their work (Halpin, 
2013; Malcolm, 2013; Morris, 2011).  
Despite growing academic interest in practices of standardisation, the legitimacy of 
standards consortia remains under-theorised. To address this gap in the literature, this 
chapter examines how the legitimacy of the ‘rough consensus and running code’ 
approach to standardisation adopted by informal web standards consortia, such as the 
W3C, may be best conceptualised using existing theories of transnational legitimacy.  
I begin the first section of the chapter, by distinguishing between the informal, deliberative 
and consensus-driven processes of the standards consortia – which will form the subject 
of this study - and the more formalised processes of ‘official’ standards development 
organisations (SDO). Following a brief review of major theoretical approaches to 
transnational legitimacy, I present the case for a normative approach to assessing the 
legitimacy of web standards consortia, which emphasises the need for standards bodies 
to demonstrate both substantive legitimacy (output) and procedural legitimacy 
(input/throughput). Given the highly decentralised and transnational nature of web 
standards development, I note how standards consortia such as the W3C tend to be 
resistant to analysis using conventional aggregative theories of procedural legitimacy. As 
such, in order to adequately analyse the procedural legitimacy of web standards 
consortia, I argue in favour of an analytical approach inspired by deliberative democratic 
theory, whose sensitivity to the legitimising potential of informal deliberative practices, 
makes it uniquely well-suited to conceptualising the legitimation claims of contemporary 
web standards bodies.  
In the second half of the chapter, I highlight some of the parallels that previous studies 
have drawn between web standardisation and deliberative theory. While I am sympathetic 
to the views of those commentators who have heralded standards consortia as exemplars 
of deliberative democratic governance in practice (Froomkin, 2003), I begin the final 
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section of the chapter by highlighting a number of concerns raised by scholars who have 
questioned the extent to which standard consortia can realistically be expected to satisfy 
the high normative standards prescribed by deliberative theory (Morris 2011; Malcolm, 
2013). In particular, I observe how concerns regarding the inclusivity of standards 
processes as well as the willingness and capacity of standards bodies to address issues 
of public policy, have led some commentators to criticise the legitimacy of consortia-based 
standardisations and their role of standards bodies in the development of techno-policy 
standards. In order to examine the validity of these critiques empirically, I conclude by 
arguing for the need to develop an analytical framework which is capable of assessing the 
procedural legitimacy of the W3C from a deliberative perspective.  
Standards Development Organisations and Standards Consortia 
  Today web standards are developed in a largely piecemeal fashion by a 
bewildering array of technical bodies which together comprise the modern web standards 
ecosystem (Hawkins, 1999). Although this panoply of organisations plays a crucial 
technical role in the practice of internet governance, currently no singular formal definition 
of a web standards development organisation exists, and in practice, the term covers a 
broad range of institutional arrangements. Some standards organisations, for example, 
focus predominantly on the development of technical specifications, while others 
concentrate on improving the usability and interoperability of existing standards. Some 
aim to formalise existing practices or promote the adoption of specific technologies, while 
others focus more on education and training. Equally, while the processes of some 
standards bodies are open to the public, others may choose to operate behind closed 
doors, and while many standards organisations actively encourage grassroots 
participation, others require members to pay membership fees in order to participate 
(Hawkins,1999). 
Despite the diversity of approaches to standards development, the literature on 
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standardisation usually distinguishes between two main types of international standards 
organisation; official standards development organisations (SDOs), whose work is often 
formally recognised and supported by national governments, and informal standards 
organisations or ‘standards consortia’ - informal alliances of firms, organisations, and 
individuals, financed by membership fees. Although SDO’s and consortia share the 
objective of coordinating technological development with emerging market demands, 
these competing models of standardisation are nevertheless commonly seen to represent 
two irreconcilable political cultures of standards development, reflecting, as Drake (1993, 
p. 643)  put it, radically divergent ‘visions of how international standardisation processes 
and network development should be organised and controlled’1.    
As ‘official’ standards development organisations, the work of bodies such as the 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), and the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) is sanctioned and 
supported by national governments. As a result, SDOs are commonly characterised by 
highly ridged and democratic procedures, designed to reflect prevailing liberal democratic 
notions of legitimacy and satisfy national stakeholder demands for openness, equitable 
representation and due process (Bunduchi, Williams and Graham, 2004; David and 
Shurmer, 1996; Iversen, Vedel and Werle, 2004). David and Shurmer (1996), for example, 
note how, official SDOs share a number of common rules and characteristics intended to 
ensure that standardisation serves the ‘public interest’, including free and equal access to 
discussions, public circulation of draft recommendations for wider comment, requirements 
for non-exclusive licensing of proprietary technology at reasonable fees, and restrictions 
                                                             
1 While this thesis maintains that there are crucial procedural differences between formal SDOs 
and informal standards consortia, it is nevertheless important to note that the rise of the private 
consortia during the last decades has led to a number of SDO’s to reform their procedures in 
attempt to adjust to the new market conditions in which they operate (David & Shurmer, 1996). 
According to Bunduchi (2004, p. 5) such reforms include, ‘procedural changes, for example, the 
streamlining and strengthening of support functions, the development of new modes of inter-
organisational coordination and cooperation such as arrangements between SDOs and private 
consortia, and the introduction of new mechanisms for conflict resolution’.  
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on the use of monetary payments to secure consensus.  
Iversen, Vedel and Werle (2004) meanwhile, observe how most international SDOs follow 
a very simple principle of territorial representation 2 , with participation in technical 
committees carefully managed in order to ensure a balanced representation of relevant 
stakeholders, including members of national and regional standards bodies as well as 
representatives of national governments, who act primarily in the interests of their own 
national telecommunications and computing companies. The management of the process 
in this way means that SDOs have often been compared to liberal democratic institutions, 
with standards usually allowed to progress along the standards track only after several 
stages of formalised voting procedures (Iversen, Vedel, & Werle, 2004; Jakobs, 2003; 
Werle & Iversen, 2006). Thus, as Kai Jakobs (2005, p. 95) put it, ‘the procedures of the 
formal standards bodies embed democratic values and reflect the desirability of a 
technically and politically neutral standards process’.  
Importantly, however, the same rules and procedures which help to ensure that the 
standards produced within ‘official’ channels are internationally recognised as legitimate 
also mean that SDOs are typically bureaucratic and so often fail to respond quickly to 
market developments. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, the limitations of formalised 
SDO processes have become increasingly apparent, as the accelerating pace of 
innovation within the ICT sector has rapidly increased the demand for new standards 
(Blind, Gauch and Hawkins, 2010; Updegrove, 2008). Within this context, many vendors 
have grown increasingly disillusioned with the arcane and ritualised processes of 
traditional SDOs, leading a substantial number of firms in the telecommunication, 
consumer electronics and media industries to pursue their standards work outside of 
traditional standards regimes (Updegrove, 2008). As a result, the web standards 
ecosystem has over the past 20 years witnessed a rapid proliferation of informal 
                                                             
2 Voting within formal SDO’s is commonly organised around the principle of ‘one-nation, one-vote’ 
or other nation-based weighted voting decision rules (Iversen, Vedel & Werle, 2004). 
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standards consortia which, for many vendors, offer more commercially orientated 
solutions to standardisation3.  
In contrast to ‘official’ standards, the technical specifications produced by consortia and 
other informal standards organisations, generally lack any formal or regulatory status. As 
a result, consortia themselves are typically subject to far less scrutiny than their SDO 
counterparts and are thus more willing to adopt flexible and pragmatic approaches to 
standards development (Cargill 2002; Hawkins, 1999; Russell, 2014; Updegrove, 1995a). 
Firstly, Hawkins (1999) observes, how unlike the restrictive system of balanced territorial 
representation adopted by formal SDOs, the memberships of most consortia are typically 
comprised of comparatively small groups of like-minded stakeholders, who coordinate and 
cooperate voluntarily in order to achieve common technological objectives. Since 
participation is voluntary, membership of an organisation typically implies agreement with 
its technical or strategic objectives. As a result, the range of actors involved in consortia-
based standards development tends to be much smaller and more homogenous than 
formal SDO's, limiting the array of technical and commercial interests involved and 
thereby enabling agreement regarding technical specifications to be reached more quickly 
and efficiently (Cargill, 2002; Hawkins 1999).   
Secondly, Domanski (2015) notes how in contrast to the ridged and democratic 
procedures of formal standards bodies, most consortia - including most notably the IETF 
and W3C – tend to be characterised by what Clarke (1992) termed a “rough consensus 
and running code” approach to standards development, which privileges informal 
deliberation and rigorous testing over bureaucratic voting procedures.  
                                                             
3 Between 1986 and the year 2000, the number of significant ICT consortia rose from a mere 
handful to around one hundred. While individual consortia may merge or dissolve as technology 
and the marketplace evolves, at the time of writing there remain at least 20 consortia that can still 
be considered as exerting significant influence over the development of ICT products and services 
internationally (Hawkins, 1999). Examples of some of the most importance and influential web 
standards consortia include; OMG, IETF and the W3C.  
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From a pragmatic perspective, this flexible approach to standardisation allows engineers 
to progress specifications along the standards track more quickly and efficiently, with 
working group chairs often empowered to judge when deliberations have yielded 
adequate levels of ‘rough consensus’ without the need to refer to a centralised authority or 
abide by a bureaucratic approval process (Moody, 1997). Conscious of a desire not to 
unnecessarily slow the process of the standardisation through the kinds of protracted and 
ponderous democratic procedures that so often hamper formal standards bodies; 
consortia usually interpret ‘rough consensus’ as having been achieved in circumstances 
where a proposal has demonstrated broad support from the community, without 
necessarily achieving unanimous approval (Crocker, 1993).  By taking this approach, 
Chairs seek to ensure that while proposals are subject to appropriate levels of discussion 
and scrutiny; otherwise widely supported specifications are not unduly delayed by the 
intransigence or objections of a small minority of participants. 
As a consequence of these procedural efficiencies, Russell (2014) observes how since 
the early 1990s, consortia with their ‘affinity for late-night bar meetings [and] informal 
hallway conversations' have succeeded in inverting ‘the stiff diplomacy and representative 
democracy embodied in the formal procedures of venerable national and international 
bodies', offering instead a pragmatic approach to standardisation more well attuned to the 
needs of commercial actors and the realities of an ever-changing technological 
marketplace (Abbate, 2010; Kiesler, 2014; Russell, 2006). As a result, consortia have over 
the past two decades consistently outperformed their SDO rivals, and are today firmly 
established as the preferred means of standards development for most web technology 
vendors (Egyedi, 2003; Hawkins, 1999; Pohlmann, 2013).  
In addition to establishing the predominance of consortia as the preferred means of web 
standardisation, the apparent triumph of ‘rough consensus and running code’, has also 
had the effect of generating sustained interest in consortia-based standardisation as a 
model of effective multi-stakeholder governance. In his influential book Code, Lawrence 
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Lessig (2009, p. 4) described Clarke’s mantra of ‘rough consensus and running code’ as 
‘a manifesto that will define our generation’. Others meanwhile have been eager to 
present the IETF, W3C and other informal standards bodies as paragons of legitimate 
internet self-regulation, with some scholars, even heralding them as contemporary 
examples of deliberative democratic governance in practice (Berners-Lee, 2000; 
Carpenter, 1996; Froomkin, 2003; Lehr, 1995).  
For critics, however, the rise of consortia-based standardisation raises a number of 
serious concerns regarding the legitimacy of techno-policy standards. Schoechle, (2003) 
for example, observes how the restrictive membership requirements of some standards 
consortia, often act to exclude civil society groups who cannot afford membership fees 
leading to standards processes which are typically less inclusive and transparent than 
those of more formal standards bodies. Halpin (2013) meanwhile argues that pressure on 
consortia to pursue commercial objectives undermines their willingness to acknowledge or 
engage with the public policy implications of their work. Finally, scholars such as Davidson 
et al., (2002) question the current procedural capacity of technocratic bodies such as 
standards consortia to host the kinds of broad-ranging and in-depth policy discussions 
necessary to legitimise the development of techno-policy standards.  
Despite these concerns, the ‘rough consensus and running code’ ethos which underpins 
the standards processes of many consortia including the W3C, remains remarkably 
under-theorised and to date, surprisingly little scholarly attention has been dedicated to 
the studying the legitimacy of consortia-based standardisation4. To address this gap in the 
literature, in what follows I provide a brief overview of competing approaches to 
conceptualising the legitimacy of transnational technocratic forms of governance and 
                                                             
4 Given their official status, there already exists a much more well established literature on the 
legitimacy of formal standards organisations (Buthe and Mattli, 2011). To date most of the literature 
on consortia-based standardisation has been dedicated to explaining the reasons behind the 
existence of consortia rather than to questions concerning their legitimacy (Hawkins 1999; 
Updegrove, 1995a, 1995b).   
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discuss how these may be used to conceptualise the legitimacy of web standards 
consortia. In doing so, I will argue in favour of a normative approach to assessing the 
legitimacy of informal standards bodies which emphasises the need for a balance 
between both substantive (output) and procedural (input/throughput) aspects of 
legitimacy.  
Normative and Empirical Legitimacy 
 The questions raised by the proliferation and growing influence of standards 
consortia are by no means unique to the field of internet governance. Since the 1970s, 
global politics more broadly has witnessed a gradual displacement of political power and 
authority away from the traditional governing institutions of the territorially bound nation-
state and towards international organisations as well as new transnational networks of 
private ordering (Beck, 1992; Dingwerth, 2007; Habermas, 2001; Held, 1995, 1999). Most 
notably, of course, this has included the increased importance of intergovernmental 
bodies such as the EU, WIPO, IMF, WTO, and the UN but in recent years, has also 
involved a far more prominent role for other more informal forms of transnational 
technocratic governance including privately led networks, such as standards bodies (Hahn 
& Weidtmann, 2016; Kica & Bowman, 2012; Marres, 2007; Take, 2012b)5.  
Despite the recognition of this trend of displacement as far back as the early 1970s, until 
                                                             
5In his 1986 book Risk Society, German sociologist Ulrich Beck describes this transition of power 
away from the nationally bounded bureaucratic state to more informal transnational arrangements 
of governance as a process of “Entgrenzung” – the becoming unbounded of politics. For Beck, this 
phenomena can be interpreted as part of a much broader structural reorganisation of late modern 
societies as a whole, caused in part by the inability of national-state institutions to adequately 
manage the complex and transnational, environmental, technological, social and economic 
challenges of post-industrial societies (1992).  These issues, Beck argues, transcend the 
boundaries of national political institutions, calling into question their suitability and necessitating 
their replacement by more reflexive transnational institutions capable of handling the complex and 
technical challenges created by globalisation (Beck, 1992; Habermas, 1975). Habermas similarly 
described this decline in the confidence of the administrative functions of institutions as a 




quite recently, International Relations theorists have tended to depict these institutions as 
either “epiphenomenal” and entirely dependent on state power, or simply as benign 
facilitators of international cooperation, created by nation-states to serve their interests or 
overcome problems of collective action (Blake, 2012; Nagel, 2005). Theorist Thomas 
Nagel (2005, p. 113), for example, argues that the nation-state is the sole “locus of 
political legitimacy”, while transnational institutions, by contrast, should be considered 
merely as “voluntary association[s] or contract[s] among independent parties” that do not 
claim “political legitimacy and the right to impose decisions by force”. Michael Blake 
(2012, p. 280) similarly insists that since transnational institutions are not engaged in 
“direct coercion against individuals” they do not generate the same political justificatory 
demands as national governing institutions, and as such do not require the same levels of 
legitimation’.  
More recently, however, the growing recognition of the ways in which transnational 
technocratic institutions are performing important regulatory functions independent of the 
power of the nation-state, has led an increasing number of scholars to view transnational 
organisations not merely as the benign facilitators of nation-state cooperation, but 
increasingly as political agents whose authority and power, is itself in need of legitimation 
and justification (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Buchanan &Keohane, 2006).   
However, at the same time that the increased regulatory role of transnational institutions 
has generated demands for legitimacy, scholars note how their decentralised and 
privatised nature means that they tend to fit awkwardly into traditional nation-state and 
social contract based theories of legitimacy, premised on a fixed and identifiable demos 
as well as direct accountability between decision-makers and their constituents (Raymond 
& DeNardis, 2015; Take, 2012a, 2012b)6.  
                                                             
6 Traditionally the concept of legitimacy has been discussed predominantly within the confines of 
the modern liberal bureaucratic state. In this setting, authority and legitimacy are generally said to 
arise from the expressed or tacit consent of the governed; who acting in their own self-interest 
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On the one hand, the liberal conceptualisation of legitimacy in terms of a direct 
consensual relationship between the centralised coercive authority of the state and its 
citizens is premised on the capacity of governing institutions to aggregate the preferences 
of their constituents accurately. In the context of the nation-state, this can quite 
straightforwardly be achieved through a formalised electoral process involving a 
constitutionally and geographically defined demos. At the transnational level, however, 
scholars observe how determining the range of stakeholders who should be involved in 
decision-making processes can be more difficult, either because of the uncertainty over 
whose preferences should be included, or alternatively because the mechanisms of 
aggregation such as voting and elections are resistant to translation to a transnational 
context (Bohman, 2005, Dingwerth, 2007; Steffek & Hahn, 2010; Uhlin, 2010)7.  
On the other hand, the lack of formal mechanisms of democratic governance at the 
transnational level means that there also exists no direct or circular relationship between 
decision-makers and those they govern. Unlike the representatives of national political 
institutions – who may be held accountable at the ballot box if they fail to act in 
accordance with their electoral mandate - participants in transnational technocratic 
organisations are typically accountable to no one. Indeed, although some actors may 
purport to be acting on behalf of a certain social group, participants are, in reality, rarely 
elected and often justify their inclusion in decision-making processes on the grounds of 
technical expertise or economic interest alone (Archibugi, Koenig-Archibugi, & Marchetti, 
2011; Dingwerth, 2007). Thus, as chains of delegation have become stretched, scholars 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
enter into a “social contract” with the state, conceding some of their freedom to the state in 
exchange for the protection of individual rights (Rousseau, 1997). Within this context, legitimacy 
can be conceptualised primarily in terms of a direct consensual arrangement between the rulers 
and the ruled, under which the state may legitimately exercise its authority only in accordance with 
the terms of that "social contract", usually established through a system of representation or 
majority voting. 
7 Bohman (2005) makes reference to the distinction between demos - a unified will of the people 
attached to nation-state and the judicial model of self-representation - and the demoi - a 
heterogeneous and distributed public sphere or community of humanity.  
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observe how accountability between decision-makers and their constituents has grown 
ever weaker, leading to concerns about how the public interest can be protected within 
transnational technocratic decision-making processes, unconstrained by the formalised 
electoral mechanisms of the nation-state. (Black, 2008; Steffek & Hahn, 2010; Tallberg & 
Uhlin, 2011) 
This problem of accountability is particularly prominent in the context of standards bodies, 
whose highly technical nature means that credibility and influence are often conferred on 
the basis of expertise or accreditation as opposed to the consent of the governed. As a 
result, critics observe how decision-making authority tends to be deferred to technical 
experts, who are largely unelected and unaccountable and whose motivations and 
objectives may not necessarily be aligned with those of consumers (Estlund, 2003)8.  
Given the limitations of traditional theories of democratic legitimacy, the past few decades 
have witnessed the production of a large body of academic literature dedicated to 
describing and analysing the legitimacy of transnational institutions.  Although this 
academic scholarship is highly diverse, broadly speaking, two main approaches to can be 
identified; the empirical which examines the acceptance and the subjective perception of 
legitimacy among those subject to rulemaking authority, and the normative which seeks to 
assess the acceptability of political authority against a range of procedural and 
substantive criteria. (Beetham, 2013; Zürn, 2004) 
Firstly, the empirical approach – which has its roots in Weberian social science – focuses 
principally on how power and authority of an institution are subjectively experienced, 
assessing, for example, the extent to which governing institutions can engender 
acceptance on the part of their internal and external stakeholders (Weber, 1984). In the 
words of Suchman (1995, p. 574), empirical legitimacy can be thought of as the 
                                                             
8 Estlund (2003) describes this deferral of decision-making responsibility to unaccountable experts 




‘generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions’. Within this framing, the rules and authority of an institutional arrangement are 
legitimate if they enjoy the consent of those who are subject to them. Conversely, an 
institution may also be shown to be illegitimate if it can be demonstrated to lack the 
support or fail to ensure the compliance of its constituents. Within the empirical 
framework, therefore, it is possible to make the case that the European Union lacks 
legitimacy since polling data regularly shows that it lacks the support and trust of a 
majority of European Union citizens (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006; Hurd, 1999).  
For theorists, there are several reasons why the authority of an institution may be 
accepted as legitimate by its stakeholders, including for example, the acknowledgment of 
the institution as necessary or inevitable, the acceptance of the institutions goals or 
procedures as morally appropriate, or in some instances pure self-interest, or what 
Suchman (1995) describes as cognitive, moral and pragmatic legitimacy. In the case of 
technocratic institutions such as standards bodies, the expertise of participants as well as 
the technical quality of the outputs produced, are often cited as significant factors in the 
social acceptance of authority. 
The emphasis of empirical approaches on the acceptance of the authority of decision-
making bodies within stakeholder communities, mean that research projects which adopt 
this perspective tend to focus their analysis on determining the extent to which relevant 
actors perceive an institution’s processes and outputs to be legitimate (Nullmeier & 
Pritzlaff, 2010; Peters, 2013; Reus-Smit, 2007). Since most large transnational 
technocratic institutions often lack fixed or identifiable stakeholder groups whose 
perception can be measured, empirical approaches to legitimacy, on the whole, tend to be 
less well suited to assessing the legitimacy of transnational organisations such as 
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standards bodies9.  
In contrast to the empirical approach, the normative approach to legitimacy focuses on the 
conditions under which an institution may be judged to be legitimate; that is, what are the 
characteristics of a governing institution that makes its rulings acceptable. Whereas 
empirical legitimacy focuses primarily on the perceptions of the ruled, normative 
legitimacy emphasises the qualities of the ruler; seeking to determine the precise 
conditions under which authority becomes morally justifiable. In this way, the normative 
legitimacy of a given institution can be evaluated not by the social acceptance of those 
subject to its authority, but rather by the extent to which its procedures and process are 
congruous with specific norms and criteria derived from principles of liberal democracy 
(Fraser, 2007; Zürn, 2004). Such criteria often relate to procedural aspects of governance 
such as transparency and accountability, inclusion and participation, and deliberative 
quality, but might also include analysis of an institution's performance including, for 
example, its problem-solving capacity or efficacy.  
Although empirical and normative forms of legitimacy are usually discussed separately, 
scholars note how at the transnational level “an institution or system or polity will in most 
cases have to enjoy” normative legitimacy “in order to enjoy [empirical] legitimacy” 
(Weiler, 1991: 416). That is, in the absence of any formal legal mandates or statutes from 
which institutions can derive an unquestionable right to rule, the empirical legitimacy of 
transnational governance arrangements is often reliant upon the perceived legitimacy of 
the institution's procedures and the outcomes they produce – or put simply their 
‘normative legitimacy’.  This is particularly true in the case of informal and voluntary 
consensus organisations such as standards consortia, where the willingness of 
stakeholders to comply with the technical specifications produced, is very often reliant on 
                                                             
9 Further to this, some studies have also attempted to reconstruct the discursive basis of these 
beliefs, that is, the social norms and values upon which their beliefs are rooted and the discursive 
practices through which they are brought about (Reus-Smit, 2007). 
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the perceived openness, fairness and quality of the development process and well as the 
technical merit of the specifications themselves (Hatanaka & Konefal, 2013). 
Given the primacy of normative conceptualisations of legitimacy at the transnational level, 
together with the methodological difficulties of studying the empirical legitimacy of 
standards bodies, for the purpose of this thesis, a normative approach to legitimacy will be 
used. In order to do so, however, it is first necessary to make a further important 
distinction between the two complementary aspects of normative legitimacy: substantive 
legitimacy which emphasises the importance of institutional outputs and performance; and 
procedural legitimacy which focuses on the democratic quality of institutional processes.  
In what follows I demonstrate how in the context of consortia-based standardisation, these 
two aspects of normative legitimacy can be understood in terms of the two mutually 
reinforcing elements of Clarke's mantra of standardisation ‘running code' (substantive 
legitimacy) and rough consensus (procedural legitimacy) (Abbate, 2010; Russell, 2014). 
Although historically, analysis of the legitimacy of standard bodies has tended to prioritise 
the former, I observe how the rapid expansion and commercialisation of the web along 
with the proliferation of techno-policy standard development has increasingly led scholars 
to scrutinise the openness and democratic quality of the so-called ‘rough consensus’ 
approach to standards development. As such, in order to be legitimate, I argue that 
informal standards bodies must be able to demonstrate both substantive and procedural 
legitimacy.  
‘Running Code’ (Substantive Legitimacy) 
 Within the literature on normative theories of legitimacy, the term substantive 
legitimacy (also referred to as output legitimacy) is used primarily to refer to the problem-
solving capacity and efficacy of collective decision-making processes. Within this framing, 
political institutions may be determined to be legitimate only to the extent to which they 
achieve their intended purpose, whether that is the protection of human rights, economic 
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growth, a reduction of carbon emissions or some other policy objective. As Scharpf put it, 
“political choices [of an authority] are legitimate if and because they effectively promote 
the common welfare of the constituency in question’ (Scharpf, 1999, p. 6). In this way, the 
notion of substantive legitimacy can be said to be characterised as following a 
consequentialist logic of performance and is closely related to the criterion of 
‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ (Majone, 1999; Risse, 2006). As a result, research which 
examines substantive legitimacy tends to focus on the outputs of decision-making 
processes and how these act to promote or inhibit the common good, addressing 
questions such as: did the process produce an outcome? What effects did the outcome 
have on relevant stakeholders and constituents – positive or negative? Were there any 
unforeseen consequences? 
For many, the demonstration of substantive legitimacy by decision-making bodies is 
particularly crucial at the transnational level, where the ability of technocratic organisations 
to coordinate stakeholders and produce effective responses to global threats such as 
migration or climate change, is often seen to outweigh demands for procedural rigour 
(Backstrand, 2013). In the context of environmental governance, for example, the 
legitimacy of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is arguably 
far more contingent on its ability to deliver substantive reductions in carbon emissions 
than the openness or transparency of the processes through which its associated 
agreements are reached (Bäckstrand, 2013; Bernstein, 2011). Similarly, while the relative 
openness and inclusivity of an organisation such as the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) 
should be commended and encouraged, it is ultimately its effectiveness in tackling 
collective problems that will determine its legitimacy in the eyes of its stakeholders.  
In the context of web standardisation, substantive legitimacy has historically been judged 
by the extent to which the standards produced by a given organisation are widely adopted 
or implemented (Boström & Hallström, 2013; Updegrove, 1995a). The reasons which 
underlie the acceptance of standards can be varied but are commonly understood to 
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include both the efficiency of the development process through which the standards are 
created as well as the technical quality and efficacy of the standards themselves (Boström 
& Hallström, 2013)10.  
In the case of the former, commentators observe how the notoriously complex and often 
protracted development processes of some standards bodies, can cause potential 
implementers to become frustrated with the process of standardisation, leading, in some 
instances, to the proliferation of proprietary or non-standardised implementations (Jakobs, 
1998; Updegrove, 2008). By ensuring that standards development processes are 
sufficiently streamlined and responsive to market needs, therefore, standards bodies can 
increase the likelihood that their standards will be widely adopted and so in the process 
enhance their substantive legitimacy.  
The importance of procedural efficiency to the substantive legitimacy of standards bodies, 
was perhaps best illustrated by the so-called “religious war” of internet standards between 
the Open System Interconnection standard (OSI) developed by ISO and the Internet 
Protocol Suite (TCP/IP) developed by the IETF, which offered alternative approaches to 
defining interface operations between disparate networks. Despite enjoying an early 
advantage in terms of market share and international support, the rigid and formalised 
procedures of ISO gradually caused the development of the OSI framework to stagnate, 
as stakeholders repeatedly tried and failed to secure unanimous agreement on a 
standardised framework for protocols. By adopting a more flexible and grassroots 
approach to standardisation which emphasised testing and implementation over 
formalised procedures, the IETF was able to outperform ISO in terms of the speed of its 
                                                             
10  Given the focus of substantive legitimacy on decision-making outputs, research which has 
previously examined the substantive legitimacy of standards development organisations, has 
typically focused on assessing the extent to which standards are widely implemented as well as the 
extent to which they achieve their technical objectives (Boström & Hallström, 2013). This presents 
a number of challenges for researchers interested in examining contemporary standards since the 
implications of a standard, may not be fully apparent for several years after implementation (Fuchs, 
Kalfagianni, & Havinga, 2011; Hahn & Weidtmann, 2016).  
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development process. As a result, by the early 1990’s the TCP/IP had overtaken OSI, 
establishing itself as the de facto standard for computer network interconnection - a 
development which would later prove decisive in paving the way for the emergence of the 
internet as we know it today.  
In addition to procedural efficiency, the substantive legitimacy of standards bodies is often 
also largely dependent on the technical quality of the standards that they produce. In the 
context of web standardisation, the technical quality of standards has historically been 
evaluated primarily in relation to their conformance with the so-called ‘running code’ 
principle of standards development. Made famous by Clark’s mantra, the term is 
sometimes used to signal the general expectation that through rigorous testing and 
implementation standards will be able to demonstrate technical efficacy. More commonly, 
however, the term is used to denote the more specific expectation that standards bodies 
be able to demonstrate multiple independent interoperable implementations of a standard 
before allowing it to advance along the standards track (Crocker, 1987; 1993; Updegrove, 
1995b). 
From a practical perspective, the expectation that multiple versions of a standard are 
tested and implemented as part of the design process, allows working groups to pre-empt 
and resolve potential bugs quickly and efficiently, therefore increasing the chances that 
the standard will be widely adopted once published. From a more normative perspective, 
the imperative to produce independent implementations helps standards bodies to 
promote competition by providing choice for potential vendors, and thus avoid the kinds of 
monopolisation or network dependencies which could stifle network growth (Jakobs, 
2003). In this way, the perceived quality of a given standard can be understood as being 
dependent not only on its technical efficacy but also on effects on the wider network or 
marketplace.  
Given the importance of web standards to the global economy, the pursuit of economic 
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objectives such as these have over the years become increasingly deeply ingrained in the 
political culture and policies of the standards community. The so-called OpenStand 
principles of open standards development – to which most of the major standards bodies 
including the W3C and IETF have committed themselves - for example, include several 
references to the need for standards to ‘enable global competition’, ‘serve as building 
blocks for further innovation’, and ‘contribute to the creation of global communities, 
benefiting humanity’(OpenStand, 2017). The W3C’s patent policy, meanwhile, was 
developed explicitly with the intention of preserving openness and innovation online by 
prohibiting the inclusion of patents within W3C specifications, which might prevent their 
implementation on a royalty-free basis (Russell, 2003; W3C, 2004). 
Today, economic objectives such as innovation and competition continue to be the 
primary metrics by which the technical quality of most contemporary standards are 
judged. However, the relatively recent transformation of the web from an academic 
curiosity to the most important technical artefact of the 21st century, has led web 
standards - and by extension standards consortia – to become increasingly embroiled in a 
much broader range of public policy disputes, from concerns about the security of e-
commerce transactions and the privacy of personal data, to moral panics about copyright 
infringement and the proliferation of online pornography (DeNardis, 2009; Morris, 2011; 
Morris, J. & Davidson, 2003). As a result, the substantive quality of web standards can 
today no longer be thought of purely in terms of their effects on interoperability and 
compatibility of an obscure information network, but – as described in the previous 
chapter - also increasingly in relation to the pursuit of a wide range of public policy 
objectives.  
Whilst most venues of standards development have traditionally eschewed political 
considerations, the growth of the web as a technology of social and political importance 
has led to a growing recognition within the standards community of the need to 
acknowledge the ways in which their work impacts on public policy and the broader user 
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community. As John Morris argued, ‘the standards development process must be “open” 
to the identification and consideration of public policy concerns. Standards that are guided 
by technical merit to the exclusion of policy considerations cannot be considered to be 
open in their creation’ (Morris, 2011, p. 13).   
The emergence of standards organisations as desirable vehicles for multi-stakeholder 
activities to address public policy issues is evident not only in the rise in techno-policy 
standards development but also increasingly in the political culture and architecture of the 
standards bodies themselves. The W3C, for example, has several working groups 
dedicated to addressing a range of web policy issues including privacy and accessibility 
(W3C, 2015c). The Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) 11  meanwhile, has recently 
chartered the ‘Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research Group’ in order to 
examine whether standards and protocols can ‘enable, strengthen or threaten human 
rights, as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), specifically, but not limited to 
the right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of assembly’ (IRTF, 2018b). 
Although the articulation of such socio-political metrics of substantive legitimacy is 
perhaps inevitable given the centrality of the web to almost all aspects of contemporary 
social, economic and political life, for many, their consideration nonetheless raises some 
significant concerns regarding the sufficiency of a purely substantive approach to 
measuring the legitimacy of standards bodies. Specifically, scholars such as Fuchs et al. 
(2011) note how unlike previous technical and economic metrics of substantive quality – 
which typically enjoy universal recognition and acceptance among relevant stakeholder 
groups – newer political and value-based metrics of substantive legitimacy are by their 
very nature contested, since different actors will be likely to prioritise and interpret 
                                                             
11 The Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) works alongside its sister organisation the IETF. While 
the IETF focuses on the shorter-term issues of engineering, the IRTF focuses on longer-term 
research issues related to internet protocols, applications, architecture and technology (IRTF, 
2018a)   
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competing values differently. For example, in the case of a standard which has 
implications for data protection, it might be expected that civil society groups such as the 
Centre for Democracy and Technology (CDT) or the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 
would interpret the value of ‘user privacy’ more highly, than platforms such as Google or 
Facebook, whose business models are dependent on the collection of large quantities of 
user data12.  
Thus, whilst early standards development organisations might once have accurately been 
described as what Peter M. Haas (1992, p. 3) termed epistemic communities – 
transnational ‘network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a 
particular domain who are united by shared, normative and casual beliefs, practices, and 
notions of validity’ - the introduction of social and political objectives into the calculus of 
standards development has meant that consensus on the values that should be pursued 
through standardisation is no longer so assured.  
In the absence of an agreed set of values or metrics against which technical outputs can 
be judged, commentators observe how the assessment of the legitimacy of standards 
bodies purely in terms of the quality of their substantive outputs is becoming increasingly 
problematic (Fuchs et al., 2011, Morris 2011). Indeed, while such an analysis may be 
useful in determining the performance of an institutional process in relation to a set of 
predefined goals or objectives, it nonetheless tells us nothing about the nature of the 
objectives themselves, including; how they were determined, by whom, and the extent to 
which they are congruent with the values or interests of the wider community of users.  
In such circumstances, it becomes necessary for researchers to not merely consider the 
legitimacy of standards consortia in terms of their technical outputs, but also the 
democratic quality, openness and inclusivity of the processes through which the values 
                                                             
12 DoNotTrack and P3P are two recent examples of how standards development can intersect with 
policy issues related to data privacy (W3C, 2007, 2015c) 
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used to judge the quality of those outputs are agreed by participants. Put another way, in 
the context of their development of techno-policy standards consortia need not only to 
demonstrate their commitment to ‘running code’ (substantive legitimacy) but also to ‘rough 
consensus’ (procedural legitimacy). With this in mind, I now turn to the second aspect of 
the normative legitimacy, procedural legitimacy.  
In what follows, I argue that the procedural legitimacy of web standards consortia can be 
most appropriately understood using ideas derived from deliberative democratic theory. In 
doing so, I highlight some of the parallels that previous scholars have drawn between 
these ideas and standards development practices. While I am sympathetic to the views of 
those commentators who have celebrated web standards consortia as exemplars of 
deliberative democratic governance (Froomkin 2003; Russell, 2003), I also note the 
concerns of others who have questioned the extent to which the technical and commercial 
processes of standards development can be expected to conform to the strict normative 
criteria of deliberative theory. In order to examine the validity of these concerns 
empirically, I argue that it is necessary to develop an analytical framework capable of 
assessing the procedural legitimacy of web standards consortia from a deliberative 
perspective. 
Procedural Legitimacy (Rough Consensus) 
 Within the literature on normative legitimacy, the term ‘procedural legitimacy’ is 
used to refer to the democratic quality of decision-making processes.  In contrast to 
substantive aspects of normative legitimacy which focus purely on the outputs of decision-
making and the effects that those outputs have for relevant stakeholders; procedural 
legitimacy examines the appropriateness and fairness of the processes through which 
those outputs are produced. Put another way, if substantive legitimacy is concerned 
primarily with the “product” of collective decision-making, procedural legitimacy concerns 
itself with the “production” or, as Barnard (2001, p. 27) puts it, ‘procedural legitimacy 
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defines the quality that makes “getting there’’ politically right’. 
From this perspective, an institution can be considered as legitimate only to the extent to 
which the processes through which collective decisions are made are consistent with 
certain normative standards derived from democratic theory, including, for example, 
inclusivity, transparency and consensus (Manin, 1987). Within the literature, it is common 
for theorists to categorise these criteria into one of two aspects of procedural legitimacy, 
namely ‘input’ and ‘throughput’ legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999; Schmidt, 2013; Zürn, 2004)13.  
Input legitimacy is typically used to refer to those aspects of procedural legitimacy related 
to the scope of participation and inclusion of relevant stakeholders in the decision-making 
process. When considering the legitimacy of any form of collective decision-making, it is 
essential to ensure that the authentic demands of all relevant stakeholders can be 
transferred for consideration, from the public space of will formation to the empowered 
space of decision-making, either through the direct participation of the stakeholders 
themselves or through the indirect representation of those views by political trustees 
(Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008). As such, in order for an institution to achieve normative input 
legitimacy it is argued that it should seek to establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure 
those who are affected by its decisions are given equal opportunities and resources to be 
able to access and influence the proceedings of the decision-making process (Dingwerth, 
2007; Risse, 2006). Research focusing on this aspect of legitimacy leads us to ask 
questions such as; do decision-makers adequately represent the diverse views of their 
constituents? On what basis, have they been given the right to decide? Who is included or 
excluded from deliberations? Are marginalised views accounted for? In this way, input 
legitimacy is closely associated with normative democratic ideals of inclusivity, 
                                                             
13 Scharpf’s original distinction between input and output legitimacy can largely be thought of as 
equivalent to the distinction between procedural and substantive forms of normative legitimacy 
(Scharpf, 1999). Later scholars have since introduced the notion of ‘throughput’ legitimacy to refer 
to those aspects of input legitimacy which relate specifically to the conduct of the decision-making 
processes themselves including the quality of deliberations (Schmidt, 2013).   
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participation, representation, and consent. 
The second aspect of procedural legitimacy, ‘throughput legitimacy’ 14 , relates to the 
justification of a model of governance based on the quality of the decision-making process 
itself (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Lieberherr, 2013). Whereas input legitimacy emphasises 
the scope of participation, throughput legitimacy is far more concerned with the quality of 
participation – seeking to ensure, for example, that deliberations are conducted 
respectfully, that the views and opinions of participants are adequately considered or that 
participants offer justifications or reasons for the views expressed. Put another way, if 
input legitimacy concerns the “who” of political decision-making, throughput legitimacy 
relates to the question of “how? Research which seeks to assess throughput leg itimacy 
may thus deal with questions such as; to what extent are procedures characterised by 
authentic deliberation? Do participants treat each other with mutual respect? Do 
participants offer justifications for their opinions? 
While all proceduralist approaches share a common recognition of the importance of the 
inputs and throughputs of formal decision-making processes as key sources of legitimacy, 
views of precisely what types of procedures are appropriate, and how these are expected 
to legitimise decision-making outcomes vary significantly across the literature. At the level 
of the nation-state, for example, the prevailing aggregative approach to procedural 
legitimacy – rooted in social choice theory – interprets the preferences of individuals as 
fixed, and so conceptualises procedural legitimacy primarily in terms of the quality and 
fairness of the formal democratic procedures, through which the pre-formed preferences 
of individual citizens are aggregated (Arrow, 1963; Black, D., 1958; Dahl, R. A., 1989; 
Schumpeter, 2013).  While such an interpretation of procedural legitimacy could 
                                                             
14 Though traditionally subsumed within the input category of normative legitimacy – under the 
heading of democratic or procedural criteria – within the context of the legitimation crisis of 
transnational governance, many theorists have begun to perceive the types of procedural 
indicators addressed by throughput legitimacy as  increasingly important, leading to it being 
considered as a separate aspect of normative legitimacy in its own right (Zürn, 2004) 
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conceivably be applied to formal SDO's - whose participants are geographically defined - 
the need for aggregative models of procedural legitimacy to define relevant actors in 
relation to formal membership criteria means that such approaches do not translate well to 
more informal transnational institutions such as standards consortia, whose political 
communities typically lack fixed boundaries.   
Given the limited applicability of aggregative models to the transnational level, since the 
1980s scholars have increasingly looked to alternative theories in order to conceptualise 
the procedural legitimacy claims of transnational technocratic bodies such as standards 
organisations. Among the most influential and popular of those proposed has been 
deliberative democratic theory which seeks to reemphasise the centrality of deliberation 
as a critical source of institutional legitimacy (Benhabib, 1994; Cohen, 1989; Dryzek, 
2000, 2001, 2012; Manin, 1987).  
Procedural Legitimacy and Deliberative Democracy 
 Drawing variously on the political philosophies of Jurgen Habermas and John 
Rawls, ‘deliberative democracy’ rejects the notion of individual preferences as fixed or 
pre-given (Habermas, 1985, 1995; Rawls, 2009), instead highlighting the ways in which 
the values and beliefs of citizens are, in fact, highly malleable and therefore amenable to 
‘the force of the better argument’ (Habermas, 1985: 24). In contrast to aggregative 
approaches to democracy, which view collective decision-making processes purely in 
terms of adversarial strategic bargaining and preference aggregation, deliberative 
theorists argue that political processes should instead be interpreted as mechanisms of 
will-formation and deliberation in which citizens are expected to be open to persuasion 
and to justify their own beliefs in terms acceptable to others (Bohman, 1997, 1998; 
Dryzek, 2000; Elster, 1998; Gutmann & Thompson, 1998). As Cohen (1989, p. 3) put it, 
‘The notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive idea of a democratic 
association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds 
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through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens’. 
By engaging in such reflexive and open processes of mutual reason-giving, theorists claim 
that participants will not only be able to have their views represented, but - to the extent 
that they are willing to put aside their strategic interests - also be more likely to identify 
common norms and values which can  be used to evaluate the quality of substantive 
outcomes (Cohen, 1989; Gutmann & Thompson, 1998). Thus, while it is acknowledged 
that within any political community there will be a plurality of interests, theorists 
nonetheless claim that deliberative procedures can help to legitimise substantive outputs, 
since the objectives and goals which they seek to realise will, in theory at least, be 
consistent with the values of the majority of stakeholders (Habermas, 1995)15. As Jurgen 
Habermas (1995, p. 117-118) commented; 
‘Under the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive and non-coercive rational 
discourse among free and equal participants, everyone is required to take the 
perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the understanding of 
self and world of all others; from this interlocking of perspectives there 
emerges an ideally extended we-perspective from which all can test in 
common whether they wish to make a controversial norm the basis of their 
shared practice’.  
Whereas aggregative approaches to democracy conceptualise legitimacy purely in terms 
of the application of appropriate procedural mechanisms of preference aggregation, for 
                                                             
15 In addition to enabling the development of a common understanding of substantive legitimacy, 
some deliberative theorists also argue that greater levels of procedural legitimacy may also help to 
enhance substantive quality of decision-making outputs by enabling a more extensive articulation 
of reasons. That is, by harnessing the collective knowledge of highly diverse stakeholder groups, 
institutions will be more likely to identify effective solutions to collective problems, delivering more 
informed and rational results whilst also increasing the acceptability of decisions (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007). These benefits are for many, particularly evident in the context of standardisation, 
where the inclusion and engagement with potential implementers and stakeholders at an early 
stage of the design process, enables working groups to more easily pre-empt and address 
potential bugs as well as organically develop broad support for standards before they reach the 
implementation stage, thereby increasing the chances of their widespread adoption once they 
become market ready.  
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deliberative democrats, legitimacy can be said to derive from the potential of affected 
stakeholders to engage in inclusive and non-coercive processes of mutual reason giving 
orientated towards the realisation of rational consensus (Cohen, 1989; Gutmann & 
Thompson, 1998)16.  
Within this framing, institutions can be seen to be procedurally legitimate only to the extent 
to which they are able to provide a framework within which such deliberative encounters 
can take place. For this reason, research which studies the procedural legitimacy of 
transnational organisations from a deliberative perspective typically seeks to assess the 
quality of deliberative and decision-making practices within those institutions observing, 
for example, the extent to which deliberations are inclusive and transparent, and whether 
participants provide justifications for their arguments and treat each other with respect 
(Bächtiger et al., 2009; Steenbergen et al., 2003; Steiner, 2004).   
By defining legitimacy in relation to the quality of interactions between interested parties 
rather than more formal aggregative democratic procedures, deliberative models of 
legitimacy, effectively circumvent the need to extrapolate electoral mechanisms from the 
nation-state to the transnational level. In doing so, it is argued that deliberative models 
offer a far more flexible and practical approach to assessing the legitimacy of 
transnational technocratic institutions than aggregative approaches which have struggled 
                                                             
16 Importantly for deliberative democrats, ‘deliberation’ here is not meant to indicate that any kind of 
communication is sufficient to legitimise a decision-making process. Instead, in referring to the 
need for stakeholders to deliberate, deliberative democrats emphasise the importance of 
participants engaging in a very specific type of communicative practice (Habermas, 1985). 
Although the precise nature of the deliberative principles by which participants are expected to 
abide varies within the literature, most elaborations of the theory highlight the importance of the 
manner in which the deliberations themselves are conducted, including, for example, the need for 
participants to treat each other with respect and provide justifications for the views expressed 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 1998). In addition, some theorists also seek to emphasise the importance 
of criteria related to the institutional setting within which the deliberations will take place, including 
the need for all relevant materials to be accessible to participants, and for the process itself to be 
transparent both in terms of its conduct but also in terms of decision-making. Finally, while some 
theorists are content to require only the presence of justification, others go further, insisting that 
justification given by participants should be rational or made in terms of the ‘common good’ 
(Bächtiger et al., 2010; Bohman, 1997). These debates and their applicability to consortia-based 
standardisation will be explored in more depth in chapter three.  
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to adapt to the new multi-layered and multilateral reality of contemporary transnational 
governance and which, consequentially, remain for the most part conceptually limited to 
the state. As John Dryzek (2000, p. 129) observed; 
 ‘[A] communicative model of democracy is particularly conducive to 
international society because, unlike older models of democracy, it can 
downplay the problem of boundaries. These older models always saw the first 
task in their application as the specification of the boundaries of a political 
community. Deliberation and communication, in contrast, can cope with fluid 
boundaries, and the production of outcomes across boundaries. For we can 
now look for democracy in the character of political interaction, without 
worrying about whether or not it is confined to particular territorial entities’. 
Standards Consortia and Deliberative Democracy 
 Over the past few decades, the gradual recognition of the utility of deliberative 
theory as a useful tool for describing the legitimation claims of transnational bodies has 
led to a growing number of studies by international relations scholars aimed at identifying 
real-life examples of deliberative governance. Among the most notable of the various 
organisations and institutions touted as potential exemplars of deliberative governance in 
practice, have been standards consortia, whose ‘rough consensus and running code' 
approach to standardisation, some commentators have argued, shares certain affinities 
with the normative ideals of deliberative theory (Froomkin 2003, Russell 2003, Umpathy, 
2010).  
In his 2003 study of the IETF for example, Michael Froomkin (2003, p. 752), suggests that 
the ‘high degrees of openness and transparency’ demonstrated by the working groups as 
well as the ‘surprising degree of self-consciousness’ and reflexivity with which participants 
go about their work, means that the IETF can arguably be considered as one of the few 
contemporary ‘concrete example[s] of a rulemaking process that meets Habermas's 
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notoriously demanding procedural conditions for a discourse capable of legitimating its 
outcomes’. More recently, Russell (2003) and Umpathy (2010), have both similarly 
observed how the W3C's openness to the consideration of public contributions and well as 
its leadership's willingness to let the standards development process run as a kind of 
"balancing act" between competing interests seems consistent with Habermas’ views on 
the importance of open procedures. 
Underpinning all these claims is the fundamental assertion that the informal and 
meritocratic ethos of standards development which has characterised most consortia-
based standards bodies since the late 1980s is capable not only of facilitating agreement 
on technical outputs, but perhaps more importantly, of doing so in a way that promotes the 
kinds of open, rational and civil discourse needed to legitimise those outputs in the 
absence of formal democratic procedures.  
In the case of the IETF for example, Janet Abbate (2000) notes how decision-making 
processes are often managed using ‘Requests for Comments’ (RFCs) – an 
unofficial system of notices and memoranda – utilised as a means of 
circulating important information and collecting feedback from participants. RFCs can be 
written by anyone and are usually developed through a type of informal peer-review 
process, with working group participants taking turns to contribute their own opinions and 
suggest edits (Crocker, 1987). In this way, Abbate (2000, p. 74) observes how RFCs are 
‘specifically designed to promote informal communication and the sharing of ideas in the 
absence of technical certainty or recognised authority’, providing a focal point for the 
group’s discussions as well as a mechanism through which competing implementations 
can be pitted against each other, and the winner determined ‘through raw Darwinian 
selection’ (Moody, 1997).  
Aside from the various practical benefits discussed above, the view that, as Steven Levy 
(1984, p. 31) put it, ‘hackers should be judged by their hacking’ seems to offer a uniquely 
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non-hierarchical and objective means by which power can be allocated among consortia 
participants (Malcolm, 2008). In contrast to formal SDO’s – where decision-making often 
simply reflects the existing balance of power among incumbent industrial interest groups – 
the emphasis placed on consensus-led deliberation and rigorous testing by consortia has 
helped to foster the emergence of a meritocratic ethos of standards development which, 
for some, is far more consistent with Habermas’ injunction that decision-making processes 
be guided by the ‘force of the better argument’ (Froomkin, 2003, Umpathy, 2010). 
Indeed, while all approaches to standardisation have historically involved a degree of 
deliberation, scholars such as Froomkin (2003) note how the rise of consortia-based 
standardisation has brought these aspects of standards development to the fore, fostering 
the creation of informal and consensus-driven processes, within which proposals can be 
subject to intense scrutiny by the broader community and in which participants can work 
cooperatively to identify and shape common values and principles. As a result, scholars 
observe how the deliberative processes of consortia-based standardisation can help to 
address the limitations of substantive claims to legitimacy by facilitating agreement on a 
shared set of values and objectives against which technical outputs can be assessed. 
From this perspective, Clarke’s mantra of ‘rough consensus’ can be understood not 
merely as a succinct description of standards development practice, but perhaps more 
importantly as a concrete claim to procedural legitimacy. 
While it is difficult to disagree with the basic assertion that informal standards processes 
are highly deliberative, other scholars have nevertheless been far more cautious in their 
assessment of the legitimacy of the ‘rough consensus and running code’ approach to 
standardisation and its apparent affinity with deliberative theory (King, Grinter, & 
Pickering, 1997; Morris, 2011) . Critiques of consortia-based standardisation are broad-
ranging but typically relate to concerns regarding standards bodies’ inclusivity, their 
willingness to acknowledge or engage with the policy implications of their work, and their 
capacity to host the kinds of extensive discussions necessary to legitimise techno-policy 
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standards (Garfinkel, 1998; Halpin, 2013; King, Grinter, & Pickering, 1997; Schoechle, 
2009)17. 
Firstly, although many consortia boast large and sometimes diverse international 
memberships, Hawkins (1999) observes how very few are based outside of the US, with 
large multinationals based in Europe or Asia far more likely to participate in US-dominated 
organisations, rather than attempt to establish competing national or regional consortia of 
their own. As a result, some critics have questioned whether the current standards 
ecosystem risks becoming unfairly orientated towards US market conditions, in a way that 
marginalises the interests of stakeholders from the developing countries, whose 
burgeoning ICT sectors are unable to compete with their more established western 
competitors (Prakesh, 2016).   
In a related concern, commentators such as Schoechle (2009) note how the almost 
exponential growth of the web over the past two decades has brought into question the 
diversity and inclusivity of standard bodies as a whole. As the web has grown beyond the 
narrow confines of a handful of elite US universities and into the living rooms, offices and 
pockets of billions of individuals worldwide, the number and diversity of actors affected by 
the design of web standards have also grown. Thus whereas the previously tight-knit 
community of researchers who participated in standardisation in the late 1980s could 
justifiably have claimed to be representative of what, at the time, was still a relatively small 
and homogenous community of ICT professionals, scholars observes how the 
commercialisation of the web, has made it difficult to maintain the assertion that handful of 
mainly western and overwhelming male engineers can legitimately take decisions on 
behalf of an increasingly heterogeneous and disparate community of users (King et al., 
                                                             
17 Scholars have also highlighted how in the context of the web’s commercialisation, the meaning 
of ‘rough consensus’ itself, both as a descriptor of standards development practice and a claim to 
procedural legitimacy, has become increasingly diluted as the term has been applied to an ever-
broader range of institutions, many of which lack the procedural features, openness or 
transparency of bodies such as the IETF (Garfinkel, 1998; Halpin, 2013; King, Grinter, & Pickering, 




In recent years, concerns about the lack of diversity within standards bodies have most 
commonly been framed in terms of the domination of standards processes by corporate 
actors, which critics claim is a direct consequence of the restrictive membership policies 
that some standards consortia chose to impose. Indeed, although some informal 
standards bodies such as the IETF actively promote grassroots participation, scholars 
observe how most newly established standards consortia are membership bodies whose 
participants are required to pay fees in order to contribute to discussions - a practice 
sometimes referred to as “pay to play” (Schoechle, 2009). Despite being theoretically 
open to all interested parties, therefore, in practice, most consortia are today dominated 
by the relatively small number of private sector organisations who can afford the hefty 
membership fees as well as the resources required to actively participate in discussions.  
In addition to impacting their inclusivity, some commentators observe how the domination 
of standards processes by corporate actors, has also impacted the willingness of 
consortia to consider broader issues of policy as part of their development processes 
(Malcolm, 2013). In contrast to the academics, computer scientists and engineers who 
traditionally comprised technical working groups, scholars observe how this new corporate 
brand of standards participant show little interest in the shared values and practices of the 
technical community, but are instead concerned first and foremost with representing the 
commercial interests of their employers - either as incumbents seeking to protect their 
privileged position or as insurgents hoping to gain a quick market share (Carpenter, 
1996). As King et al. (1997, p. 23) put it, ‘these new players have little understanding of or 
use for the culture of [standardisation] or the elaborate social conventions and norms that 
sustained that culture and enabled the production of the very artefacts that so entice 
them’. As a result, critics observe how, since the web’s commercialisation in the 1990s 
standards processes have begun to take on a very different character with discussions 
increasingly driven by neoliberal economic imperatives and the pursuit of the short-term 
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interest of corporate actors, often to the exclusion of wider architectural principles or 
public policy concerns. As Jeremy Malcolm (2013) explains; 
‘The underlying problem is that the internet community bodies have been 
captured by industry, and by a narrow segment of civil society that is beholden 
to industry… As a result, internet technical standards are biased in favour of a 
US-led, free market-directed model of competition, which fails to incorporate 
broader public interest objectives’ 
Finally, in addition to concerns about standard participant’s willingness to consider the 
policy implications of their work, some scholars have also questioned the capacity of the 
technical community to adequately contemplate the complex legal, social and economic 
issues raised by techno-policy standards development (Morris, 2011). In the view of 
commentators such as Jeremy Malcolm (2013), technical know-how can be no substitute 
for policy expertise and should not be treated as such, regardless of how open or 
deliberative the development process may be. As Malcolm (2013) himself states, 
 ‘The W3C’s process is simply unsuitable for making any progress on a 
technical standard that involves disputed public policy issues, particularly 
those that impact broader community interests. These public policy issues 
have to be resolved first… preferably through a more structured multi-
stakeholder process, before it becomes possible to develop a technical 
standard on the basis of those decisions’. 
Together these concerns raise a number of fundamental questions about the meaning of a 
‘rough consensus’ approach to standardisation, and the extent to which current standards 
practices are sufficient to legitimise the development of techno-policy standards. While 
many commentators continue to celebrate the procedural efficiency of standards 
consortia, others warn that their embrace of less formal and rigorous procedures risks 
undermining the procedural legitimacy of standards development as a whole. As Andrew 
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Russell (2014, p. 276) observed; 
‘Standards consortia had stormed onto the scene by rejecting and subverting 
accepted procedures for balance, openness, and due process. Because these 
mechanisms had been developed over time to assure critics of the fairness 
and public accountability of the voluntary consensus standards process, their 
rejection amounted to a crisis of legitimacy for technical standardisation’. 
An obvious solution to these concerns would, of course, be for standards bodies to reform 
their processes to make them more open and inclusive. Davidson et al. (2002) for 
example, argue that given their growing public policy role standards bodies should do 
more to encourage the participation of lawyers and other public policy experts at an early 
stage. Lawrence Lessig meanwhile, has similarly suggested that - in the context of their 
development of techno-policy standards – consortia should be treated the same as any 
other political institution.  As Lessig himself commented, consortia ‘should be more open. 
If they want to do policy, they have to accept the constraints on a policy-making body, 
such as openness in who can participate’ (Lessig cited in Garfinkel, 1998, p. 42). 
However, as the fate of the ISO’s TCP/IP standard (see above) demonstrates, the simple 
enforcement of a more procedurally rigorous approval process is by no means a 
guarantee of effective or legitimate governance. Whilst it might generally be anticipated 
that higher levels of deliberativeness and inclusivity will correlate to greater levels of 
overall legitimacy, some commentators observe how an overemphasis on the types of 
rigorous procedures prescribed by deliberative theory, may also – as a result of lengthier 
decision-making processes – inadvertently act to undermine the efficiency and 
effectiveness of an institution, and thus jeopardise its claims to substantive legitimacy 
(Bäckstrand, 2013; Bernstein, 2011; Dahl, R. A., 1989; Peters, 2013; Scharpf, 1999; 
Wieland, 2007)18.  
                                                             
18 Dahl (1999) described this tension between input-output legitimacy as the ‘democratic dilemma’. 
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The challenge that currently faces standards bodies, therefore, is how, on the one hand, 
to maintain the kinds of hierarchical, top-down leadership necessary for effective and 
efficient decision-making, while at the same time, satisfy growing demands for broader 
participation and the due consideration of non-technical policy issues. Put simply, that is, 
how to balance the competing demands of substantive and procedural legitimacy? Where 
precisely this balance lies and how organisations might be expected to achieve it, 
however, is not always so simple to determine and will vary considerably between 
institutions depending not only on the nature of the decisions taken but also the specific 
political culture and norms of the institution itself.   
On the one hand, the level of procedural legitimacy that an organisation is expected to 
demonstrate will depend largely on the nature of the activities that it undertakes. In the 
case of standards consortia for example, it could justifiably be argued that historically the 
work of these organisations only required quite low levels of legitimation, since much of 
their work was purely technical in nature and so unlikely to significantly affect stakeholder 
groups beyond those of a small number of implementers and vendors directly involved in 
the design process. As the work of standards bodies has begun to impinge on areas of 
public policy, however, the levels of legitimation that they are expected to demonstrate 
has naturally increased in line with the potential impact of their work on a broader range of 
users.  
On the other hand, the precise forms of legitimacy that transnational institutions are 
expected to enact will also vary across organisations, depending on the relative weight 
which stakeholders ascribe to different forms of legitimacy. In some contexts, for example, 
stakeholders may give greater importance to the transparency of a process, whereas in 
other circumstances participants may perceive justification of arguments to be more highly 
valued. Likewise, whereas some organisations may view a highly inclusive process as 
desirable, in another context, stakeholders may wish to place greater emphasis on the 
capacity of a small group of participants to engage in in-depth discussions (Bernstein, 
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2011; Take, 2012a).  
Thus, despite a tendency within the academic literature to seek universal or objective 
measures of legitimacy, in order to assess the procedural legitimacy of an institution 
properly, it is necessary not only to evaluate its processes and outputs against normative 
procedural metrics, but also consider how each of those metrics should be interpreted and 
appropriately weighted within its specific institutional context. The question that presents 
itself therefore, is not whether the ‘rough consensus and running code’ approach to 
standards development is legitimate as such (given the terms broad application, such a 
question would arguably be unanswerable in any case) but more specifically; to what 
extent a specific institutional operationalisation of the ethos (the W3C in the case of this 
thesis) is procedurally rigorous enough to legitimise that organisations development of 
techno-policy standards? 
In order address such a question, it is first necessary to determine which of the various 
normative standards of procedural legitimacy identified by deliberative democratic theory 
to consider and how each of these should these be interpreted and operationalised in the 
context of the consortia-based standardisation? If, as deliberative theorists demand, 
standards processes are required to be ‘inclusive’ for example, then who should standard 
bodies include and how? Similarly, if there is an expectation for standards development 
processes to be deliberative then how might we define ‘deliberation’ in the context of 
consortia and what metrics or indicators can we use to determine that such deliberation 
has taken place?  
Despite the growing popularity of deliberative theory as well as a broadening awareness 
of the role of standards in the arbitration of public policy disputes – these are questions 
which, to date, have still received remarkably little scholarly attention. To address this gap 
in the literature, in the next chapter, I will present a detailed review of the current literature 
on deliberative democratic theory. In doing so, I will identify several indicators of 
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procedural legitimacy and discuss how each of these can be interpreted within the specific 
context of consortia-based standardisation. Together these indicators will then form the 
basis of an analytical framework which will later be used to assess the legitimacy of the 
W3C in the case of its development of the EME standard. 
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3. Analytical Framework  
 In the previous chapter, I argued that deliberative democratic theory offers a range 
of useful conceptual tools with which to investigate and assess the procedural legitimacy 
of informal web standards consortia. While some suggest that informal standards 
development processes demonstrate an affinity with deliberative theory, I observed how 
other commentators remain sceptical regarding the capacity of standards bodies to fulfil 
the normative requirements set out by deliberative scholars. Finally, I noted how despite 
the growing importance of these debates to the field of internet governance, to date 
surprisingly little empirical research has been conducted to investigate the legitimacy of 
standards organisations (Froomkin, 2003; Russell, 2003; Umapathy, Purao, & Bagby, 
2012).  
To address this gap in the literature, in this chapter I outline an original analytical 
framework for assessing the procedural legitimacy of web standards consortia inspired by 
deliberative democratic theory. Drawing on the work of deliberative theorists as well as 
their critics, I discuss several indicators of procedural legitimacy (inclusion, transparency, 
deliberativeness, respect, justification, and constructiveness), highlighting some of the 
controversies within the existing literature and suggesting how each of these indicators 
may be interpreted and operationalised in the context of web standards development. In 
chapter four, I will then proceed to discuss how this framework was applied empirically to 
assess the procedural legitimacy of the W3C in the context of its development of EME.  
The ‘empirical turn’ in deliberative theory 
  Since the deliberative turn in democratic theory during the 1980s, normative 
approaches to transnational democracy have for the most part been dominated by 
scholarship which emphasises the importance of open and non-coercive deliberations 
among free and equal stakeholders as the principal source of institutional legitimacy. 
Whilst this ever-expanding body of literature is united by a shared understanding of the 
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legitimising power of communicative engagement, precisely what forms of deliberative 
interaction are required in order to legitimise a decision-making process and how such 
deliberation should be studied and assessed are questions about which deliberative 
scholars remain divided (Bächtiger et al., 2010).  
For early theorists of deliberative democracy, their insistence upon ‘deliberation’ as a 
source of legitimacy was not intended to indicate that any communication between 
stakeholders would be sufficient to legitimise the outputs of a decision-making process. 
Instead, in referring to the need for deliberation, first generation deliberative democrats 
emphasised the importance of engaging in a very specific type of communication, rooted 
in the logic of Habermasian communicative action (Habermas, 1985). From this 
perspective, deliberation implied the engagement of participants in a highly systematic 
form of rational discourse, consistent with a range of normative procedural standards or 
what Habermas (1985) collectively termed the ‘ideal speech situation’. Under such 
conditions, theorists anticipated that actors would tell the truth, justify their positions 
extensively, and be willing to yield to the force of the better argument. In doing so, 
theorists argued that participants would be able to evaluate the arguments of their 
opponents purely on the basis of the reasons and evidence provided, and come to a 
rational consensus unaffected by the coercive influences of strategic bargaining (Cohen, 
1989; Gutmann & Thompson, 1998; Habermas, 1985).  
Although some maintain that the normative prescriptions set out by early versions of 
deliberative theory offer a useful regulative ideal against which the procedures of 
transnational institutions might be assessed, in recent years, Habermasian interpretations 
of deliberative legitimacy have nevertheless attracted sharp criticism from a variety of 
scholars, many of whom object to what they perceive to be the unrealistic, abstract and 
hypothetical nature of the theory’s normative claims, as well as the potentially 
exclusionary effects of its commitment to the ideals of consensus and discursive 
rationality (Dahlberg, 2007b; Kadlec & Friedman, 2007; Mouffe, 1999; Young, 2001). 
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In response to these critiques, deliberative theory has over the past two decades 
undergone several stages of revision and refinement, as a second, and more recently a 
third generation of deliberative scholars have sought to develop deliberative democracy 
from a “regulative ideal” into a “working theory” (Bächtiger et al., 2010). Taking on board 
the theoretical and methodological insights from a broad range of empirical studies and 
deliberative experiments, these scholars have gradually begun to move away from the 
earlier idealistic elaborations of the theory and towards a more realistic and empirically 
testable interpretation of the deliberative democracy which is more reflective of the 
challenges and limitations of deliberations within a pluralistic society (Dryzek, 2012; 
Niemeyer & Dryzek, 2007)1.  
Most notably, these efforts have led to the development of a wide range of analytical 
frameworks designed to empirically evaluate the performance of deliberative processes in 
relation to various normative standards of deliberative theory; including for example, the 
extent to which institutional design facilitates interactivity or constructive discourse as well 
as the micro-interactions of the participants themselves (Kies, 2010; Steenbergen et al., 
2003; Steiner, 2004).   
Undoubtedly the most popular and influential of all attempts to study deliberative theory 
has been the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) – a quantitative approach to measuring the 
quality of discourse in deliberations, which uses a sophisticated coding scheme in order to 
evaluate speech acts against a range of procedural criteria normatively grounded in 
Habermasian discourse ethics; including, levels and content of justification, respect and 
constructive politics (Steenbergen et al., 2003). Although initially developed to assess the 
deliberative quality of parliamentary debates, the index has since been refined and 
repurposed by scholars to study a wide range of deliberative encounters from deliberative 
polls and citizen forums to non-synchronous online fora, such as web forums and the 
comments sections of online newspapers (Collins & Nerlich, 2015; Graham, T. & 
                                                             
1 Dryzek describes this move as deliberative theory’s ‘empirical turn’(Dryzek, 2012, p. 8). 
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Witschge, 2003; Monnoyer-Smith & Wojcik, 2011; Steffek & Hahn, 2010; Steiner, 2004; 
Stie, 2008; Stromer-Galley, 2007)2.   
While all of these studies share an understanding of the importance of deliberation as a 
source of legitimacy, variations in the theoretical interpretations of deliberative theory, 
together with the inevitable procedural differences which exist between institutional 
contexts means that there is no universal approach to the assessment of deliberative 
procedural legitimacy which can straightforwardly be applied to any case study. As such, 
in attempting to evaluate the legitimacy of standards development processes from a 
deliberative perspective, it is necessary to begin by carefully considering how to interpret 
the procedural standards identified by deliberative democrats within the specific historical 
and institutional context of web standardisation.  
With that in mind, I will now present an original analytical framework, developed 
specifically to assess the procedural legitimacy of standards consortia in the context of 
techno-policy standards development. 
Analytical Framework   
When approaching the development of an analytical framework for the 
assessment of web standards consortia, the first question that needs to address is which 
of the numerous potential indicators of procedural legitimacy to measure. Within the 
literature, there currently exists a wide range of frameworks for assessing procedural 
legitimacy from a deliberative perspective, all of which define, interpret and combine the 
various possible evaluative metrics of deliberative theory in slightly different ways. 
Steenbergen et al. (2003) for example, list a total of nine criteria of deliberative quality; 
including, participation, level of justification, content of justification, respect, and 
                                                             
2 Within the literature, there remains a great deal of debate over precisely where deliberation 
happens. Some scholars focus on traditional venues of political contestation such as parliaments 
(Steiner, 2004) or administrative committees (Joerges & Neyer, 1997), while others look to 
alternative and informal spheres of deliberation outside of institutional arrangements (Warren & 
Pearse, 2008; Wilhelm, 1999). 
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constructive politics. Whereas Schneider (1997, p. 72) uses just four dimensions (equality, 
diversity, reciprocity and quality) which, for him, ‘embody the spirit of the idealised public 
sphere’.  
The task of selecting indicators for inclusion in the analytical framework is further 
complicated by the wide range of terms used by theorist to denote similar concepts. The 
expectation that participants actively engage with and respond to the views of others, for 
example, is commonly referred to as ‘deliberativeness’ but has also been described using 
the terms ‘reciprocity’ (Graham, 2002), and ‘interactivity’ (Friess & Eilders, 2015). 
Despite these challenges, an extensive review of the existing literature reveals the 
following criteria to be those which deliberative theorists use most consistently to assess 
procedural legitimacy of deliberative processes.  
Table 3.1: Indicators of deliberative procedural legitimacy 
Indicator Meaning 
Inclusion All actors affected by the issues under discussion should be able 
to participate either directly or indirectly. Also referred to as 
‘discursive equality’ (Kies, 2010), and ‘participation’ 
(Steenbergen et al., 2003). 
Transparency All information relevant to the deliberations should be made 
available to participants, including records of discussions. 
Deliberativeness Participants should listen to the opinions of other participants 
and respond accordingly. Also referred to as ‘reciprocity’ 
(Graham, 2002), and ‘interactivity’ (Friess & Eilders, 2015). 
Justification Participants should support their opinions with reasons or 
justifications.  
Respectfulness Participants should conduct themselves in a professional 
manner.  




 In addition to the indicators listed in the table above, some scholars have also 
assessed the quality of deliberations in relation to indicators such as sincerity (Graham, 
2002), reflexivity (Jensen, 2003a) and empathy (Dahlberg, 2004). While the importance of 
these concepts to effective and legitimate deliberations is clear, assessing their presence 
within discussions empirically, presents a number of methodological challenges since they 
are largely internalised processes. This is particularly the case in studies which adopt a 
textual or content analysis approach (such as this one) since as Dahlberg (2004, p. 33) 
explains, ‘written communications may only show traces of such a subjective process’.   
As such, for the purposes of this study, the analysis of procedural legitimacy will be limited 
to the measurement of the inclusion, transparency, deliberativeness, justification, respect, 
and constructiveness all of which have been successfully operationalised to assess the 
quality of non-synchronous deliberations (Kies, 2010)3. Also, since ‘inclusion’ can relate 
both to the inclusion of individuals and discourses, this indicator will be measured across 
three dimensions, namely representation, participation and ‘discursive inclusion’ (see p. 
81-88).   
Having decided upon the indicators to include in the framework, a secondary question 
which needs to be addressed is how these indicators should be combined or arranged. In 
most previous studies of deliberative governance, scholars have typically chosen to 
maintain the analytical distinction between input legitimacy and throughput legitimacy. By 
making this distinction researchers are able not only to better disaggregate and organise 
the various criteria of deliberative democratic legitimacy but, to the extent that each of 
these categories refers to different aspects of the deliberative process, also develop 
insights into the relative strengths and weaknesses of the process at various stages. For 
example, in instances where the analysis reveals low levels of input legitimacy, this could 
                                                             
3 The choice of terminology for the indicators selected is partly influenced by common usage within 
the literature, but is also intended to reflect this study’s own particular interpretation of deliberative 
theory. The reasons underlying the decision to include each of these indicators are discussed in 
the corresponding sections below. 
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be an indicator of what Young (2002) termed ‘external exclusion’, wherein individuals or 
groups are denied access to the decision-making process, either as a result of deliberate 
restrictions on participation or through a lack of sufficient means for counter-discourses to 
be considered as part of the deliberation. Alternatively, in a situation where the analysis 
reveals high levels of input legitimacy, but low levels of throughput legitimacy, this could 
suggest, that the problem is not the ‘external exclusion’ of minority viewpoints, but rather 
more subtle forms of ‘internal exclusion’ that Young (2002, p. 53) argues sometimes occur 
once counter-discourses have been transmitted to the process itself. These could include, 
for example, instances whereby ‘the terms of discourse make assumptions some do not 
share, [or] the interaction privileges specific styles of expression’.  
Figure 3.1: Analytical Framework 
Procedural Legitimacy 
Input Legitimacy Throughput Legitimacy 
Inclusion 







 Given the potential analytical benefits of distinguishing between the input and 
throughput aspects of deliberative processes, for the purposes of the study, each of the 
indicators listed above was categorised accordingly (see Figure 3.1) (Scharpf, 1999; 
Schmidt, 2013; Zürn, 2004)4.  
                                                             
4 Scharpf’s original distinction between input and output legitimacy can largely be thought of as 
equivalent to that made in the previous chapter between procedural and substantive forms of 
normative legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999). Later scholars have since introduced the notion of 
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After selecting and arranging the indicators appropriately, the final stage is to determine 
how to interpret each of these indicators in the specific context of web standardisation. As 
described in the previous chapter, to do so, it is crucial not only to consider insights 
derived from the theory but also the specific political culture and norms of the organisation 
itself. Specifically, it is important to consider the expectations of stakeholders in relation to 
the balance between substantive and procedural aspects of legitimacy as well as any 
limitations that might prevent the organisation from adopting certain kinds of procedure.  
In what follows, I examine each of the indicators selected, highlighting some of the 
controversies and debates within the literature as well as describing how each indicator 
will be interpreted for the purposes of this study5.  
Inclusion  
 Until quite recently, direct participation in web standards development has tended 
to be limited to organisations such as telecommunications companies and browser 
vendors who are directly involved in their implementation (Jakobs, 2003; Kahin & Abbate, 
1995; Russell, 2014). However, as the size and scope of the web have expanded, so too 
has the diversity of actors potentially affected by the design of web standards, leading to 
growing pressure on standards bodies to better represent the interests of a broader range 
of stakeholders including, civil society groups and users from developing nations. The 
pressure on standards bodies to be more inclusive has recently been amplified by their 
involvement in the development of techno-policy standards. However, given their lack of 
formal mechanisms of representations, precisely how standards bodies should be 
expected to facilitate the fair and balanced representation of a diverse range of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
‘throughput’ legitimacy to refer to those aspects of input legitimacy which specifically related to the 
conduct of the decision-making processes themselves, including the quality of deliberations 
(Schmidt, 2013).   
5 The purpose of this chapter is strictly to outline the indicators that will be used to assess the 
procedural legitimacy of the W3C and how these can be interpreted in the context of web 
standardisation. For a discussion of how each of these indicators was studied empirically, see 
chapter four.  
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stakeholder groups remains unclear (Abbate, 2000; Cerf, 1993; Egyedi, 2003; Garfinkel, 
1998). 
 
For deliberative democrats, how to equitably represent the interests and opinions of 
relevant actors within political decision-making processes is a central question of 
democratic legitimacy (Bohman, 1998; Cohen, 1989; Dryzek, 2001; Thompson & 
Gutmann, 2004). In contrast to elitist democratic theories, which overwhelmingly 
preference the delegation of responsibility for deliberation to a exclusive class of 
politicians, administrators and experts (Brennan, 2016; Lippmann, 1946; Schumpeter, 
2013), the majority of deliberative democrats emphasise the importance of direct 
participation in deliberative processes by all relevant stakeholders (Bohman, 1998; 
Cohen, 1989; Dryzek, 2001; Thompson & Gutmann, 2004). From this perspective, 
outcomes can be considered to be legitimate only ‘to the extent that they receive reflective 
assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in 
question’ (Dryzek, 2001, p. 651).  
While prioritising direct participation over-representation may help to circumvent some of 
the logistical challenges faced by electoral forms of representation at the transnational 
level, in doing so, critics observe how deliberative democrats risk generating an entirely 
different set of problems, most notably relating to the deliberative capacity of participants 
and scalability (Parkinson, 2003).  
Firstly, while critics such as Posner (2005) and Brennan (2016) acknowledge the 
normative justification for the inclusion of all relevant actors, they nevertheless raise 
concerns about the effects that greater citizen participation could have on the 
effectiveness of transnational institutions as well as the quality of their substantive 
outputs. Specifically, they question the extent to which all those affected by a particular 
issue can be expected to possess the required level of deliberative capacity to contribute 
effectively and rationally to the deliberations, as well as the apparent assumption that their 
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inclusion will necessarily lead to a more informed or rational outcome (Brennan, 2016; 
Posner, 2005; Schumpeter, 2013). For theorists such as Schumpeter (2013) and 
Lippmann (1946), attempts to accommodate laypersons in technical decision-making, 
risks jeopardising the quality of deliberative outputs, since most participants are unlikely to 
possess the requisite expertise or technical knowledge necessary to participate 
effectively. Instead, they recommend a more minimalist approach to inclusion, in which 
decision-making authority is conferred only upon an elite group of experts or politicians, 
and the role of the public is constrained to participation in cyclical elections. By placing 
such restraints on participation, they argue that governing institutions will be better able to 
balance the need for public interest representation while also maintaining the coherence 
and effectiveness of the process. 
This problem of deliberative competence is arguably particularly acute in the context of 
transnational technocratic institutions such as standards development bodies, where the 
highly technical nature of discussions requires participants to possess a certain level of 
expert knowledge in order to contribute actively or effectively to deliberations. In such 
contexts, commentators observed how attempts to broaden participation will likely fail to 
deliver the types of substantive benefits that deliberative democrats desire since non-
experts will in most cases lack adequate comprehension of the issues at hand (Jakobs, 
1998).  
Responding to these critiques, many deliberative theorists have noted how the apparent 
opposition between expert and lay knowledge often overlooks the manifold ways in which 
non-experts can positively contribute to complex and even technical decision-making 
processes. Fischer (2000), for example, observes how in relation to moral or ethical 
considerations, scientists, technical experts, and policy-makers have no greater expertise 
than citizens. By including a diverse range of actors, therefore, it is argued that decision-
makers will be able to gain a broader understanding of the social implications of their 
decisions and thus help to avoid controversy or unforeseen consequences (Habermas, 
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1985; Rawls, 2001; Thompson & Gutmann, 2004). Furthermore, some deliberative 
theorists also observe how the act of participating itself may help non-experts to develop 
their deliberative capacity by providing them with the opportunity to inform themselves of 
the issues (Doble, 1995; Joss & Durant, 1995). 
In addition to the problem of deliberative competence, some critics have raised concerns 
about the scalability of deliberative practices to the transnational level. Specifically, critics 
of deliberative democracy note how, with the exception of deliberations in which the 
number of stakeholders is minimal, direct participation can quickly make deliberative 
processes unruly and impractical (Mutz, 2006). As Dahl notes, ‘if an association were to 
make one decision a day, allow ten hours a day for discussion, and permit each member 
just ten minutes – rather extreme assumptions […] – then the association could not have 
more than sixty members’(Dahl, R. A., 1990: 67-68) 6.  
As with the problem of deliberative competence, the challenge of scalability is arguably 
particularly acute within the context of transnational technocratic institutions and in 
particular web standards bodies, where the global nature of the issues discussed mean 
that those counted as stakeholders could justifiably include anyone capable of connecting 
to the internet via a web browser7. In the case of the W3C for example, the need to limit 
the scope of participation in order to maintain procedural efficiency, was cited by the 
consortium’s founder Tim Berners-Lee, as one of the main motivations behind his decision 
                                                             
6 One possible solution to the problem of scalability is to conduct deliberations through highly 
structured interactions or otherwise impose procedural constraints on deliberative encounters, for 
example by limiting the time allocated to individuals to speak. In doing so, it may be possible to 
alleviate some of the concerns around time whilst also ensuring that the time and resources 
needed to deliberate are divided more equitably among participants.  Critics note, however, that 
such practices may limit the scope of deliberations – since there is unlikely to be sufficient time or 
resources allotted to each participant in order to achieve a meaningful interaction. As a 
consequence, it is argued conflicting or divergent perspectives risk being downplayed in favour of 
weak consensus statements (Jakobs, 1998). 
7 Since it now seems inevitable that by the end of the century most if not all of the billions of people 
who are currently without access to the internet will be connected, this argument could be extended 
even further to include those whom, whilst not presently connected to the internet, could 




to restrict direct participation in the process to fee-paying member organisations and 
invited experts  (Berners-Lee, 2000). 
By highlighting the limitations of large-scale deliberative practices both in terms of 
deliberative competence and scalability, critics draw attention to what they perceive to be 
an inherent tension within deliberative theory between normative commitments to 
inclusivity and direct participation on the one hand, and deliberative quality and the 
effectiveness of transnational decision-making processes on the other. For critics, any 
deliberative fora that claim to provide genuine opportunities for participants to deliberate in 
a comprehensive and meaningful way must necessarily place limitations on who can 
participate (Brennan, 2016; Posner, 2005; Schumpeter, 2013).  Given the global effects of 
technical web standards, it is clear that direct participation by all relevant stakeholders is 
not a realistic or feasible approach to ensuring an inclusive process. If users and 
developers cannot participate directly in the process, however, then this leaves open the 
question of how their views should be represented?   
In response to critiques of direct participation, recent deliberative theorists have sought to 
deemphasise the importance of direct stakeholder involvement in deliberative processes, 
in favour of a more selective approach in which the interests of the public are represented 
by ‘political trustees’ (Eckersley, 2004). In particular, many scholars have highlighted the 
important role of civil society groups, whose democratising potential lies in their ability to 
enhance the representation of marginalised societal groups by channelling their views to 
policy-makers (Tallberg & Uhlin, 2011). In this way, scholars argue that the problem of 
under-representation may be circumvented through the inclusion of organisations whose 
professionalism, expertise and experience of policy-making processes mean that they can 
represent the viewpoints of minority or marginalised groups more effectively than would 
be possible if those groups were to participate directly in the process themselves (Steffek 
& Hahn, 2010; Tallberg & Uhlin, 2011). From this perspective, in order for a standards 
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body to demonstrate its inclusivity, it would simply need to evidence a sufficient level of 
participation by civil society groups. 
While this approach appears to resolve the problem of scalability, critics such as 
Peruzzotti (2006) nonetheless question the extent to which civil society actors can 
adequately fulfil the role of credible representatives of disadvantaged stakeholder groups. 
Peruzzotti observes, for example, how in most cases civil society actors themselves lack 
the democratic credentials of publicly elected bodies and are often unaccountable to those 
they claim to represent. Others meanwhile note how, far from reflecting the interests of 
those least able to represent themselves, civil society groups can at times become 
detached from the broader public interest, seeking instead to promote their own narrow 
political agendas (Edwards, 2000; Kohler-Koch, 2010). In the absence of formal electoral 
mechanisms, therefore, critics argue that any so-called ‘representatives’ will inevitably be 
unaccountable to those they claim to represent. Finally, Parkinson (2003) highlights how a 
reversion to a more selective or representative approach to inclusion, will also inevitably 
introduce the problem of whom to include. As Parkinson (2003, p. 181) himself observes; 
‘deliberative decisions appear to be illegitimate for those left outside the forum while 
bringing more than a few in would quickly turn the event into speech-making, not 
deliberation’. 
In response to these concerns, some deliberative theorists have gone further, arguing that 
efforts to ensure the inclusion of all relevant viewpoints within deliberative processes 
should not be limited to the representation of individuals or social groups, but should more 
importantly focus on the representation of viewpoints or discourses themselves - defined 
as ‘categories and concepts embodying specific assumptions, judgments, contentions, 
dispositions, and capabilities’ (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008, p. 481). In this way, Dryzek 
(2001, p. 660) argues that interpreting inclusivity should involve, ‘detaching the idea of 
legitimacy from a headcount of... reﬂectively consenting individuals conferring legitimacy 
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instead on collective agreements which are consistent with the “constellation of 
discourses”’.    
In elaborating their notion of ‘discursive representation’, Dryzek and Stevenson (2012) 
distinguish between the public space of opinion formation and the empowered space 
where collective decision-making takes place8. Within this framing, the legitimacy of a 
deliberative forum can be judged by the accuracy with which the plurality of discourses 
present within the public space – including radical, subversive or counter-discourses - are 
transmitted to the empowered space (Dryzek & Stevenson, 2012)9. Thus, in the context of 
standardisation, a discursively inclusive organisation would be one that was able to 
successfully integrate broader discussions of matters of public concerns with its 
development process.  
By emphasising the importance of discursive representation over direct participation, 
Dryzek and Stevenson (2012) claim to be able to overcome concerns about the effect of 
large-scale participation on the effectiveness of institutions, since the approach places no 
requirements on the number or type of individuals that need to participate. At the same 
time, by adopting a discursive approach to inclusion, they also claim to be able to avoid 
the risk of certain viewpoints not being adequately represented by delegates, and 
therefore the prospect of so-called ‘enclave deliberations’ in which a small number of 
hegemonic discourses dominate deliberative spaces to the exclusion of marginal voices 
(Bäckstrand, 2013; Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008; Dryzek & Stevenson, 2012).  
                                                             
8 This approach to deliberative democracy builds upon Habermas' earlier distinction between the 
processes of opinion-formation in the public sphere and will-formation in formal decision-making 
institutions. Furthermore, this distinction between the empowered and public spaces can also be 
understood in the context of a broader ‘systemic turn' in deliberative theory which interprets the act 
of deliberation as a polity-wide phenomenon (Mansbridge et al., 2012). 
9 For Dryzek the means through which discourses in the public space can influence deliberations in 
the empowered space is captured by the concept of transmission mechanisms. These can include 
the work of activist campaigns and social movements or formal and informal links between relevant 
actors in the public and empowered spaces (Dryzek, 2000, 2012). 
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Despite the obvious applicability of the concept of discursive inclusion to transnational 
technocratic governance, to date, the inclusivity of standards development organisations 
has most commonly been assessed in relation to the diversity of their memberships 
(representation) and the scope of participation within their technical working groups 
(participation). While, such metrics provide useful insights into the overall openness of 
standards processes, they nevertheless only offer researchers a superficial understanding 
of the organisation’s inclusivity, since - as described above - the mere presence of a 
stakeholder group does not necessarily suggest that they will be effective in representing 
their own interests or the interests of those they supposedly represent.  
As such, in order to provide a more comprehensive and accurate assessment of 
inclusivity within standards bodies, for the purpose of this study, the criterion of inclusion 
will be assessed not only in relation to representation and participation but also the 
discursive inclusivity of deliberations. To be considered as procedurally legitimate, 
therefore, standards bodies must demonstrate not only a diverse and active membership 
but also the ability to channel any publicly expressed concerns about its work into the 
deliberations of its technical working groups. 
Transparency 
 Despite the importance of standards to the global economy, the transparency of 
standards development processes can vary dramatically from organisation to 
organisation. While some standards bodies such as the IETF have been commended for 
the openness with which their working groups operate (Froomkin, 2003), others remain far 
more secretive and so less exposed to external scrutiny. Historically, such closed working 
practices have been justified on the grounds of corporate confidentially and the privacy of 
individual members. However, as the intersection of standards development and policy-
making has become increasingly evident, there have been growing calls for standards 
bodies to publicise their activities and be more transparent in the way that they operate.  
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From a deliberative democratic perspective, the principle of transparency has for a long 
time been considered as a cornerstone of procedural legitimacy. For many deliberative 
democrats, transparency can help to ensure that participants act authentically and are 
held accountable for their decisions (Habermas, 2006; Mena & Palazzo, 2012). 
Furthermore, theorists claim that transparency may also serve to encourage participants 
to provide the best possible justifications for their premises and conclusions, thereby 
increasing the rationality and quality of collective decision-making (Thompson & Gutmann, 
2004). 
Although some theorists tentatively warn of possible side effects to excessive publicity 
including, political point-scoring or political theatre, most of these concerns generally 
relate political decision-making processes at the national level which may be subject to 
high levels of media attention (Chambers, 2003; Stasavage, 2007 ). At the transnational 
level, by contrast, there is broad recognition of the normative importance of transparency 
and public awareness. This is particularly true in the case of technical standards bodies, 
whose work is often esoteric and obscure to most (Kica & Bowman, 2012; Uhlin, 2010).  
Procedurally speaking, transparency as a criterion of normative legitimacy is relevant 
throughout the deliberative process from agenda-setting to decision-making and can refer 
to the accessibility of general information relevant to the deliberations as well as the 
content of the deliberations themselves. In the case of the former, transparency is 
interpreted in terms of the availability of the all information necessary for participants to 
engage fully in the decision-making process. Such materials could include, for example, 
requirements documents, technical specifications or policies. The availability of this 
information, allows participants to inform themselves of the relevant facts and so develop 
their own opinions prior to the deliberations themselves (Nanz & Steffek, 2005).  
The second aspect of transparency relates to the public accessibility of the records of the 
deliberations themselves as well as the openness of the decision-making process. This 
90 
 
aspect of transparency is often considered as critical to deliberative processes since the 
knowledge that their contribution will be available for public scrutiny often motivates 
participants to engage in more respectful and constructive discourse. Furthermore, the 
transparency of decision-making also encourages accountability, since there will be a 
public record of the preferences and opinions expressed by stakeholders during 
deliberations.   
Given the growing pressure on standards bodies to adopt more open working practices, 
for the purpose of this study the criterion of transparency will be used as an indicator of 
procedural legitimacy. In order to been considered procedurally legitimate, therefore, it is 
expected that standards bodies make all records relating to the development of their 
standards publicly available. This might include the publication of documents such as 
technical specifications and policies as well as records relating to working group 
deliberations including meeting minutes and mailing list archives.   
Deliberativeness 
 Given that the development of any standard will necessarily require the interaction 
of a diverse range of stakeholders, it is widely accepted that standards bodies should – at 
a bare minimum – help to facilitate discussions between competing interest groups and 
ensure that any concerns raised during the process are appropriately and adequately 
addressed. In some instances, the role of initiating discussions is delegated to working 
group chairs who often act as the unofficial moderators of working group discussions. In 
other cases, norms of reciprocity are more formally codified as part of the standards 
process itself. For example, in the case of the W3C, the consortium’s process document 
explicitly establishes as a precondition of a specifications progression along the standards 
track, the requirement that chairs directly address and responded to all formal objections 
(W3C, 2017d).   
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For deliberative theorists such as Bohman (1996), deliberations are at their most basic 
social processes, involving not only the giving of opinions but also the listening and 
responding to the opinions of others. Without due consideration of the arguments of 
others, scholars warn that deliberations risk becoming simple acts of speech-making, in 
which competing arguments are never brought into productive dialogue. Given that 
deliberative theory distinguishes itself from aggregative theories of democracy on the 
basis that the opinions of individuals are not fixed but malleable (and therefore amenable 
to ‘the force of the better argument’) the requirement that deliberations be interactive, and 
thus, facilitate the engagement of individuals with arguments with which they might 
disagree, is a central component of procedural legitimacy (Habermas, 1985).  
On the one hand, by ensuring that all relevant opinions are fully considered, theorists 
claim that participants will be better placed to identify common values as well as possible 
areas of compromise (Bohman, 1996; Cohen, 1989; Habermas, 1985). On the other hand, 
deliberative democrats observe how the criterion of deliberativeness is crucial to avoid 
certain forms of ‘internal exclusion’, whereby minority demands are included, but 
patronised, treated dismissively or simply ignored (Young, 2002)10. In this way, 
deliberative theorists highlight the importance of deliberativeness not only from a 
pragmatic perspective but also a normative perspective, noting how the mere presence or 
visibility of a given discourse within a debate does not necessarily guarantee that 
decision-makers will genuinely consider it as part of the decision-making process.  
Given the normative importance attributed to the principle of reciprocity by both the 
standards community and deliberative scholars, for the purpose of this research the 
criterion of “deliberativeness” will be used as an indicator of procedural legitimacy.  For a 
                                                             
10 This need for deliberative interactivity is sometimes referred to by principle of reciprocity. 
Graham (2002, p. 45) defines reciprocity as “the taking in (listening, reading) of another’s claim or 
reason and giving a response”. For Schneider (1997, p. 74) meanwhile, reciprocity “refers to the 
notion that people are engaged in conversation with each other, and that their messages are 
reflected upon and discussed by others”.  
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standards body to be considered procedurally legitimate, therefore, it is crucial that 
discourses and opinions are not merely present within discussions but also actively 
engaged with and addressed throughout the process.  
Justification 
 Historically, the relative homogeneity of the web standards community together 
with the technical nature of standardisation has meant that disagreements regarding 
standards development have mostly related to technical differences. Given the technical 
communities preference for resolving such issues through rigorous testing and ‘running 
code’, the need for participants to explicitly justify their opinions has until recently been 
quite limited. However, as the increased prevalence of techno-policy standards has begun 
to introduce value-based considerations into the development of standards, there have 
been growing demands for standards participants to not only express their preferences but 
also to justify their positions in relation to the increasing number of public policy objectives, 
which they pursue through standardisation (Morris, 2011). While such demands are not 
unreasonable given the potential social impact of techno-policy standards, precisely what 
forms of argumentation standards participants are expected to engage in or what level of 
justification would be deemed sufficient remains unclear. 
For deliberative democrats, the expectation that participants not only state their 
preferences but also provide reasons or evidence which explains or justifies those 
preferences is an important aspect of legitimate deliberative governance (Steenbergen et 
al., 2003). By ensuring that reasons or evidence sufficiently support all viewpoints, 
deliberative democrats claim that participants will be better equipped to understand the 
positions of their opponents, and so will be better placed to identify possible areas of 
compromise or common ground (Graham, 2002). Equally, they observe how by requiring 
deliberators to justify their beliefs, the arguments presented will be more accessible to 
critique and scrutiny, thereby enabling participants to more easily offer counter-evidence. 
In this way, deliberative democrats argue that ‘justification’ must be considered as a vital 
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aspect of any deliberative process, providing as it does, both a basis on which the 
development of consensus is possible, as well as a mechanism through which 
deliberators can be held accountable. Furthermore, without reason-giving, theorists claim 
that deliberation will simply degrade into a process of preference statement and 
aggregation (Wilsdon & Willis, 2004). 
In addition to the general requirement that participants provide reasons to support their 
preferences, early deliberative democrats, including Habermas himself, made a number of 
normative demands concerning the precise form and substance of the justifications given. 
In relation to the form, early deliberative democrats argued that in order to be considered 
legitimate, reasons should be expressed logically or rationally (Habermas, 1985). Echoing 
Aristotle’s claim that laws could be legitimate only to the extent that they were the product 
of ‘reason unaffected by desire’ (Aristotle, 1943), early deliberative scholars argued that 
requiring arguments to be expressed rationally would prevent participants from presenting 
irrational, subjective or spurious claims which lack supporting evidence.   
By formulating their concept of deliberation in terms of a distinction between rational and 
irrational, or legitimate and illegitimate forms of communication, critics argue that 
deliberative democrats risk reinforcing existing hierarchies as well as excluding forms of 
knowledge which do not meet the required levels of scientificity or erudition. Drawing on 
post-positivist critics of science, and more specifically on the work of Michael Foucault, 
critics claim that this rationalist bias of first-generation deliberative democracy neglects the 
normalising and coercive power involved in the designation of a particular form of 
communication as rational or legitimate (Dean, 1996; Mouffe, 1999; Young, 2001). They 
observe for example, how by designating a particular form of communication (most 
commonly masculine and western forms) as “rational”, deliberative democrats effectively 
force participants to internalise the rules and norms of that mode of deliberation or else 
risk being excluded from the public sphere (Dean, 1996; Villa, 1992). The effect of this, 
critics argue, is to privilege and reinforce existing hierarchies of power and influence, while 
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excluding those radical or marginalised groups which do not conform to the ‘rational’ 
forms of communication prescribed by deliberative elites.   
In this way, critics such as Young (2001) and Mansbridge et al. (2010) observe how early 
versions of deliberative democratic theory have tended to discount a wide range of 
communicative modes, including protest, activism, humour, and irony. While these forms 
of communication do not conform to the supposedly rational forms of discourse prescribed 
by early elaborations of deliberative theory, they highlight how they can nonetheless 
enrich deliberations, offering alternative means for sometimes marginalise discourses to 
be injected into the political process. As Mansbridge et al. (2010, p. 67) explain ‘stories 
can establish credibility, create empathy, and trigger a sense of injustice, all of which 
contribute directly or indirectly to justification’.  
For many, these forms of exclusion are particularly concerning in the context of 
technocratic organisations such as standards bodies, where the highly technical nature of 
the work conducted often means that there are clear demarcations between expert and 
non-expert, and between technical and non-technical discourses (Estlund, 2003; Hamlett, 
2003)11. Within such forums, commentators observe how the relative influence of 
participants is often closely correlated to their perceived technical expertise or subject 
knowledge, with non-expert or non-technical discourses often marginalised or excluded 
altogether (Hamlett, 2003; Lövbrand, Pielke Jr, & Beck, 2011)12. As such, when 
considering the appropriate forms of argumentation which should be present in order to 
                                                             
11 For STS theorists, the normative value of deliberative theory is its potential to open up processes 
of technological development to critical interventions by non-experts. By prescribing a rational form 
of discourse which privileges expert knowledge, many observe how early iterations of deliberative 
theory seem to enable precisely the kinds of coercion and elitism that STS scholars seek to avoid 
(Lövbrand, Pielke Jr, & Beck, 2011).  
12 The exclusion of lay voices is not uncommon in technical fora where citizen rationality is often 
constructed as ill-equipped to deal with the complex issues associated with modern science and 
technology. As Hamlett (2003, p. 125) observes, ‘often in this account, the public is depicted as 
inattentive to potentially troublesome issues in the development of new technologies, and if they do 
get involved, their participation is sporadic, uninformed, and too often driven by misinformation and 




legitimise a standards process, it is important not to prioritise technical rationality over 
other forms of reason unfairly.  
In addition to designating an appropriate form that justification should take, Habermas and 
many other early deliberative democrats also sought to specify the appropriate content of 
justifications. Specifically, they argued that in order for deliberation to be legitimate the 
justifications or reasons given by participants should be expressed in terms of the 
‘common good’, as opposed to self-interest. As Habermas (1985, p. 285-286) himself put 
it, communicative action requires that; 
‘participating actors are not coordinated via egocentric calculations of success, 
but through acts of understanding. Participants are not primarily oriented 
toward their own success in communicative action; they pursue their individual 
goals under the condition that they can coordinate their action plans on the 
basis of shared deﬁnitions of the situation’. 
Thus, for Habermas, the production of a rational consensus among participants in 
deliberative processes is possible only to the extent that they are willing and able to look 
beyond their own narrow strategic interests. In order for deliberations to achieve their goal 
of a mutually agreeable outcome, therefore, scholars argue that deliberative fora must 
ensure that all justifications and reasons are presented in a way that will be acceptable to 
all participants.  
As with the stipulation that justifications be expressed rationally, deliberative democrat’s 
attempt to exclude strategic interests has also attracted criticism. Firstly, critics question 
the extent to which individuals can realistically be expected to put to one side their 
strategic interests, or for that matter, the extent to which doing so would be desirable. 
Parkinson (2003) for example, notes how an individual’s pre-formed preferences are often 
that which motivates them to participate in deliberative processes in the first place. By 
rejecting the validity of these interests, he argues, a deliberative forum runs the risk of 
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being perceived as procedurally unfair, and thus illegitimate, by those whose views it has 
excluded.  In the context of web standardisation, this stipulation seems particularly 
strange since stakeholders who join standards bodies do so explicitly for the purpose of 
defending or promoting their own interests.  
Similarly, others have argued that far from representing a barrier to consensus, the 
inclusion of strategic or private interests can be an essential part of developing a common 
understanding of the problems to be resolved, and therefore the range of acceptable 
options available. Mansbridge et al. (2010) for example, note how it is important for 
minority or otherwise marginalised groups to have the opportunity to express their 
personal grievances and concerns, which might otherwise be neglected or remain 
unheard. As Mansbridge et al. (2010, p. 72-75) put it, 
 ‘including self-interest in deliberative democracy reduces the possibility of 
exploitation or obfuscation, introduces information that facilitates reasonable 
solutions and the identification of integrative outcomes, and also motivates 
vigorous and creative deliberation. Including self-interest in the regulative 
ideal of deliberative democracy embraces the diversity of human objectives 
as well as the diversity of human opinions’ (Mansbridge et al., 2010: 72-75)  
In response to these criticisms, more recent deliberative theorists have more sought to 
soften their position both in regards to rationality and strategic interests. Instead, they 
attempt to overcome the exclusions inherent in designating certain types of justification 
legitimate, by proposing more inclusive conceptual models of deliberation which permit 
specific uses of strategic bargaining as well as non-conventional forms of argumentation 
such as story-telling or humour (Sanders, 1997). For many contemporary deliberative 
theorists, what is of greater concern is not the precise form or substance of a particular 
justification or reason, but simply whether arguments are supported by justifications and 
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therefore accessible to the scrutiny and critique of other participants at all (Bohman, 1996; 
Manin, 1987).  
Given the understandable concerns regarding the evaluation of deliberative quality in 
relation to a specific form of justification, for the purposes of this study, the ‘rationality' of 
deliberations will be assessed purely in terms of the presence of justification. Thus, while 
participants are not expected to engage in any particular form of argumentation, in order 
for a standards body to be deemed legitimate it is nonetheless anticipated that when 
expressing their preferences standards participants will provide some evidence or 
justification for their choices.  
Respect  
 Like all negotiations involving a diverse range of interests, web standards 
development processes often require participants to express their opinions and 
preferences in a robust and straightforward way. While such exchanges are to be 
expected - and to some extent encouraged - within the standards community, it is 
nonetheless broadly recognised that in order for standards processes to remain effective 
and legitimate, it is essential for contributors to conduct themselves in a civil and 
professional manner (W3C, 2015a).  
The need for standards participants to treat each other with mutual respect was 
recognised at an early stage by web developers, who quickly set about formulating a set 
of general rules for web-mediated interactions or what has become known as netiquette 
(Hambridge, 1995)13.  More recently, these social norms have been formally codified into 
the various codes of conduct which are used to govern the behaviour of contributors to the 
mailing lists of most contemporary web standards bodies. These guidelines commonly 
                                                             
13 The RFC 1885 Netiquette Guidelines represent an early attempt to codify norms of behaviour for 
web-mediated discussions. In the document, Sally Hambridge (1995) outlines a long list of do's and 
don't, including the suggestions to ‘be conservative in what you send and liberal in what you 
receive', ‘use mixed case. UPPER CASE LOOKS AS IF YOU'RE SHOUTING', and ‘wait overnight 
to send emotional responses to messages'.  
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reference the need for participants to ‘treat each other with respect, professionalism, [and] 
fairness’ and to ‘communicate constructively and avoid demeaning or insulting behaviour 
or language’ (W3C, 2015a). However, precisely how participants are expected to interpret 
or enforce these rules is by no means clear and in practice is often left to the discretion of 
working group chairs who regularly acts as mailing list moderators. 
Although the issue of ‘respect’ is in some ways closely related to that of ‘rationality’, many 
deliberative theorists nevertheless emphasise the importance of mutual respect for both 
listeners and speakers alike as an indicator of procedural legitimacy in its own right. As 
Jane Mansbridge et al. (2010, p. 2-3) acknowledged, ‘participants should treat each other 
with mutual respect and concern. They should listen to each other and give reasons to 
one another that they think the others can comprehend and accept’.  
The notion that participants in a deliberation orientated towards consensus should be 
respectful may at first glance appear to be self-evident. Nevertheless, within the literature, 
there exists a degree of controversy concerning the precise definition of respect and 
whether or not respect should be accorded to all arguments regardless of how irrational or 
distasteful they may be.  
As with concerns regarding the requirement for justifications to be rational, critics argue 
that by mandating that speech must be ‘respectful’ deliberative democrats risk stifling or 
excluding certain forms of communication, such as protest or humour, which are often 
present within deliberations (Testa, 2012; Young, 2001). For Young (2001), these types of 
confrontational or adversarial forms of discourse, far from being detrimental to 
deliberations, are critical to the proper functioning of a deliberative democracy, which 
should hold at its core, a commitment to the robust contestation of discourses and ideas. 
Such observations highlight the need to make a couple of important distinctions regarding 
the acceptable use of confrontational forms of discourse. Firstly, it is necessary to 
distinguish between an impassioned or aggressive rebuke of a particularly distasteful 
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viewpoint by countering its arguments or debunking its premise on the one hand, and the 
complete disregard of that viewpoint from consideration altogether because it is distasteful 
and therefore beyond respectful engagement, on the other. While the former is to be 
expected within any discussion of a controversial topic, the later risks leading to forms of 
‘internal exclusion’ that are hard to justify on normative grounds and which run contrary to 
the basic presuppositions of deliberative theory (Young, 2002). As Rostbøll (2008, p. 103) 
points out;  
‘[a] basic assumption underlying deliberative democracy, as I see it, is that no 
one has privileged access to truth or the true interests of others. The only way 
to arrive at judgements that have the presumption of having right on their side 
is through public processes of deliberation where everyone is free and able to 
participate.’ 
The second important distinction to make regarding the use of confrontational rhetoric is 
between a robust engagement with the content of an opponent’s argument and 
aggressive criticism of the speaker as an individual or their right to participate in the 
discussion. In the case of the latter, deliberative theorists observe how the direct criticism 
of individuals can undermine their willingness to engage or make compromises. Others 
meanwhile note how ad hominem attacks may also result in indirect forms of exclusion, 
such as in cases where personal attacks cause an individual or group to leave or abstain 
from discussions altogether (Bächtiger, Steenbergen, & Niemeyer, 2007).   
Whilst in practice it may be difficult for participants to hold no preconceptions about the 
quality or credibility of an opponent’s arguments based on personal traits such as their 
character, reputation, or accreditation, scholars nevertheless stress the need for 
arguments to be judged on the basis of their rationality and the credibility of the reasons 
supporting them (Rostbøll, 2008). Failure to do so may ultimately lead to a regression to a 
hierarchical form of governance, in which the ability to influence the outcome of a 
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deliberation is premised on social status or perceived expertise of participants rather than 
the quality of the arguments which they present (Rostbøll, 2008).   
Given the potential risks involved in defining the concept of respect too broadly, to assess 
the legitimacy of the standards development processes, ‘respect’ will be interpreted simply 
as the absence of personal attacks or unjustified neglect or dismissal of an individual’s 
views on the basis of their identity. To be considered procedurally legitimate, what is 
important, is not necessarily that participants respect each other’s opinions but that they 
respect each other and give due consideration to all arguments and opinions presented 
regardless of the race, gender, reputation, or credentials of the person expressing them.   
Constructiveness  
 In the context of web standardisation, consensus – or more precisely “rough 
consensus” – is commonly perceived as the ultimate objective of deliberations and the 
primary metric by which the success and legitimacy of standards processes are 
measured. While precise definitions of ‘rough consensus’ vary, most commentators tend 
to interpret the term to mean the absence of strong or principled objections to proposals 
(Crocker, 1993). Given the shared principles and values of the early web standards 
community, until quite recently the goal of achieving rough consensus could largely be 
considered as a realistic one. However, as web standards development processes have 
become increasingly contested and politicised, commentators observe how widespread 
agreement among participants on technical proposals is now rarely guaranteed (Morris, 
2011). In this context, some commentators have begun to question what forms of 
consensus are sufficient to legitimise technical outputs, with some even casting doubt on 
whether the explicit pursuit of consensus as a deliberative objective is still realistic or even 
desirable (Malcolm, 2013).    
For many early deliberative democratic theorists, rational consensus, achieved through an 
open and deliberative process, represented the ultimate objective of any decision-making 
101 
 
process and the ‘gold standard’ of political justification and legitimacy (Dryzek, 2012). By 
orientating deliberative processes towards the development of a broad-based consensus, 
theorists argued that deliberative democratic fora could avoid the kinds of coercion often 
associated with majoritarian decision-making since processes would by their very nature 
produce collective decisions to which all participants give their tacit assent (Cohen, 1989; 
Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2006; Habermas, 1985).  
Habermas recognised that within any political community there would inevitably exist a 
plurality of interests. Nevertheless, by engaging in a free and open debate, he claimed 
that participants would be able to identify common values and norms which together could 
form the basis of collective action, without having to resort to metaphysical foundations 
(Habermas, 1985). As Cohen (1989, p. 78) observes, from this perspective the 
‘characterisation of an ideal deliberative procedure links the formal notion of deliberative 
democracy with the more substantive ideal of a democratic association in which public 
debate is focused on the common good of the members’. 
However, just as deliberative democrats’ determination that participants engage in 
‘rational’ discourse drew strong criticism from poststructuralists who saw such 
prescriptions as exclusionary, the call for participating actors to put to one side their 
differences in pursuit of the ‘common good’ has also proved to be a soft target for critics of 
deliberative theory. By projecting rational consensus as the ultimate objective of 
deliberations, critics note how deliberative democrats implicitly assume the existence of 
an objective and universal common good which is knowable to participants if only their 
deliberative interactions can be procedurally constrained in such a way as to generate 
mutually acceptable justifications. Thus, although appeals to a universal common good 
may serve as a useful cognitive standard for the evaluation of deliberative processes, for 
critics, what constitutes the common good cannot be considered as an adjunct to the 
deliberations, but is crucially, itself a matter of contestation (Dahlberg, 2007a; Kadlec & 
Friedman, 2007; Mouffe, 1999).  
102 
 
In contrast to deliberative democrats’ expectation that justification from the perspective of 
the common good will inevitably lead to consensus, critical pluralists argue that the sheer 
plurality of voices involved in modern politics means that, regardless of its procedural 
legitimacy, any decision-making process will be unlikely to achieve consensus. As such, 
consensus-building, they argue, will always require some form of reductionism or 
compromise and so will inevitably also involve a certain degree of coercion (Dahlberg, 
2013; Fraser, 1990).  
For Mouffe and others, political processes orientated towards consensus will always tend 
to privilege those existing political hierarchies and hegemonic discourses which are 
powerful enough to dominate preceding at the expense of marginal groups or counter-
discourses (Mansbridge et al., 2010; Sanders, 1997). As Mouffe (2000, p. 22) herself 
comments, ‘to negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and aim at a universal 
rational consensus- that is the real threat to democracy. Indeed, this can lead to violence 
being unrecognised and hidden behind appeals to "rationality," as is often the case in 
liberal thinking’. Thus, for critical pluralists such as Mouffe, the objective of deliberation is 
not to achieve consensus but simply to facilitate the introduction of counter-publics into 
the political domain which can unveil and challenge the prejudices and assumptions of 
hegemonic discourses.  
Many of these concerns regarding the coercive effects of consensus have more recently 
been echoed by STS theorists, who like poststructuralist critics are cautious of the claims 
of universality implicit in early versions of deliberative theory (Lövbrand et al., 2011; 
Stirling, 2008). In the same way that claims of a universal rationality jar with STS’s 
constructivist ontological allegiances, scholars such as Lövbrand et al. (2011, p. 6) 
observe how deliberative democracy’s emphasis on consensus over plurality is counter to 
the work of many STS theorists, for whom, the ultimate purpose of citizen participation in 
technological processes is ‘not to reach the truth, or even agreement, on the common 
good…. [but rather] to make explicit the plurality of reasons, culturally embedded 
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assumptions and socially contingent knowledge that can inform collective action’. Thus, 
for many STS theorists and critical pluralists, consensus as an objective of deliberations is 
not only unrealistic but also risks obscuring genuine disagreement and as such 
marginalising dissenting voices.  
In attempting to address this problem and bridge the competing ideals of consensus and 
plurality, Niemeyer and Dryzek (2007) have proposed abandoning attempts to prescribe 
consensus as the only legitimate outcome of deliberations in favour of a less demanding 
requirement or what they describe as ‘meta-consensus’ (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2006; 
Niemeyer & Dryzek, 2007) 14.  At its most basic, meta-consensus refers to ‘a set of agreed 
forms of deliberative outputs (acceptable domain of preferences) that are the product of a 
similarly meta-consensual (mutually acceptable) domain of supporting values and beliefs 
that are agreed as legitimate and worthy of consideration by all, even if not all individuals 
come to actually agree with them or their implications’ (Bächtiger & Steenbergen, 2008, p. 
4). In contrast to what they describe as ‘simple consensus’ which requires unanimous 
agreement about deliberative outputs, meta-consensus simply requires participants to 
agree on an acceptable range of values, beliefs and preferences.  
In explicating their theory, Niemeyer and Dryzek (2007) begin by distinguishing between 
three types of consensus: normative, epistemic, and preference. Normative consensus 
refers to an agreement about the values and norms which inform the decision-making 
process. The second, epistemic consensus, pertains to an agreement about how specific 
actions or outcomes map onto those values in terms of cause and effect. Finally, the third, 
preference consensus relates quite straightforwardly to an agreement about what actions 
should be taken. Simple consensus, such as that promoted by early deliberative 
                                                             
14 Despite their acknowledgement of the tensions between consensus and plurality, most second 
generation deliberative theorists still maintain an understanding of consensus or at the very least 
compromise as the ultimate aim of any deliberative forum. Indeed, countering the critiques of 
Mouffe (2000) and other poststructuralists, Dryzek (2012) observes how the notion of agonistic 




democrats, would, Dryzek argues, ideally require agreement on all three of these aspects. 
Crucially however, Niemeyer and Dryzek (2007) claim that each of these elements of 
consensus has its own ‘meta’ counterpart which structures the process of deliberation. 
Firstly, normative meta-consensus implies a ‘reciprocal understanding and recognition of 
the legitimacy of the values held by other participants in political interaction’ (Dryzek & 
Niemeyer, 2006, p. 642). As such, the development of normative meta-consensus 
indicates that participants agree on the range of values that should be considered as part 
of the deliberations though not necessarily the priority that should be given to these values 
in their application to a particular proposal or policy. For Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006), one 
of the primary tasks of any deliberation encounter is to identify and make explicit 
commonly held values which can sometimes become obscured by the strategic actions of 
participants in their attempts to undermine the arguments of their opponents. Such values, 
it is argued, could, once revealed, form the basis of compromise and mediation as well as 
contribute to the overall respectfulness and rationality of deliberations. In the context of 
the standards development, this aspect of meta-consensus would relate to the agreement 
on the values that need to be considered in the development of a given standard such as 
its effects on interoperability, competition, user rights or innovation.  
 Secondly, epistemic meta-consensus refers to an agreement on “the credibility of 
disputed beliefs, and their relevance to the norms that define the issue at hand” (Dryzek & 
Niemeyer, 2006, p. 640). A deliberation can be judged to have achieved epistemic meta-
consensus if participants’ beliefs about the effects of a proposal or policy are accepted as 
credible by their opponents. Importantly, this does not mean that agreement is reached on 
the normative weight or likelihood of the belief, only that the belief is credible and worthy 
of consideration. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006) observe how the complexity and 
uncertainty associated with certain technical decisions can often preclude definitive 
explanations of phenomena, meaning that it is sometimes necessary to allow for equally 
credible beliefs about the effects of decision-making outcomes to co-exist. In the context 
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of the standards development, epistemic meta- consensus would relate to an agreement 
regarding the likely effects of a given proposal or standard. 
The final form of meta-consensus, preference meta-consensus, refers to an agreement 
regarding an acceptable range of alternative proposals. For Dryzek (2012, p. 106), 
preference meta-consensus is valuable to the extent that ‘it makes social choice less 
vulnerable to arbitrariness, instability, manipulation, by clever strategists’. Achieving 
preference meta-consensus thus reduces the opportunity for individuals to sabotage 
deliberations by proposing irrelevant or implausible alternatives, or conversely, to 
influence the outcome by unduly excluding feasible alternatives from the discussion. In 
relation to the development of technical web standards, preference meta-consensus 
would refer to the acceptance by participants of the plausibility of a set of counter-
proposals.  
By focusing on consensus at the meta-level rather than the simple level, Dryzek and 
Niemeyer (2006) argue that it is possible to ease the tension between the competing 
ideals of plurality and consensus and so avoid many of the potential pitfalls of early 
versions of deliberative theory identified by difference democrats15.  Using this approach, 
deliberative theory can preserve plurality at the level of simple consensus, while also 
achieving consensus at one or more of the meta-levels. By retaining space for 
disagreement, therefore, meta-consensus does not force partisan groups to change or 
abandon their views in the name of consensus (Pomatto, 2013).  
In the sense it requires the creation of a community of participants united by their 
acceptance of a shared set of values, norms, and beliefs, meta-consensus can be 
understood as a substantive outcome of deliberative practice and thus a criterion of 
substantive legitimacy. However, to the extent that agreements on the various aspects of 
                                                             
15 It remains important to emphasise the temporality and instability of any form of meta-consensus 
and to realise that, when achieved, meta-consensus should not represent an end-point of 
deliberations but rather an interval which needs to be continually tested and re-examined.   
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meta-consensus inevitably determine both the scope and character of the deliberations 
themselves, meta-consensus can also be interpreted as an important component of 
procedural legitimacy. That is, since the development of meta-consensus will determine 
the range of values and beliefs accepted as valid as well as the array of proposals and 
counter-proposals to be considered as part of the negotiations, the development of meta-
consensus can be seen not only as an important deliberative outcome but also as a 
prerequisite to productive deliberations, without which discussions become vulnerable to 
forms of internal exclusion and framing effects (Barisione, 2010).  
Ideally, of course, the development of meta-consensus would take place prior to the start 
of the deliberations themselves, most preferably through an open agenda-setting process 
which would itself be conducted in accordance with the procedural principles of 
deliberative democracy. While such an approach would maximise the chance of 
constructive discussions, theorists note how such open and cooperative agenda-setting 
processes are not always practical and may not necessarily guarantee meta-consensus. 
In the case of the W3C for example, requirement documents and proposals are usually 
developed between interested parties in private or in special ‘interest groups’ with 
community and public input on specification documents only sought once they have 
reached the stage of a working draft (W3C, 2017c).  
Give these limitations, what is crucial from a legitimacy standpoint is not that participants 
achieve meta-consensus prior to the deliberations beginning but rather that where 
disagreements over the over the validity of ideas, values or beliefs exist, opportunities are 
provided for existing deliberative frames to be challenged and for participants to work 
proactively to address differences in opinion by engaging in constructive exchanges 
orientated towards the generation of normative, epistemic and preference meta-
consensus.   
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Given the understandable concerns regarding both the feasibility and exclusionary 
implications of prescribing ‘simple consensus’ as a deliberative objective, for the purposes 
of this study the less stringent concept of meta-consensus will be used as an indicator of 
procedural legitimacy. To be considered as legitimate, what is important is not that 
standards processes yield unanimous agreement on technical outputs but simply that the 
deliberations themselves are orientated towards the generation of meta-consensus. From 
a practical perspective, this means not only that there exist opportunities for participants to 
reframe discussions but also that participants engage in “constructive” dialogue orientated 
towards the identification of common values and beliefs. By taking this approach, it is 
possible to maintain the possibility of plurality while also remaining committed to an 
understanding of deliberations as constructive processes. 
Conclusion  
 In this chapter, I have presented an original analytical framework for the 
assessment of techno-policy standards development processes. The framework is 
inspired by the work of early deliberative democratic theorists but also takes into 
consideration later critiques of their work, specifically in relation to their strict definitions of 
consensus and rationality. By interpreting these indicators of procedural legitimacy more 
broadly, I have attempted to present a framework which maintains the normative drive of 
deliberative theory while avoiding some of its more elitist and exclusionary implications. 
Furthermore, in developing the analytical framework for this study, I have also attempted 
to be sensitive to the specific context of web standardisation and in particular how 
commercial pressures and the technical nature of standardisation affects the types of 
procedures that standards bodies can realistically be expected to implement.   
Having outlined the specific indicators to be included within the analytical framework, the 
next question becomes how each of these indicators can be studied and measured 
empirically. To address this question, in the next chapter I discuss the methods used to 
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operationalise each of the indicators above in order to assess the procedural legitimacy of 




4: Methodology  
 
 In the previous three chapters I have established the political rationale for 
examining the legitimacy of standards development processes, discussed how legitimacy 
can be conceptualised in the context of standardisation, highlighted some of the 
challenges of legitimation faced by web standard organisations in the wake of the web’s 
commercialisation and outlined an analytical framework for the assessment of procedural 
legitimacy of web standards bodies inspired by deliberative democratic theory. In this 
chapter I provide an overview of the two-stage methodology, which was used to apply this 
framework to the case of the W3C’s development of the Encrypted Media Extension 
specification (EME). This combined a preliminary thematic analysis of web content related 
to the EME specification, with an in-depth content analysis of the W3C mailing lists.    
In what follows, I will outline the methodology adopted for this study, including discussions 
of the methods of data collection and analysis used. I begin by explaining my selection of 
the W3C and, more specifically, its development of the EME specification as the object of 
study. Following this, I describe how web sources relevant to the controversy were 
collected and sampled and explain how the thematic analysis of this data helped to inform 
the primary analysis of the mailing lists. I will then proceed to describe how data from the 
W3C mailing lists were collected and sampled, before finally justifying my use content 
analysis and describing how I applied this method to the mailing list data in order to 
assess the procedural legitimacy of the W3C in relation to each of the indicators described 
in the previous chapter. 
Case Study 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) 
 For the purpose of this thesis, the standards development process of the W3C was 
chosen for analysis. Although there currently exist dozens of large web standards 
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consortia, many, if not all of which face the types of challenges to their legitimacy 
described in previous chapters, the W3C has a number of unique attributes which made it 
a particularly interesting and appropriate choice as a case study.  
Firstly, together with the IETF, the W3C is among the largest and most influential 
contemporary web standards organisations, responsible for the development of some of 
the web’s most well-known and widely implemented standards, such as HTML and CSS1. 
Like most web standards, the recommendations produced by the W3C cannot be legally 
enforced meaning that W3C standards are, in theory, almost entirely reliant upon the 
voluntary compliance of vendors to ensure their implementation. In practice, however, the 
reputation and influence of the W3C mean that in most cases its specifications can be 
considered as de facto standards, carrying a ‘moral authority’ that one observer described 
as ‘the closest thing the Internet has to law’ (Garfinkel, 1998). The privileged status 
enjoyed by W3C standards means that the consortium has the potential to influence the 
future development of web technologies globally, and as such must be considered as a 
key institution of internet governance. 
Secondly, unlike some other well-established industry consortia, the W3C has over the 
past twenty-five years become progressively more open to acknowledging the impact of 
its work on wider issues of public policy and has even made concerted efforts to address 
some of the concerns regarding its legitimacy (Russell, 2014)2. The apparent willingness 
of the W3C to acknowledge its impact on policy-making and to take proactive steps to 
ensure an open and transparent process has led many to perceive the consortia as an 
exemplar of legitimate multi-stakeholder governance and effective internet self-regulation 
in practice (Russell, 2011; Umpathy, 2010). An empirical examination of the procedural 
                                                             
1  Together with Javascript the W3C’s HTML and CSS standards form the triad of core web 
technologies which all web developers must learn, ‘HTML to specify the content and layout of web 
pages; CSS to specify the presentation of web pages; and JavaScript to specify the behaviour of 
web pages’ (Flanagan, 2006 p. 1).  
2  The evolution of the W3C as an institution of internet governance, including its political 
architecture and culture will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
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legitimacy of the W3C in the context of its development of techno-policy standards thus 
provides an intriguing opportunity to put the claims of the consortium’s proponents to the 
test and determine whether its reputation as an open and transparent organisation is 
deserved.  
Finally, despite the importance of the W3C as a standards development organisation and 
institution of internet governance, to date very limited empirical research into the 
consortium’s standards development process has been conducted. Indeed, although 
deliberative democratic theory has previously been used to describe the legitimacy of 
other technical standards bodies (Froomkin, 2003; Werle and Iversen, 2006), to the 
author’s knowledge no empirical studies of the procedural legitimacy of the W3C currently 
exist.  As such, analysis of the case of the W3C offers the opportunity to make a 
significant and timely contribution to the existing literature on both standardisation and 
deliberative theory.  
 Encrypted Media Extension Specification  
 For the purpose of the thesis, the researcher elected to study the development of 
the W3C’s Encrypted Media Extension specification (EME) from its initial proposal in early 
2012 through to its publication as an official W3C Recommendation in July 2017.  
Briefly, the EME specification – an extension to the W3C’s flagship HTML standard - was 
a proposed W3C standard designed to enable web applications to interact with Digital 
Rights Management (DRM) systems to allow the playback of encrypted content within 
web browsers. Historically the use of DRM technologies - which are designed to impose 
restrictions on the functionality of digital files - as a means of preventing piracy and 
copyright infringement had been highly controversial, with several consumer and digital 
rights groups objecting to what they perceived to be the technologies negative impact on a 
broad range of internet policy issues, including accessibility, security and privacy, 
interoperability and user rights (O’Brien, 2013). For the authors of the specification, EME 
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was necessary to protect the rights of digital content creators and copyright holders. 
However, by working on a proposal that would effectively standardise a means of 
implementing DRM on the web, critics accused the W3C of betraying ordinary users and 
its founding principles in favour of the business interests of a small number of powerful 
corporations.  
Although the W3C develops dozens of standards annually, including many that could be 
characterised as ‘techno-policy standards’, the development of the EME specification had 
a number of features which made it a particularly interesting choice as a case study.  
Firstly, unlike the development of many other web standards, which may prompt heated 
technical debates between engineers but which otherwise fail to alert any wider interest, 
the controversial decision to publish the EME specification sparked outrage and debate 
across a wide variety of venues from the European Commission3 to the comments section 
of the Guardian news website. Unlike most other technical standards, therefore, the 
debate surrounding EME transcended the boundaries of the W3C and involved a broad 
range of actors including consumer advocacy groups, free software activists, browser 
developers, artists, politicians, content producers, and even members of the public. From 
a methodological perspective, the highly controversial nature of EME offered the perfect 
opportunity to assess the W3C’s handling of public policy issues since such controversies 
are by their very nature data-rich events. STS theorists note for example, how during 
socio-technical controversies opponents are more inclined to express and justify their 
opinions publicly; assumptions which were previously implicit are made explicit, and lines 
of division between competing discourses and stakeholder groups are more clearly 
demarcated (Sismondo, 2010; Venturini, 2010)4. In studying the EME controversy, the 
                                                             
3 In response to the W3C’s decision to publish the EME specification as a First Public Working 
Draft, Pirate Party MEP Amelia Andersdotter hosted a roundtable event at a gathering of the 
European Commission’s European Multi-Stakeholders Platform on ICT Standardisation to discuss 
the role of technical standards bodies in public policy (Andersdotter, 2013b).   
4 The methodological logic underlying the study of controversies parallels that of experimental 
science, where scientists study natural phenomena in states of chaos and instability. By studying 
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researcher thus sought to follow the advice of Bruno Latour (1987, p. 4) when he 
observed that ‘The impossible task of opening the black box [of technology] is made 
feasible (if not easy) by moving in time and space until one finds the controversial topic on 
which scientists and engineers are busy at work’. 
In addition to its controversial nature, the EME specification also represented an 
interesting case study due to the range of issues connected with it and the possibilities 
that this presented for a rich comparative analysis of deliberative quality across a variety 
of policy areas. Traditionally, most studies which examine the procedural legitimacy of 
deliberative venues have tended to do so in a comparative way, comparing, for example, 
the differences in deliberative quality online and offline or variations in levels of procedural 
legitimacy between two or more institutional settings.  
Since this research focused on a single case study, analysis of procedural legitimacy 
across separate deliberative venues was not possible. However, by studying a case study 
which impinged upon a wide range of policy issues, it was still possible to develop 
comparative insights, since the deliberative quality and procedural legitimacy of the 
process could be compared across policy areas. By examining the EME controversy, 
therefore, it was possible to not only assess the procedural legitimacy of the W3C in 
general but also to understand how and for what reasons the deliberative quality of 
discussions concerning EME varied between different policy issues. Such insights would 
ultimately provide a far more detailed and nuanced understanding of the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the W3C process than might otherwise have been possible.  
Having described the reasoning behind the selection of the W3C and the EME 
specification as the object of this study, I shall now proceed to describe the 
methodological approach used to assess the procedural legitimacy of the W3C, including 
methods of data collection and analysis.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
processes of technological development at their most turbulent, it is possible to reveal something 





 When attempting to assess the procedural legitimacy of a deliberative forum, the 
first question which must be addressed is where the deliberations and decision-making 
take place. In the case of the W3C, deliberations concerning the development of 
standards have historically been conducted within a range of working group mailing lists 
within which participants have the opportunity to voice their opinions, suggest edits to 
technical specifications and raise or rebut arguments. In addition to their role as 
deliberative fora,  mailing lists are also commonly used for many of the more formal 
aspects of the standards development process, including calls for consensus (Cfc), 
declarations of formal objections and the announcement of working group decisions 
(W3C, 2017d). As such, they provide the perfect source of data for the analysis of the 
W3C process, allowing the researcher not only to assess the discursive quality of 
deliberations but also understand the effectiveness of these discussions within the context 
of the W3C’s development process itself.  
Given their centrality to the standards development process, the W3C mailing lists formed 
the primary dataset to which the analytical framework described in the previous chapter 
was applied. However, as discussed above, the controversy surrounding EME was not 
confined to the ‘empowered spaces’ of the W3C’s working groups, but also manifest itself 
in a wide range of ‘public spaces’ both online and offline (Friess & Eilders, 2015; 
Mansbridge et al., 2012). Although the majority of these venues were not deliberative in 
nature – and so are not susceptible to analysis using the analytical framework developed 
in chapter 3 – they did nevertheless offer a rich source of supplementary data which 
helped to contextualise the controversy and inform the analysis of the primary mailing list 
data set could be developed.  
As such, for the purposes of the research, analysis of the EME controversy was divided 
into two distinct parts. In the first stage, a preliminary thematic analysis of web sources 
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related to the EME controversy including blogs, articles and press releases was 
conducted. This allowed the researcher to identify policy areas relevant to the EME 
specification and informed the sampling of the mailing list messages. It also provided a 
necessary point of comparison for the assessment of procedural indicators such as 
discursive inclusion (see below). In the second stage, messages from various W3C 
mailing lists and other relevant data5 were subjected to content analysis using a coding 
scheme designed to test the quality of the deliberations in relation to the indicators 
included in the analytical framework. The results were then analysed to assess the overall 
procedural legitimacy of the W3C process and highlight any variations in deliberative 
quality between the policy areas studied.     
                                                             
5  The majority of indicators included in the analytical framework were assessed using data 
collected from the W3C mailing lists. However, to assess the indicators ‘representation’ and 
‘transparency’ it was necessary to use data from other sources. As will be explained below, 
‘representation’ was assessed using data from the W3Cs members lists, while ‘transparency’ was 
assessed in relation to the confidentiality classifications of documents and mailing lists related to 
the development of EME.  
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Web Corpus – Data Collection 
 The W3C’s decision to publish the Encrypted Media Extension specification as a 
First Public Working Draft (FPWD) in early 2013 caused a flurry of outrage and critical 
commentary online 6 . Although the size and publicity of the controversy cannot be 
compared to that of other well-known socio-technical controversies, such as the debates 
around net neutrality or the revelations about NSA spying programmes (Ball, Borger & 
Greenwald, 2013), the sheer volume of blog-posts, podcasts, and web articles produced 
in relation to the specification’s development nonetheless meant that a more manageable 
dataset needed to be sampled. To do so, this study developed an innovative approach to 
data collection and sampling which leveraged the power of network analysis and web 
crawling technologies to identify web sources which were most relevant to the 
development of the controversy.  
 In recent years, the growing recognition of the importance of the web as a vitally 
important source of data for social science research has led to the development of an 
increasingly expansive range of methods and tools to collect and analyse digital media 
(Rogers, 2013). Among some of the most frequently used of these tools are ‘web 
crawlers’ – applications which use hyperlinks to automatically and systematically discover, 
map and index websites. By utilising the indexing functions of web crawlers, researchers 
can not only build large web corpora of digital content, but, when used in conjunction with 
network analysis software,  also develop useful insights into the relationships between the 
sources collected, including for example, the centrality or visibility of given sources or 
actors within the network (Jasani & Kumbharana, 2014; Rogers, 2010).    
                                                             
6 Almost all commentary on the EME specification was mediated through digital media, including 
blog posts, podcast, and articles on technology news websites. A few notable exceptions included, 
public protests outside the W3C’s Advisory Committee Meeting at MIT in 2016 (Higgins, 2016)  and 




Historically, most web crawlers have been relatively unsophisticated requiring data to be 
collated in a highly automated manner without much user control. These features have 
often meant that web crawlers have been difficult to use for social scientists who, for 
methodological reasons, often require greater levels of accuracy and control over the way 
in which their datasets are compiled (Jasani & Kumbharana, 2014; Rogers, 2010). More 
recently, however, advances in programming have led to the creation of a number of more 
sophisticated web crawling applications7, including most usefully for the purposes of this 
project, the web indexing and curation tool, Hyphe8, developed by researchers at the 
MediaLabs project in Paris.  In contrast to some other web crawling tools, Hyphe has 
been designed specifically with social scientists in mind, offering several features 
including the ability to define the granularity of web entities, set the depth of crawls and 
filter irrelevant sources, which together provide users with greater control over the 
compilation of datasets (Jacomy et al., 2016).  
In order to build a web corpus relevant to the EME controversy using Hyphe, the 
hyperlinks of a selected sample of around fifty web sources were collected and imported 
into the application, where they were then defined as “web entities” – web pages or 
domains whose content is crawled in order to generate a larger corpus9. This initial core 
corpus of sources was sampled on a purposive basis from a variety of different websites 
and included sources such as blog posts, web articles and campaign materials, all 
identified by the researcher as in some way relevant to the EME controversy (Jacomy et 
al., 2016).  
                                                             
7 A few other notable web crawlers that have been used for social science research include; Issue 
Crawler (Rogers, 2010), SocSciBot (Thelwall, 2009) and Voson (Ackland et al., 2006). These 
crawlers are comparable to Hyphe in terms of their purpose and usability, however none of them 
provide the types of corpus curation features offered by Hyphe, thus making them unsuitable for 
this research project.  
8 Hyphe’s demo and source code are available online at: http://hyphe.medialab.sciences-po.fr . 
9 Unlike some other web crawlers, Hyphe uses a memory structure which allows researchers to 
dynamically define the granularity of their “web entities”, from the domain level down to the level of 
individual webpages. Since, this project was primarily interested in building a corpus of sources 
strictly relevant to the EME controversy, web entities were classified as individual web pages.    
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Once imported into Hyphe, these web entities were then crawled to a page depth of zero 
– meaning that only the hyperlinks contained within the page content of the defined web 
entities themselves would be harvested in order to generate a larger sample of sources. 
While selecting a low crawl depth helped to limit the overall size of the corpus and prevent 
the kinds of “snowballing effects” that have previously been characteristic of many 
automated web crawling methods, the number of “discovered” web entities still numbered 
in the thousands and included a large number of sources irrelevant to the EME 
controversy. As such, following the initial crawl, it was necessary for discovered web 
entities to be manually “curated”, a process which involved the inclusion of web pages 
relevant to the controversy and the exclusion of those deemed to be irrelevant10.   
Once this curation process had been completed, the new larger corpus was then crawled 
and curated for a second time. This process was then repeated until it was determined 
that the web corpus was of sufficient size and scope to provide a representative sample of 
all ‘generic’ web content pertaining to the EME controversy. Adopting this step-by-step 
expansion method of corpus building, allowed the researcher to maintain control over the 
content of the web corpus, ensuring that the sample was large enough to provide 
comprehensive coverage of the controversy, whilst also avoiding the kinds of “snowballing 
effects” and “topic drift” that have previously been associated with some web crawling 
techniques (Jacomy et al., 2016).  
Once the process of building the web corpus was complete, the next step was to analyse 
the network in order to select from among the several hundred web pages and articles a 
sample of the most important and influential web sources. Online, it is often observed that 
hyperlinks function in much the same way as citations within academic publishing 
                                                             
10 Given the automated nature of web crawling techniques, uncurated web corpora will quite often 
include large number of irrelevant entities. Most commonly these include generic webpages from 
so-called ‘hyper-connected’ websites, such popular social media platforms (Rogers, 2010). If set to 
crawl to a depth of 2 or 3 without curation the EME web corpus would have been larger by  many 
orders of magnitude but would also have been comprised mostly of webpages irrelevant to the 
EME controversy.  
120 
 
(Berners-Lee & Cailliau, 1990). That is, by including a hyperlink within the body of an 
article or web page, the author of that piece is implicitly suggesting that the source to 
which they are referring contains information that is relevant to the topic being discussed 
or provides evidence in support of the arguments being made. Following this logic, the 
number of hyperlinks within the web corpus which reference a given web source - or its 
“indegree” in the parlance of graph theory - can be used as a proxy for assessing the 
relative prominence or influence of that web source within the web corpus as a whole, or 
what is sometimes referred to as its ‘network centrality’ (Rogers, 2010)11. 
Figure 4.2: A visualisation of the sampled web corpus12 
 
 In order to calculate the “indegree” of the web sources within the web corpus, 
metadata generated by the web crawling process was exported from Hyphe into Gephi – 
a software program used for visualising and analysing network data. Using Gephi, it was 
                                                             
11  This approach is similar in nature to the method of citation analysis used in bibliometrics 
(Coughlin, Campbell, & Jansen, 2016)   
12 Figure 4.2 shows a visualisation of the web corpus generated using Hyphe and Giphe. In the 
visualisation sampled web sources are highlighted blue. Sources with a large ‘indegree’ are 
represented by the larger node in the network. The largest node was the Encrypted Media 
Extension specification document which was linked to by most sources in the network (W3C, 
2016b). Given its purely technical nature this source was excluded from the sample.  
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possible to represent the web corpus as a network; with sources or web pages 
represented by individual ‘nodes’ and hyperlinks represented by the ‘edges’ which link the 
nodes together (see figure 4.2). By using the network data to calculate the number of 
edges directed into each node, it was thus possible to discover the “indegree” of each web 
source and therefore its relative importance and influence within the web corpus. By 
excluding web sources with an indegree of 2 or lower - e.g. those web pages which had 
been linked to less than three times by other web sources within the corpus, the overall 
size of the sample was reduced from several hundred to just over two hundred. Following 
this process, the remaining sources were then sampled and on a purposive basis; 
selecting those of greatest relevance to the controversy and the research questions. In 
total 205 web sources were selected for analysis.  
Web Corpus - Data Analysis 
 After generating a manageable sample, the web sources were then imported into 
the Nvivo data analysis software. A thematic analysis of each web source was then 
conducted in order to identify topics and policy issues relevant to the EME specification 
(Clarke & Braun, 2014)13. As a result of this process, five distinct policy areas were 
identified as being affected by the development of the EME standard, namely “Security”, 
“Interoperability”, “Accessibility”, “User Rights” and “Content Protection”14.  
As mentioned above, the intention of this preliminary analysis was not – as some recent 
deliberative democratic scholars have suggested - to assess discursive quality of 
deliberations across multiple deliberative venues (Bächtiger et al., 2007; Curato, 2015), 
but rather more modestly, to enable the researcher to establish a contextual 
understanding of the controversy and to lay the foundations for the primary analysis of the 
mailing lists.  Specifically, this preliminary stage of the research was intended to allow the 
                                                             
13 This process was highly reflexive, with coding categories undergoing several stages of revision 
and refinement before the final list was selected (Clarke & Braun, 2014).   
14 The relevance of each of these policy areas to the EME controversy will be discussed in detail in 
chapter six.  
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researcher to do three things, which would later be crucial for the primary analysis. Firstly, 
as described above, the analysis of the web corpus allowed the researcher to identify the 
key policy issues related the development EME. This helped to guide the development of 
the coding categories which would later be used as part of the primary analysis of the 
mailing lists (see below). Secondly, the coding of the web corpus allowed the researcher 
to generate a list of keywords and phrases which were relevant to the controversy and 
which could then be used to sample the mailing list messages (see below). Finally, by 
analysing web content related to the controversy the researcher was also able to establish 
a baseline of “discursive intensity” for each of the policy issues identified. This would later 
be used as a basis for assessing the discursive inclusion of the W3C process (see below). 
Having described how data for the preliminary stage of the research was collected and 
analysed, I will now proceed to discuss how data for the primary analysis of the W3C 
mailing lists was collected and sampled. Following this, I will then describe how content 
analysis was used to assess the quality of the W3C process in relation to each of the 
normative criteria of procedural legitimacy outlined in the analytical framework.  
Mailing List – Data Collection  
Although the W3C provides a range of opportunities for its members to participate 
and collaborate in its process, including, for example, annual face-to-face (f2f) advisory 
committee meetings and teleconferences, currently the vast majority of technical 
standards work takes place on the W3C’s working group mailing lists (W3C, 2017d)15. 
These lists not only provide a useful means of gathering opinions on proposals but, as 
mentioned above, also play host to many of the more formal aspects of standardisation 
including ‘Calls for Consensus’. As such, when identifying potential sources of data with 
which to study the legitimacy of the W3C standards development process, the mailing lists 
represented an obvious choice. 
                                                             
15 The W3C maintains a comprehensive archive of mailing lists messages on its website available 
at https://lists.w3.org/.  
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In addition to their centrality to the W3C’s process, the mailing lists also had a number of 
other attributes which made them particularly useful as a source of data. Firstly, although 
access to a small number of mailing lists is restricted to W3C staff or members, the 
majority of mailing lists are publicly available and can be easily accessed via a portal on 
the W3C’s website making them a readily available and reliable source of data. 
Secondly, the particular structure of the mailing lists made online discussions easy to 
follow and so relatively straightforward to analyse from a deliberative perspective.  Within 
each of the W3C’s mailing lists, messages are arranged into ‘threads’ – a series of 
messages pertaining to a specific topic or question. When contributing to the mailing lists, 
individuals must either respond directly to messages within an existing thread or start a 
new thread with a different subject line. This arrangement gives each of the mailing lists a 
tree-like structure, with all contributions neatly arranged into chains of messages and 
responses around a given topic. As a result, the mailing lists offered an ideal source of 
data with which to examine the quality of deliberations within the W3C, since the 
researcher could easily follow the flow of discussions on specific topics as they grew and 
evolved throughout the process. 
In attempting to generate a sample of messages for the analysis, the first task was to 
identify those mailing lists which were relevant to the development of the specification. 
Hundreds of W3C mailing lists currently exist, each with their own discrete area of work or 
technical objectives16. Some such as public-html are used to discuss technical issues 
pertaining to specific standards, while others such as www-tag are used to discuss 
broader questions pertaining to policy or governance. Similarly, while some mailing lists 
are associated with specific proposals and so expected to produce discrete technical 
outputs, others are intended to function more as general fora to canvas members opinions 
and develop ‘rough consensus’ on matters of interest to the community.  
                                                             
16 Asynchronous mailing list systems enable users from many different time zones to contribute 
and collaborate without the need to coordinate their schedules. There use is common practice 
within most informal standards communities (Jakobs et al., 2001).  
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As an ‘extension’ of the HTML5 standard, content relevant to EME could be found within 
most of the HTML working group’s major technical mailing lists (public-hme-editors, 
public-html, public-html-admin, public-html-comments, and public-html-media). In addition 
to these mailing lists, data was also collected from the W3C’s Technical Architecture 
Group mailing list (www-tag) - which provided technical feedback and comments on the 
specification - and from the restricted media community group mailing list (public-
restrictedmedia) - which was established during the controversy to serve as a forum for 
discussions concerning alternative content protection solutions.  
Once the relevant mailing lists had been identified, the question then became which 
threads within those mailing lists to sample. One option, used previously in empirical 
studies of mailing list archives, was to use a python script such as Big Bang 17  to 
automatically extract from the archives all messages containing certain keywords in their 
subject line. Such an automated approach would allow data to be collected quickly and 
efficiently. Unfortunately, W3C policy prohibits subject tagging on its mailing lists, meaning 
that content relevant to the EME controversy would not necessarily contain any reference 
to the specification within its subject line. As a result, sampling the mailing lists purely on 
the basis of the subject would likely be neither accurate nor comprehensive.  
Given these challenges, the decision was taken to adopt a more precise, albeit far more 
laborious approach to data collection, whereby selected mailing lists were individually 
browsed and relevant messages manually captured and imported into the Nvivo data 
analysis software using the programme’s ‘Ncapture’ content logging feature (Bazeley & 
Jackson, 2013). Once imported into Nvivo, messages were then sorted and arranged into 
their respective threads ready for analysis. In total, 2939 messages across 235 threads 
were collected.  
                                                             
17 Big Bang Python Script available at https://github.com/datactive/bigbang. 
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Given the exceptionally large number of messages collected from the mailing list, in order 
to generate a dataset that was both manageable and relevant to the research questions, it 
was necessary for the collated messages to be sampled. In order to do so, a statistical 
analysis of word frequencies within the sampled web corpus sources was conducted, from 
which a set of 100 key terms relevant to the controversy was generated (see Annex A). 
Following this, a content analysis of the mailing list messages was carried out to establish 
the rate of occurrence of these key terms in each of the message threads. Threads were 
then ordered on this basis, before being sampled using a purposive approach to ensure 
the inclusion of messages from the entire duration of the controversy. No specific target 
sample size was set prior to the analysis. Instead, message threads were analysed until it 
was determined that coding saturation had been reached. In total 868 messages across, 
66 threads were analysed as part of the research. 
Having described how data from the mailing lists was collected and sampled, I will now 
proceed to discuss how this data was analysed in order to assess the quality of the W3C 
process in relation to the indicators of procedural legitimacy described in the previous 
chapter. I will begin by justifying the use of content analysis as the primary research 
method. In doing so, I will respond to some common critiques of this method and explain 
its utility for addressing the research questions. Following this, I will discuss each of the 
chosen indicators of procedural legitimacy, highlighting debates within the literature and 
explaining how content analysis was used to operationalise each of them for the purposes 
of this study. 
Mailing Lists - Data analysis  
 The empirical turn in deliberative theory, described in the previous chapter, led not 
only to a transformation in our theoretical understanding of discursive forms of 
governance but also to a rapid proliferation of methodological tools and frameworks 
designed to measure the deliberative capacity of technocratic transnational institutions. 
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While all empirical studies of deliberative governance are united by a desire to 
operationalise its normative criteria, the precise methods adopted by researchers to do so 
can vary dramatically depending on their particular interpretation of deliberative theory, 
the indicators that they choose to examine, the object of their study and the questions 
which their research seeks to address (Bächtiger et al., 2009; De Vries, R. et al., 2011; 
Kies & Jansen, 2004; Steenbergen et al., 2003; Stie, 2008; Stromer-Galley, 2007). 
For scholars who adopt DQI-inspired analytical frameworks similar to the one outlined in 
the previous chapter, the most common methodological approach has been a form of 
quasi-quantitative content analysis, which utilises sophisticated and often elaborate 
coding schemes designed to measure and evaluate the various normative criteria of 
deliberative theory (Steffek & Hahn, 2010; Steiner, 2004; Stie, 2008; Stromer-Galley, 
2007). In their study of British parliamentary debates, for example, Steenbergen et al. 
(2003) developed a coding scheme consisting of nine separate indicators of deliberative 
quality including participation, level of justification, and respect towards counter-
arguments. Using the scheme, Steenbergen et al. coded the content of hours of 
parliamentary speeches, before analysing the findings to determine the levels deliberative 
quality across multiple debates. More recently, similar schemes have been developed to 
test the deliberative quality of various asynchronous online venues such as social media 
platforms and online forums, coding text rather than speech acts for markers of 
deliberative quality (Collins & Nerlich, 2015; Graham, T. & Witschge, 2003; Kies & 
Jansen, 2004; Mendonça, 2015; Monnoyer-Smith & Wojcik, 2011).    
While such methods have proved to be very popular as a means operationalising 
deliberative theory, quasi-quantitative approaches have nevertheless attracted strong 
criticism for what many perceive to be their overly mechanical approach to deliberative 
assessment.  
Firstly, whilst many critics acknowledge that the insights produced by quasi-quantitative 
methods are useful for assessing the quality of individual speech acts, they question the 
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extent to which an analysis of the micro-interactions of individual participants is capable of 
adequately capturing the overall quality of deliberations or the legitimacy of a process 
within its broader institutional context (Dahlberg, 2004; Mendonça, 2015). Specifically, 
critics note how the discursive quality of a decision-making process cannot be assessed in 
relation to single messages but instead must be evaluated more holistically, with particular 
sensitivity given to the ways in which the arguments and preferences of participants shift 
and evolve over time (Dahlberg, 2004). By focusing their analysis solely at the micro level, 
critics argue that quantitative researchers risk individualising processes and transforming 
deliberations into nothing more than an exchange of utterances. (Kadlec, Sprain, & 
Carcasson, 2012; Mendonça, 2015). As Ricardo Mendonça (2015, p. 98) observed, ‘rich 
deliberative processes can be demolished by coders simply because they view each 
utterance as being unsophisticated. On the contrary, a weak process can be praised for 
featuring isolated actors and opinions’.   
Secondly, deliberative quality analysis has also been critiqued for its apparent failure to 
account for the coercive power and framing effects of hegemonic discourses. Specifically, 
critics argue that by focusing purely on the perfunctory measurement of the discursive 
quality of contributions rather than the content of the contributions themselves, 
deliberative scholars risk neglecting the complex ways in which participants construct 
meaning, and in particular how such constructions may act to frame discussions in a way 
that can exclude or marginalise counter-discourses or minority voices (Barisione, 2012). In 
his analysis of debates on obesity in Australia and the UK, for example, Boswell (2014) 
demonstrates how the valorisation of scientific evidence above all other forms of 
discourse, served to marginalise lay knowledge and personal expressions of subjective 
experiences, and in so doing excluded certain stakeholder groups from the debate 
including most importantly, obese individuals themselves.  
For Mauro Barisione (2012) these so-called ‘deliberative frames’ – defined as ‘the context 
of meaning within which a deliberation is constructed’ – inevitably introduce an element of 
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bias into any deliberation. As such, Barisione argues that the presence of deliberative 
frames risks limiting both the scope and potential outputs of deliberations. As a result, 
Barisione argues that such frames pose serious challenges for the procedural legitimacy 
of deliberative institutions18.  
Given their apparent lack of sensitivity to the ways in which entrenched forms of power 
can frame deliberations, scholars such as Barisione (2012) and Boswell (2014) argue that 
quantitative and micro-analytical approaches such as the DQI are ultimately unsuitable for 
examining procedural legitimacy. Instead, they argue for a more qualitative and 
interpretative approach to deliberative assessment that focuses on the ways in which 
discourses are used by participants to construct and frame the meaning, purpose and 
objectives of the deliberations themselves (Bevir & Ansari, 2012; Kadlec & Friedman, 
2007; Kadlec et al., 2012). By studying deliberations using interpretive methods, they 
argue that researchers will be empowered to better identify and assess the complex ways 
in which different participants define problems and construct meaning; demonstrating, for 
example, how certain discourses or forms of rationality come to be privileged over others, 
and how the discursive parameters of deliberations are constructed and enforced 
(Barisione, 2010). As a result, researchers argue that interpretive methods can provide 
greater insights into the quality of deliberations than would be possible using a purely 
quantitative approach, revealing not only the existence of procedural deficits but also their 
cause.  
While the importance of interpretive analysis to the assessment of procedural legitimacy is 
recognised, here it is suggested that such interpretive approaches should not be seen as 
incompatible with DQI-inspired approaches, but rather as already implicit within the 
methods used by proponents of deliberative quality analysis. Bachtiger et al. (2009) for 
example, observe how although frameworks influenced by the DQI tend to evaluate and 
                                                             
18 Barisione (2010, p. 9) notes how the functioning of these forms of subtle exclusion are in many 
cases ‘beyond the cognitive horizon and testifying limits of participants’ many of whom he argues 
are ‘incapable of grasping the element of communicative distortion’.  
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present their results numerically, the actual process by which the data is analysed is often 
highly qualitative in nature, requiring the researcher to carefully read and interpret 
arguments and make normative judgements regarding the performance of specific speech 
acts in relation to the indicators used. Similarly, Steiner et al. (2004, p. 60) observe, how 
despite claims to the contrary, it is not possible to implement quantitative methods of 
deliberative assessment in a purely mechanically way since “assessing the quality of 
discourse requires interpretation. One needs to know the culture of the political institution, 
the context of the debate, and the nature of the issue under debate, to get a true 
understanding of how actors in the institution use and interpret language”. Thus as 
Dahlberg (2004, p. 32) argues, for the purpose of assessing the procedural legitimacy of 
deliberative decision-making processes  ‘neither an approach that relies upon the 
operationalisation of discrete variables nor one that avoids all specification of critical 
criteria and indicators is adequate’. 
Considering the discussion above, for the purposes of this study, the decision was taken 
to adopt a quasi-quantitative approach to the data analysis similar in nature to that used 
by previous DQI-inspired studies of deliberative governance. Using this approach, mailing 
list messages, as well as other relevant data sources such as membership lists, were 
closely studied and coded using a coding scheme developed specifically for the purpose 
of operationalising the indicators of deliberative quality identified in the previous chapter 
(see table 4.2). Importantly, the process of coding mailing list messages required the 
researcher to read and interpret the content of each individual message carefully. In doing 
so, it was possible to leverage the analytical strengths of quantitative analysis while also 
remaining close enough to the text itself to make interpretive judgements about the 
strengths and weaknesses of the deliberations. Specifically, this approach allowed the 
researcher not only to identify the existence of deliberative frames but also understand 
how participants deployed these as part of the process.  
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While the choice of content analysis enabled the researcher to draw inspiration from a 
wide range of previous studies of deliberative governance, the manifold ways in which 
DQI-style methodologies have previously been applied is a testament to the fact that there 
is no ‘off-the-shelf’ method of operationalising deliberative procedural standards. As such, 
in order to measure the procedural legitimacy of the W3C, it was necessary to consider 
not only how the normative standards of procedural legitimacy should be conceptualised, 
e.g. “what does inclusive or deliberative mean in this institutional context”, but also how 
the data available could be best used to measure those standards.  With this in mind, I will 
now proceed to discuss how - using the data collected from the web corpus and the 
mailing lists - each of the indicators of procedural legitimacy described in the previous 
chapter was assessed in the case of the EME controversy. 
Inclusion 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly given the diversity of ways in which ‘inclusion’ has been 
conceptualised within deliberative theory, empirical studies of deliberative democracy 
have utilised a wide variety of methodological approaches for studying the inclusiveness 
of deliberative processes, ranging from assessments of the equality of access and the 
socio-economic representativeness of participants (Albrecht, 2006; Coleman, Hall, & 
Howell, 2002; Monnoyer-Smith & Wojcik, 2011), to measurements of discursive equality 
and formal procedural linkages between deliberative sites (Graham, T., 2002; Nanz & 
Steffek, 2005; Schneider, 1997; Stromer-Galley, 2007). As discussed in the previous 
chapter, rather than limit the analysis of the inclusivity of the W3C standards process to a 
single metric, for the purpose of this research, a multi-faceted approach to the evaluation 
of inclusion was adopted. This combined a descriptive analysis of the W3C’s membership 
(representation), an analysis of the equality of participation within the mailing lists 
(participation), and an evaluation of the discursive representativeness of the mailing list 





 Given that the W3C is a membership organisation, the initial and most obvious 
approach to assessing the inclusivity of the consortium involved analysing the diversity 
and representativeness of its members. The perceived domination of the W3C by Western 
(mainly US) and corporate interests has been a common source of criticism (Schoechle, 
2003). While a certain degree of commercial bias might be expected given the nature of 
the consortium’s work, in order to be considered legitimate it was nonetheless anticipated 
that the W3C’s membership should include representatives from civil society as well as 
organisations from non-western countries. In order to assess the representativeness of 
the W3C, a descriptive analysis of the consortia’s membership was conducted. Using 
information taken from W3C’s member profiles and member organisation’s websites, 
organisations listed in the W3C’s register of members were categorised by their sector, 
country and region 19 . This data was then analysed to produce an overview of the 
geographic and sectoral distribution of the W3C’s membership.  
Participation 
 In addition to an analysis of the diversity of the W3C’s membership, an analysis of 
the equality and distribution of participation within the mailing list discussions was also 
conducted. The rationale behind using participation as an indicator of inclusion alongside 
that of representation derives from the recognition that the mere presence of an 
organisation or individual within an institution does not necessarily guarantee that they will 
actively engage in processes of deliberation or decision-making.  
Within the literature, analysis of participation has generally involved the use of content 
analysis to assess the extent to which deliberations are inclusive of a broad range of 
participants or dominated by a small group of influential actors. Often these studies have 
also involved an analysis the demographics of participants, seeking, for example, to 
                                                             
19 The location of the organisation’s HQ was used to determine its country of origin.  
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assess the extent to which participants are representative of the broader community or 
affected stakeholders (Warren & Pearse, 2008). 
In order to assess the equality of participation in the W3C process, the authors of all 
messages relevant to the EME specification on the W3C mailing lists were recorded. After 
discounting participants with less than five contributions over the entire duration of the 
standard’s development20; social media profiles, including Linkedin and GitHub profiles as 
well as personal websites and blogs were then used to determine, the gender, region and 
employer of participants. This data was then analysed to provide insight into the 
demographic representativeness of participants.  
Discursive Inclusion 
 Finally, in addition to the metrics of representation and participation, discursive 
inclusion – was also used as an indicator (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008). As discussed in the 
previous chapter, analysis of the discursive representativeness is a critical aspect of the 
assessment of the inclusivity of deliberative processes since the mere presence and 
participation of stakeholder representatives does not necessarily guarantee that the 
interests and opinions of those groups will be accurately or adequately represented. 
To analyse discursive inclusion, it was first necessary to establish a baseline level of 
discursive intensity within the public space against which the inclusivity of the 
deliberations within the empowered space of the mailing list could be measured. To do 
this, a thematic analysis of sampled sources from the web corpus was conducted in order 
to identify key discourses and issues of concern (see above). The results of this analysis 
                                                             
20 It was noted during the analysis of the mailing lists that a minority of participants only contributed 
to discussions in order to indicate their preference during ‘Calls for Consensus’ and other informal 
‘voting’ procedures. These contributions often only consisted of simple expressions of affirmation, 
such as “+1” to signal their agreement with a proposal or decision. Since the indicator of 
‘participation’ was intended to measure the equality and diversity of those actively engaged in 
deliberations over EME, the decision was made to exclude participants who contributed less than 
five messages to the mailing list from the analysis of participation. This helped to ensure that the 




were then used to inform the creation of coding categories for the analysis of the mailing 
lists. Messages from the mailing list were then coded for the presence of the topics 
identified during the analysis of the web corpus, after which the relative frequencies of 
these issues within both datasets were compared.  
In order for the process to be considered as discursively inclusive, it was anticipated that 
all topics present within the web corpus (public space) would also be present within the 
mailing lists (empowered space). In addition to enabling the researcher to assess the 
discursive inclusivity of the process as a whole, this analysis would also reveal variations 
in the levels of discursive inclusivity between different policy areas. 
Transparency  
 The selection of transparency as an indicator of procedural legitimacy was 
motivated by the growing pressure on standards bodies to be more open in the way that 
they operate. As discussed in chapter three, transparency in an institutional context can 
be thought of both in terms of the accessibility of important information as well as the 
publicity of the deliberations and decision-making processes themselves.  
In the context of the W3C, access to information pertaining to specifications as well as the 
transparency of the working group mailing lists is governed by the consortium’s 
confidentiality policy. This policy specifies three separate levels of confidentiality, Team-
only, Member-only and Public. Team-only documents and mailing lists are restricted to 
W3C staff members, member-only documents and mailing lists are restricted to 
authorised parties, including the representatives of member organisations and invited 
experts, while public documents and mailing lists are freely published and accessible to 
the general public (W3C, 2017d).  
Given the W3C’s use of the confidentiality policy to manage access to key documents and 
mailing lists, for the purposes of this research, assessment of the transparency of the 
W3C process simply involved recording the confidentiality level of mailing lists and key 
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documents including, meeting minutes, specification drafts and Advisory Committee 
voting records. Mailing lists and documents classified as “Public” were taken to be publicly 
accessible whereas those classified as “Team-only” or “Member-only” were considered to 
be inaccessible to the public. In order to be considered transparent, it was expected that 
the W3C would classify all documents and mailing lists relevant to the development of the 
EME specification as “Public”.  
Deliberativeness 
 When considering the various ways in which the criterion of deliberativeness has 
been operationalised within previous studies of deliberative processes, Trenel’s (2004) 
analytical distinction between formal and substantive types of interactivity is instructive. 
Trenel uses the concept of formal interactivity to specify the degree to which messages or 
contributions within deliberative exchanges are linked to each other. Research projects 
which examine instances of formal interactivity tend to adopt a quantitative approach to 
assessing deliberativeness, measuring, for example, the formal linkages between 
individual contributions (Coleman et al., 2002; Wilhelm, 1999; Winkler, 2003). Schneider 
(1997, p. 74) for example, measures deliberativeness within online forums by counting the 
number of ‘replies’, defined as messages which ‘appear in the same thread within seven 
days of the previous message, or [which] cite message[s] directly by message 
identification numbers’. Wilhelm (1999) similarly measures the total length of threads 
within message boards, reasoning that the longer the thread, the more deliberative the 
discussion is likely to be. 
Whilst the analysis of formal linkages between messages, may seem to provide a 
relatively clear-cut and objective means of assessing the degree to which individuals 
within a deliberative process interact, critics nonetheless observe how the mere presence 
of a formal link between two messages does not necessarily indicate that the content of 
those messages correspond to each other. Kies (2010) for example, notes how online 
messages which may superficially appear to be linked – as a result of being within the 
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same thread for example – can often be completely unrelated or off-topic and as such fail 
to deal substantively with the arguments expressed in the message to which they 
supposedly refer.  
This feature of asynchronous online discussions is noticeable in the W3C mailing lists 
where single posts often cover several topics only some of which will be engaged with by 
subsequent replies. As such, while analysis of formal interactivity may provide a rough 
indication of the overall intensity of a particular discussion, such methods nevertheless fail 
to capture the interactivity of discussion in a way that deliberative democrats would accept 
as legitimate (Habermas, 1985). 
To address these concerns, other research projects have taken a more qualitative 
approach to study deliberativeness. In contrast to studies of formal interactivity, these 
approaches focus not on the linkages between messages, but rather on the content of 
messages themselves, seeking for example to identify the presence of direct or indirect 
references to the arguments and reasons expressed in preceding contributions 
(Monnoyer–Smith & Wojcik, 2012). Jensen (2003a) for example uses qualitative analysis 
to categorise message into various types, such as “initiate”, “reply” and “monologue”. 
Graham (2002) similarly, uses the comparable categories of “initial,” “response,” and 
“irrelevant”, while, Hagemannn (2002) examines the text of messages for explicit markers 
of “agreements” and “disagreements” with previous contributions. By taking this more 
qualitative and nuanced approach, researchers are not only able to provide a more 
accurate account of the overall deliberativeness of a given process, but, to the extent that 
the analysis is conducted at the level of the text itself, also to provide insights into the 




Figure 4.3: Example of mailing list message structure  
 
While, the need to qualitatively analyse messages for evidence of deliberative 
engagement with the arguments of preceding contributions, may appear to present certain 
interpretive as well as methodological challenges, the tree-like structure of the W3C 
mailing lists meant that, in practice, it was relatively straightforward to identify replies to 
initial thread posts21. Furthermore, the widespread use of quoted text within the body of 
“reply” messages, meant that it was also possible to accurately identify the specific issues 
and arguments to which the authors were responding22.   
This practice of using quoted text within reply messages offered the researcher a simple 
and effective means of measuring deliberativeness within the W3C mailing lists. To do so, 
quoted text within the body of reply messages was first coded to one of several issue-
specific “QUOTED” nodes. These “QUOTED nodes each corresponded to their own 
“ISSUE” node - for example, “QUOTED SECURITY” or “QUOTED USER RIGHTS” - and 
                                                             
21 Within the W3C mailing list archive replies to each message are listed at the bottom of the page 
making navigating through the discussions quite straightforward. When importing captured 
messages into Nvivo, it was necessary to arrange imported messages in a folder structure which 
replicated the structure and order of messages on the mailing list archive.  
22 This use of quoted text is a common feature of many asynchronous mailing lists and part of the 
informal etiquette of technical standards development. Previous analysis of the W3C mailing lists 
found examples of quoted text in over 99% of reply messages (Passant et al., 2010).  
Quoted text in mailing list messages is 
displayed in the main body of the 
message between chevron symbols.  
The structure and arrangement of mailing 
list threads allowed the researcher to 




were used to indicate a direct response to arguments made in relation to those policy 
issues.  
Importantly, if a reply message contained quoted text which included references to several 
different policy issues, only those sections of quoted text which were directly addressed in 
the reply would be coded using a “QUOTED” node. For example, if a reply to an initial 
message which had included text coded to the “SECURITY” and “USER RIGHTS” issue 
nodes, contained a response to questions raised concerning security but failed to engage 
with concerns about user rights, then only the quoted text relevant to security would be 
coded to the “QUOTED-SECURITY” node. 
 After completing the analysis of the mailing list messages, the degree to which a given 
topic was genuinely deliberated could then be calculated simply by comparing the number 
of messages which included text coded to a specific issue node i.e. “SECURITY” with the 
number of messages which included text coded to that issue’s corresponding “QUOTED” 
node, i.e. “QUOTED SECURITY”. The larger the proportion of messages coded to the 
“QUOTED” node as compared to the corresponding “ISSUE” node the more deliberative 
discussions around that topic were determined to be. By taking this approach, it was not 
only possible to assess the level of deliberativeness across the process as a whole, but 
also examine how and why levels of engagement and reciprocity varied between different 
policy issues.  
Justification 
 Within the existing literature, the criterion of justification offers the greatest level of 
diversity in terms of its operationalisation, with researchers adopting a broad range of 
methods to assess the extent to which the arguments presented by participants within 
deliberative fora are supported by reasons or evidence. Perhaps the most basic and 
straightforward of these approaches is that adopted by Coleman et al. (2002), which 
simply involves counting the number of words used in each message. According to 
Coleman’s methodology, the level of justification can be correlated to the length of 
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contributions with a high average word count per message taken to indicate high levels of 
justification and argumentation and a low average word count interpreted to mean a low 
level of justification (Coleman et al., 2002).  
More sophisticated approaches to the assessing justification involve the analysis of the 
actual content of messages themselves for the presence or absence of reasons or 
supporting arguments.  This can be done for all messages, or as Hagemann (2002) 
suggests only for those messages which include expressions of opinion or preference.  
Within the literature, a wide range of coding schemes have been developed to analyse the 
presence of justification, each of which varies in its complexity and sophistication. 
Steengbergen et al. (2003), for example, differentiate between multiple levels of 
justification, including ‘inferior’, ‘qualified’, and ‘sophisticated justification’. Kies et al. 
(2004) by contrast restrict their analysis of justification to a binary distinction between 
‘justified’ and ‘unjustified’ messages.  
Since this thesis is concerned exclusively with the presence of justification, it was 
determined that methods which attempt to make elaborate distinctions between multiple 
levels or types of justification, such as those used by Steenbergen et al. (2003), would be 
unnecessarily complex and unlikely to yield any additional analytical insights. As such, the 
decision was taken to restrict analysis of justification to a simple binary distinction 
between messages which contained justification and those which did not23.  
From the field of semiotics, it has come to be understood that justification can be thought 
of as a process through which ‘someone tries to convince someone of something by citing 
evidence and drawing, or suggesting, inferences from this evidence and other beliefs and 
assumptions’ (Sebeok, 1994, pp. 50-51). For this reason, empirical studies of deliberation 
                                                             
23 In addition to measuring for the presence of justification, some studies also utilise a distinction 
between the types of justification. Steenbergen et al (2003) for example, distinguishes between 
appeals to self- interest and group-interest. Jensen (2003a), meanwhile, distinguished between 
internal justification, which relies on subjective knowledge, and external justification which is refers 




generally define justification as the explanation and rationalisation of opinions or claims 
through the provision of empirical or logical evidence which supports those claims 
(Stromer-Galley, 2007). Dahlberg (2001, p. 623) for example, suggests that ideal 
deliberation ‘involves engaging in a reciprocal critique of normative positions that are 
provided with reasons rather than simply asserted’. Similarly, in their study of political 
conversations on the group discussion site “UK Online”, Graham and Witschge (2003) 
define “rational” messages as those that provide justifications or reasons for “validity 
claims”. For the purpose of this research, justification was taken to mean the provision of 
any reason or piece of evidence which acted to explain or justify a given preference or 
opinion. Such justifications could include, references to previous examples or case 
studies, statistics, personal experiences, anecdotes, or logical deductions.   
In order to assess levels of justification across different policy issues, text coded to a 
particular issue node, which also included justifications were also coded to a 
“JUSTIFICATION” node. A matrix coding analysis was then conducted to identify overlaps 
between the coding of each issue node and the “JUSTIFICATION” node. The results of 
this analysis were then used to determine the proportion of arguments related to each 
issue which were supported by evidence or reasons. By taking this approach, it was not 
only possible to examine the level of justification across the process as a whole, but also 
determine how and why levels of rationality varied between different policy issues.  
Since not all mailing list messages contained explicit expressions of opinions or 
preferences, following Hagemann (2002), it was also decided to limit the analysis of 
justification to those messages which required justifying. To do this, messages which did 
not include any expressions of preference or opinion were classified as “N/A” for 





 Respectfulness as a criterion of discursive quality is present within almost all 
attempts to study deliberative democracy and is a common metric in most empirical 
studies of online deliberation (Graham, T. & Witschge, 2003; Kies, R, 2010; Spörndli, 
2003; Steenbergen et al., 2003). Operationalisations of respect tend to be quite consistent 
across the literature, with most variations in approach being attributable to differences in 
the object of study. Studies which examine face-to-face discussions such as 
parliamentary debates, for example, often include an array of paralinguistic indicators of 
respect in their coding schemes, such as, the number of times a speaker was interrupted 
or body language (Steiner, 2004). In the case of asynchronous online deliberations - 
where an analysis of body language or non-discursive communication is not possible - 
measurements of respectfulness are typically restricted to the analysis of the content of 
contributions (Collins & Nerlich, 2015; Graham, T. & Witschge, 2003).  
In studies where respect is considered to be a primary indicator of procedural legitimacy, 
some scholars have devised complex and elaborate coding schemes for assessing the 
respectfulness of deliberations. Steenbergen et al. (2003) for example, differentiate not 
only between ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ expressions of respect but also between “respect for 
groups,” “respect for the demands of others,” and “respect for the counterarguments of 
others”.  
Given that respectfulness represented only one aspect of the much larger analytical 
framework used by this study to assess the deliberative quality of the mailing list 
discussions, such complex operationalisations of respect were deemed to be 
unnecessarily complex and unlikely to yield any additional analytical insights. As such, for 
the purposes of this study, analysis of respect was limited to the binary distinction 
between respectful and disrespectful contributions.  
In the context of asynchronous deliberations, ‘respect’ is usually interpreted in terms of an 
absence of explicit linguistic markers of disrespect, such as offensive language or abusive 
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or demeaning personal attacks (Bentivegna, 1998; Coleman et al., 2002; Jankowski & 
Van Os, 2004; Jensen, 2003b). From a methodological perspective, messages which 
contain explicit examples of abusive or offensive language are generally quite 
straightforward to identify as disrespectful, regardless of their deliberative context. 
However, some scholars observe how in addition to these explicit markers of disrespect,  
disrespectful messages may also contain other more subtle forms of derogatory language, 
such as sarcasm or humour, which researchers may or may not interpret as disrespectful. 
How researchers should code these forms of discourse is less clear since the extent to 
which these forms of language can be classified as disrespectful will in most cases 
depend both on the cultural and political norms of the institution as well as the 
argumentative context in which they are deployed. Thus, when coding for respectfulness, 
it was necessary not only to examine of the content of mailing list contributions for explicit 
examples of abusive language but also to be sensitive to the norms and deliberative 
etiquette of the W3C as well as the context within which less explicit forms of demeaning 
or argumentative language were used. For the purposes of this study, the W3C’s own 
Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct provided a useful point of reference for 
determining what should or should not be considered as respectful in the context of the 
mailing lists (W3C, 2015a). 
To assess levels of respectfulness across different policy issues, text coded to a specific 
issue node, for example, “SECURITY” or “USER RIGHTS”, which also contained 
disrespectful or abusive language was coded to a “DISRESPECT” node. A matrix coding 
analysis was then conducted to identify overlaps between the coding of each issue node 
and the “DISRESPECT” node. The results of this analysis were then used to determine 
the proportion of arguments raised in relation to a specific issue which were made in a 
disrespectful manner. By taking this approach, it was not only possible to examine levels 
of respectfulness across the process as a whole but also determine how and why levels of 




 In previous attempts to study deliberative democracy empirically, the extent to 
which participants within a deliberative process genuinely attempt to identify areas of 
agreement or reach a rational consensus has most commonly been assessed by coding 
messages for ‘constructive speech’. Monnoyer-Smith and Wojcik (2012), for example, 
consider messages as constructive if contributors make new proposals or ask questions. 
Trenel (2004) similarly measures constructiveness by coding whether individuals attempt 
to discover common ground or propose solutions to collective problems. Finally, Black et 
al. (2011) assess not only if participants make recommendations, but also the extent to 
which these recommendations are given due consideration as part of the decision-making 
process.   
Given that the analytical framework used for this research defined constructiveness in 
terms of the pursuit of ‘meta-consensus’ as opposed to a ‘simple consensus’, 
constructiveness within mailing list messages was assessed on the basis of participant’s 
efforts to realise one or more of the three aspects of meta-consensus (normative, 
epistemic, or preference). Such efforts could include, for example, the acceptance by 
participants of the appropriateness of the values expressed by their opponents 
(normative); the recognition of the validity of the beliefs of other contributors (epistemic); 
or the acknowledgement of the feasibility of proposals or compromises presented by other 
participants (preference). Further to this, messages were also classified as 
constructiveness if participants demonstrated genuine attempt to better understand the 
position or arguments of their opponents, for example, by requesting additional 
information or seeking clarification.  
To assess levels of constructiveness across different policy issues, text coded to a 
specific issue node, for example, “SECURITY” or “USER RIGHTS”, which also contained 
constructive speech was coded to a “CONSTRUCTIVE” node. A matrix coding analysis 
was then conducted to identify overlaps between the coding of each issue node and the 
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“CONSTRUCTIVE” node. The results of this analysis were then used to determine the 
proportion of arguments related a given issue which were expressed constructively.  By 
taking this approach, it was possible not only to determine overall levels of meta-
consensus but also describe how and why levels of constructiveness varied between 
policy areas. Since ‘initial’ thread messages did not refer directly to previous contributions, 
only ‘reply’ messages were coded for examples of constructiveness.   
Conclusion  
 In this chapter, I have outlined the ways in which the indicators of procedural 
legitimacy included in the analytical framework were operationalised and assessed in the 
context of the W3C’s development of the EME specification. The attributes used to 
classify mailing lists messages (Table 4.1); the coding scheme used to code the content 
of the mailing lists (Table 4.2); and a summary of the data, methods, and metrics used to 
assess each indicator (Table 4.3), are all provided in the tables below.  
 
Table 4.1: Summary of classifications and attributes for mailing list messages 
Classification Attribute 
Author’s name e.g. John Smith 
Author’s region Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, South America 
Author’s sector Academic and Research, Government, Non-Profit, Private Sector 
Author’s gender Male, Female 







Table 4.2: Summary coding scheme for mailing list messages 
Code Description Example 
ACCESSIBILITY Text related to the topic of 
accessibility 
DRM systems usually prohibit any manipulations with content… thus making a content less 
accessible by disabled people (Sergey, 2014).   
CONTENT PROTECTION Text related to the topic of content 
protection 
It has been demonstrated over and over again that the bootleggers that DRM is supposed to 
stop always find ways to circumvent DRM (Russwurm, 2013). 
INTEROPERABILITY Text related to the topic of 
interoperability 
Is the Team taking a position on whether it's appropriate for a W3C specification to rely 
exclusively on components that cannot be independently interoperably implemented when the 
specification is used for its intended purpose? (Sivonen, 2016) 
SECURITY Text related to the topic of security If there is a part of a browser that makes security research difficult and possibly illegal, then 
that part of the browser is rather self-evidently dangerous to end-users (Halpin, 2016).  
USER RIGHTS Text related to the topic of user rights Digital Restrictions Management (DRM) restricts the public's freedom, even beyond what 
overzealous copyright law requires (Russwurm, 2013). 
QUOTED ACCESSIBILITY Quoted text which related to the topic 
of accessibility. 
>>DRM systems usually prohibit any manipulations with content… thus making a content less 
accessible by disabled people<< (Sergey, 2014) 
QUOTED CONTENT 
PROTECTION 
Quoted text which related to the topic 
of content protection. 
It has been demonstrated over and over again that the bootleggers that DRM is supposed to 
stop always find ways to circumvent DRM (Russwurm, 2013). 
QUOTED 
INTEROPERABILITY 
Quoted text which related to the topic 
of interoperability.  
>>Is the Team taking a position on whether it's appropriate for a W3C specification to rely 
exclusively on components that cannot be independently interoperably implemented when the 
specification is used for its intended purpose?<< (Sivonen, 2016).  
QUOTED USER RIGHTS Quoted text which related to the topic 
of user rights. 
>>Digital Restrictions Management (DRM) restricts the public's freedom, even beyond what 
overzealous copyright law requires<< (Russwurm, 2013). 
QUOTED SECURITY Quoted text which related to the topic 
of security.  
>>If there is a part of a browser that makes security research difficult and possibly illegal, then 
that part of the browser is rather self-evidently dangerous to end-users<< (Halpin, 2016). 
JUSTIFIED Text which contains an explanation or 
justification for a stated opinion (see 
pp. 92-97) 
After the experience for example with the DRM rootkit malware which was distributed by a 
once respectable company named Sony there certainly is *no* reason why consumers should 
trust the producers. (Kuckartz, 2012) 
 
DISRESPECTFUL Text which contains disrespectful or 
abusive language (see pp. 97-100) 
The old 'it's hard on me too' argument, pathetic. Grow up and take some responsibility 
(Andrews, 2013a) 
 
CONSTRUCTIVE Text which contains examples of 
“constructive speech” (see pp. 100-
107)   
I would like to hear what you would consider to be a good enough specification for a CDM. Are 
you are talking about the API interface that the UA exposes for a CDM to plug into? I would be 
interested in participating in this discussion, but I don't believe that interface should be part of 
this spec (Steele, 2013) 
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Table 4.3 Summary of data analysis 




membership list  
Classification of W3C members by stakeholder 
group and region.   
Representation of organisations from a diverse range 
of stakeholder groups and regions.  
Participation 
(Inclusion) 
Mailing lists  Classification of mailing list participants by 
region, sector, and gender.  
Participation of male and female individuals from a 







Coding of web corpus sources and mailing list 
messages using “issue nodes”.  
Presence of web corpus issues/discourses within the 
mailing lists.    
Transparency Mailing lists and 
specification 
documents 
Analysis of the W3C’s classification of key 
mailing lists and specification documents, i.e. 
“Team-only”, Member-only”, “Public”.    
The proportion of mailing lists and documents 
specified as “Public”.  
Deliberativeness Mailing lists Coding of mailing list messages using “issue 
nodes” and “quoted issue nodes”. 
The proportion of mailing list content coded to a 
“issues node” which is also coded to its 
corresponding “quoted issues node”.  
Justification Mailing lists Coding of mailing list content as “JUSTIFIED”. The proportion of mailing list content coded to the 
“JUSTIFIED” node overall and for each policy issue.  
Respect Mailing lists Coding of mailing list content as 
“DISRESPECTFUL”. 
The proportion of mailing list content coded to the 
“DISRESPECTFUL” node overall and for each policy 
issue. 
Constructiveness Mailing lists Coding of mailing list content as 
“CONSTRUCTIVE”. 
The proportion of mailing list content coded to the 




5: The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) 
Today the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is one of the most influential and 
well-respected institutions of internet governance, responsible for the development of 
some of the web’s most important and widely used technical standards including HTML 
and CSS. Led by the inventor of the World Wide Web Sir Tim Berners-Lee, the W3C has 
often been praised for the effectiveness of its consensus-led development process as well 
as its commitment to the principles of openness and transparency (Doty & Mulligan, 2013; 
Russell, 2003; Umpathy, 2010). For others, however, the consortium’s commercial focus 
and restrictive membership policies raise questions about its inclusivity as well as the 
capacity of its process to accommodate broad ranging deliberations on matters of public 
policy.  In recent years, the W3C’s development of techno-policy standards has brought 
these concerns to the fore, generating renewed scrutiny of the consortium’s processes 
and concerns about its procedural legitimacy (Malcolm, 2013, Halpin, 2013).  
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the W3C's organisational structure, process and 
political culture. In doing so, I shall demonstrate how contrasting imaginaries of the web 
that emerged in the wake of its commercialisation have forced the W3C to mediate 
between contrasting interpretations of its role as an institution of internet governance. 
Specifically, I show how competing expectations for the consortium to demonstrate both 
procedural efficiency (substantive legitimacy) and rigour (procedural legitimacy) have led it 
to adopt an approach to standards development that combines the ethos of ‘rough 
consensus and running code’ with elements of hierarchical control. I conclude by showing 
how the tensions inherent in this institutional design have been highlighted by the W3C’s 
recent development of techno-policy standards. 
The chapter will be divided into three parts. In the first section, I examine the historical and 
political context of the W3C’s creation, highlighting how the commercial pressures created 
by the web’s invention led the consortium’s founder Tim Berners-Lee to adopt an 
organisational structure that combined commitments to grassroots participation and rough 
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consensus with elements of centralised control. In the second part of the chapter, I 
provide an overview of consortium's political architecture including a summary of some of 
the W3C’s most important committees and working groups as well as an overview of its 
standards development process. In the final section of the chapter, I then demonstrate 
how the consortium’s recent development of techno-policy standards has highlighted the 
underlying tensions inherent within its procedural design as well as ideological conflicts 
between those who see the W3C as a purely coordinative technical body and those who 
wish it to play a more active role as an advocate of open web principles and digital rights.  
The origins of the W3C  
 Despite the on-going development of the internet during the 1970s and 1980s, a 
chronic lack of commercial investment and interest in the technology meant that by the 
beginning of the 1990s the network largely remained an academic curiosity whose content 
was often disorganised and confusing to navigate (Gilles & Cailliau, 2000). In 1991, in an 
attempt to encourage greater adoption of the technology, the National Science Foundation 
(NSF), which had managed the technical infrastructure of the internet since 1986, lifted all 
restrictions on commercial activity over the network (Abbate, 2010). Later the same year, 
CERN researcher Tim Berners-Lee set out to address the problem of the networks 
navigability by developing a series of protocols which would, for the first time, provide a 
user-friendly means of browsing hypertext documents online (Berners-Lee, 2000). The 
World Wide Web as it became known, rendered the internet easily navigable by creating 
links between ‘nodes’ on the network and providing a simple user interface through which 
users could easily access the information they wanted (Curran cited in Tsatsou, p. 206). 
Together these two developments instigated a period of rapid commercialisation and 
expansion which over the next decade would see the internet grow from an initially 
obscure academic research project into one of the most critical technical and commercial 
infrastructures of the 21st Century (IWS, 2017). The speed with which the size and scope 
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of the web grew during the 1990s is perhaps best understood from a statistical 
perspective. In 1996, for example,  the number of websites hosted online was estimated 
to be around a quarter of a million, by the year 2000 that number had increased nearly 
seventyfold to over 17 million (IWS, 2017). Likewise, from the mid-1990s onwards the 
number of individuals connected to the web grew almost exponentially from a mere 16 
million in December 1995 to just over 1 billion ten years later (IWS, 2017). 
In part, this growth was driven by the investment of private companies, who in contrast to 
the web’s early innovators had come to view the web as a potential marketplace, offering 
novel ways to reach their customers, develop new services and exploit markets which 
were previously unknown (Flichy, 2007)1. As Harry Halpin (2013) observed ‘the web 
stopped being viewed as a playground of hackers and was viewed instead as the latest 
frontier of capital, an even infinite one. It would be the backbone [upon which] the 
“knowledge economy”…that promised never-ending returns of productivity, would be 
built’. 
Commercial interest in the web helped to accelerate the pace of innovation. In doing so, 
however, it also threatened to undermine the openness and universality that had made 
the early web such a success. Eager to capitalise on the web’s nascent commercial 
potential and in their rush to gain a crucial early market advantage, many corporations 
had begun to neglect existing standards and add new non-standard features into their 
products (Halpin, 2013). Although these products were supposedly developed in the 
interests of consumers, the effect of this technical arms race was, in reality, to severely 
jeopardise the universality and interoperability of the web, through the production of 
                                                             
1 Perhaps most notable of the early advocates of a commercial internet, was the then Vice-
President and technophile Al Gore, for whom investment in what he famously termed the 
“Information Superhighway” was necessary to revitalise the US economy.  The High Performance 
Computing Act of 1991 (HPCA), often referred to as the Gore Bill, provided the foundations for 
much of the investment in the web technologies during the 1990s (Congress, 1991).   
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incompatible and proprietary digital fiefdoms accessible only through the use of particular 
software and applications2.   
Faced with the risk of balkanization, Berners-Lee quickly recognised the need for a new 
standards body to help coordinate the ‘smooth progression of the web through a period of 
continued technological innovation’ and protect his original vision of an open and universal 
network (Berners-Lee, 2000). In 1994, Berners-Lee founded the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) and established as its mission statement the determination to ‘lead the 
web to its full potential by developing protocols and guidelines that ensure long-term 
growth for the web’ (W3C, 2017b). Over the next two decades, the organisation would 
grow to become one of the web’s most important and influential governing institutions. 
More immediately, however, the W3C faced the urgent question of how to balance the 
technical community’s expectation for rigorous and consensus-led procedures with the 
private sector’s demands for speed and efficiency. 
The commercialisation of the web  
The commercialisation and expansion of the web during the 1990s not only 
transformed the social and economic importance of the web as a technology but also the 
political composition and culture of the technical standards communities responsible for its 
development.  During the 1970s and 1980s standards organisations had for the most part 
been dominated by a relatively small and insular group of academics and engineers, 
united by cooperative working practices and a shared commitment to architectural 
principles of openness (Egedyi, 1996; King et al., 1997)3. For this reason, commercial 
activity on the network was for a long time treated with deep suspicion by standards 
community veterans, many of whom saw proprietary systems as potentially damaging to 
the interoperability and openness of the network and counter to the internet’s foundational 
                                                             
2 This episode in the web’s early history is commonly referred to as the ‘browser wars’ (Halpin, 
2013) 
3 This notion of a shared set of ideas, assumptions, values and beliefs is what Egedyi (1996) 
termed the standardisation ideology.  
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principles of open access and permissionless innovation (Bollier, 2008; McChesney, 
2013; Naughton, 2010)4. As David Bollier (2003, p. 102) put it, ‘they were not sellers and 
buyers negotiating their distinctively different interests through a market transaction. They 
were co-users and co-developers carrying on a social conversation… They were, in truth, 
building a commons: A diverse community dedicated to shared goals and self-governed 
through a cooperative social ethos and informal decision making forums’.  
However as the ideal of a non-commercial web gradually began to erode during the 
1990s, standard processes inevitably began to attract the attention of a much wider range 
of stakeholders, including commercial interest groups eager to discover how they might 
capitalise on the latest technological innovation. In contrast to their academic 
counterparts, this new corporate brand of the standards participant had little knowledge of 
the architectural principles around which the web was designed nor any interest in the 
practices or social conventions of the technical communities which maintained it. Instead, 
as King, Grinter, and Pickering (1997) observe, these newcomers were first and foremost 
interested in representing the commercial interests of their employers, either as 
incumbents seeking to protect their privileged position or as insurgents hoping to gain a 
quick market share5. As Andrew Russell (2014, p. 257) put it; ‘the days of informal 
discussion between bearded and sandaled graduate students were in the past; rather a 
greater proportion of [consortia participants] in the late 90s worked for private companies 
and wore suits and ties – a vivid reminder that the world of internet standards had 
changed’. 
                                                             
4 Janet Abbate (2000) observes how users of the popular USENET bulletin board system found to 
be exploiting the network for commercial purposes were often “flamed” by fellow users – a process 
by which the perpetrators inbox was clogged with messages from fellow users demanding the 
activity be ceased immediately. 
5 The reasoning behind this strategy was quite clear, since it is widely accepted that under certain 
market conditions first-movers can quickly gain significant advantages over their rivals by acquiring 
control over critical interfaces. By establishing a standard in the market, therefore, firms could 
quickly attract a network of users large enough to reduce incentives for these users to seek 
alternative platforms. Once a user network had become established, firms could then leverage 




As a consequence of these changes, during the 1990s standardisation processes began 
to take on a very different character with discussions increasingly driven by economic 
imperatives and the pursuit of self-interest rather than shared engineering principles or 
technical curiosity. As one standards participant at the time reflected, ‘the rules had 
changed substantially. There was big money involved, and everyone knew it… Everybody 
realised that… how we did the technical solutions, determined market lines, determined 
economics, determined money in somebody’s pocket, so everybody was out for blood. It 
was no longer this nice old-boys club’ (John Day cited in  Russell, 2014, pp. 270-271).  
For commentators such as David Post (2000), the reorientation of the standards 
ecosystem towards the fulfilment of private sector objectives was to be welcomed or at 
least preferred, to what he perceived to be the alternative of state regulation of the web. 
For those veterans of the standards community who had long been suspicious of 
proprietary systems, however, the introduction of market competition posed a genuine risk 
to the interoperability of the network as well as the architectural principles of standards 
development which had seen the web flourish (Bollier, 2008; McChesney, 2013; 
Naughton, 2010). As Berners-Lee (2000, p. 197) himself commented, ‘the internet ethos 
in the seventies and eighties was one of sharing for the common good, and it would have 
been unthinkable for a player to ask for fees just for implementing a standard protocol 
such as HTTP. Now things are changing'. 
Consequently, as the web continued to develop through the 1990s and into the new 
millennium, the W3C found itself in the increasingly difficult position of mediating between 
the competing and contradictory visions of the web as an information commons and a 
marketplace. These conflicting imaginaries of the web not only framed expectations of 
how the web should develop but as a corollary, also implied starkly different 
interpretations of the role of the W3C as an institution of internet governance, including 




For commercial actors, the role of the W3C could be understood, quite straightforwardly, 
as a facilitator of cooperation between competing stakeholder groups. From this 
perspective, the primary objectives of the consortium should be limited to tasks which 
maximised the commercial value and marketability of the web, including the promotion of 
interoperability and innovation (Flichy, 2007; Post, 2000). This focus on the commercial 
and technical outcomes of the process meant that the legitimacy of the W3C could be 
understood primarily in terms of its procedural efficiency and the technical quality of its 
standards, that is, from a ‘substantive’ perspective.  
In contrast to this view, many veterans of the standards community, as well as early 
pioneers of the Free and Open Source Software movement (FOSS), interpreted the role 
of the W3C far more broadly (Davidson & Morris, 2002; Lessig, 1999; Stallman, 2002). 
For them, the W3C should not only act as a facilitator of private sector cooperation but 
also as a steward of the open web and as an advocate for the interests and rights of 
ordinary developers, creators and users. From this perspective what was important, was 
not only that the W3C promoted innovation and economic growth, but that it did so in a 
responsible and considered way that was sensitive to the interests of users and that 
provided ample scope to develop consensus on the principles that would guide the web’s 
future development. In this way, the legitimacy of the W3C was seen as being dependent 
not only on the quality of its technical outputs but also on its procedural rigour, including 
the extent to which the views and interests of the broader web community could be 
represented as part of the process (Morris, 2011).  
This more expansive interpretation of the W3C’s role was initially reflected in the 
consortium’s design principle a ‘Web for All’, which indicated its commitment to create a 
web open and accessible to all users, ‘whatever their hardware, software, network 
infrastructure, native language, culture, geographical location, or physical or mental ability’ 
(W3C, 2013). The view that the W3C should play a proactive role in defence of open web 
principles was also one to which Berners-Lee (2000, p. 108) himself seemed sympathetic, 
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suggesting that companies would be ‘in for a fight’ should they attempt to manipulate or 
exploit the W3C process in their own interests.  Despite the rhetoric, however, the 
inevitable commercial pressures exerted on the consortium by the web’s growth meant 
that the W3C would need to be pragmatic in the pursuit of its principles.  
In what follows I demonstrate how the tensions between these two competing 
interpretation of the W3C influenced the development of its political architecture and 
process. Specifically, I will show how growing pressure on standards bodies to streamline 
their development procedures led the W3C to adopt an organisational structure which 
combined grassroots participation and consensus-led discussions with elements of 
hierarchical control.  In the final part of the chapter, I will then demonstrate how the 
tensions inherent within the W3C’s institutional structure have been highlighted by its 
recent development of techno-policy standards. 
The W3C’s political architecture and process6 
 The challenges that the web’s growth would pose to the principled idealism of the 
standards community were apparent to Berners-Lee and other senior W3C figures from 
an early stage. Writing in his memoirs Berners-Lee (2000, p. 98) reflects how in the 
context of the web’s commercialisation ‘running the consortium would always be a 
balancing act between taking the time to stay as open as possible and advancing at the 
speed demanded by the onrush of technology’.  
As a veteran of the internet community, Berners-Lee held a deep admiration for the IETF 
and its ‘rough consensus and running code’ model of standards development. As such, in 
founding the W3C, Berners-Lee borrowed heavily from the IETF’s organisational 
structure, adopting processes which emphasised the importance of rigorous testing and 
                                                             
6 W3C’s activities are administered by MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab 
European Research Consortium for Informatics and Mathematics (ERCIM). The consortium also 
has HQ’s in Paris and at Keio University in Japan, as well as several other regional offices around 




informal discussions over ponderous voting procedures (Updegrove, 1995a). Like the 
IETF, Berners-Lee also recognised the importance of consensus-building, defining the 
consortium’s development process as one ‘designed to maximise consensus about the 
content of a technical report, to ensure high technical and editorial quality, and to earn 
endorsement by W3C and the broader community' (W3C, 2017b).  This dual commitment 
to voluntary consensus and informality was also reflected in Berners-Lee’s decision to 
refer to the consortium’s technical outputs as ‘recommendations’ rather than ‘standards’. 
As Berners-Lee (2000, p. 98) himself explains; 
 ‘We wrestled over the terms – whether the consortium should actually set a 
"standard" or stop just short of that by issuing a formal "recommendation." We 
chose the latter to indicate that getting "rough consensus and running code" – 
the Internet maxim for agreeing on a workable program and getting it out there 
to be tried – was the level at which we would work'.  
At the same time that Berners-Lee wished to remain faithful to the ‘rough consensus and 
running code’ ethos of standards development, he was also realistic about the pressures 
that commercialisation would place on the consortium and cautious about the effect that 
direct grassroots participation could have on its procedural efficiency (Berners-Lee, 
2000). Unlike earlier internet standards bodies – which had mostly operated outside the 
market economy - the W3C was from the beginning expected to be responsive to the 
demands of commercial vendors. From the early days of commercialisation, other informal 
standards bodies such as the IETF had been largely ignored by corporations who had 
grown frustrated at their lack of commercial focus and the ‘endless philosophical rat holes 
down which technical conversations would disappear’ (Halpin, 2013)7. Thus, in order to 
                                                             
7 As Harry Halpin (2013) observed, ‘Soon all the major corporations had a website. The 
corporations sent their representatives to the IETF in an attempt to discover who the power-brokers 
of the Internet were (and to stack their meetings in order to control voting process) but instead 
found themselves immersed in obscure technical conversations and mystified by the lack of a 
formal body of which to seize control. So, instead of taking over the IETF, the corporations began 
ignoring the IETF'.  
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avoid irrelevance and prevent corporations from fracturing the universality of the web in 
pursuit of their own short-term interest, Berners-Lee recognised the need for a more 
hierarchical and streamlined approach to standardisation that could keep pace with 
innovation in an ever-changing marketplace.  
To achieve this Berners-Lee took the controversial decision to restrict participation at the 
W3C to organisations who were willing to pay a membership fee. Corporate members 
would be asked to pay an annual fee of $50,000, while non-profit, academic, and 
governmental organisations would be expected to make a contribution of $5,000 a year8. 
In exchange for their annual fees, members received access to member-only committees 
and mailing lists as well as one representative on the Advisory Committee – the body 
responsible for the maturation and approval of proposals and standards (W3C, 2017d).  
By adopting a more restrictive approach to participation, Berners-Lee was able to 
substantially improve the efficiency with which standards could be developed. In doing so, 
however, the consortium also severely limited its capacity to accommodate the input of 
the broader community. Indeed, although, some degree of public participation was still 
possible through the organisation’s mailing lists, its political architecture acted to restrict 
the scope of this participation, leading to an institutional structure and process which, like 
many other standards consortia, was heavily skewed towards private interests.   
Partly to address these concerns and pre-empting the risks to open web principles that 
such a one-sided process could pose, in founding the W3C Berners-Lee also took the 
equally controversial decision to offset the influence of commercial interests by 
concentrating a considerable amount procedural authority in his own position as Director 
(one which he claims for life). Among the broad-ranging powers held by the director are: 
‘responsibility for assessing consensus within W3C for architectural choices, publication of 
technical reports, and new activities’; appointing working group chairs; chartering new 
                                                             
8  No category of W3C membership current exists for individuals.  
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working groups and deciding the outcome of Formal Objections (see below) (W3C, 
2017d).  
In addition to his considerable procedural authority, Berners-Lee also enjoyed a 
substantial amount of ‘soft power’. As a long-time veteran of the internet standards 
community and inventor of the World Wide Web, Berners-Lee’s knowledge and expertise, 
were beyond dispute, while his selfless and much-praised decision to release the web 
freely9 helped to reinforce his reputation as someone who could be trusted to act in the 
long-term interests of the open web.  
From a purely pragmatic standpoint, Berners-Lee’s role gave him the strategic advantage 
of being able to foster an institutional environment in which corporate actors could pursue 
their own interests freely, while at the same time ensuring that the design principles which 
were vital to the web’s long-term success were safeguarded from the excesses of 
privatisation. As Michael Dertouzos (2000, p. x) put it, Berners-Lee’s decision was 
intended to ensure that ‘the web would move forward, flourish, and remain whole, despite 
the yanks and pulls of all the companies that seemed bent on controlling it’. 
Although the procedural importance of the role of Director has often led Berners-Lee to be 
characterised as the W3C’s ‘benevolent dictator’, in founding the consortium Berners-Lee 
was careful to create a political structure in which responsibility for the creation and 
development of standards and web technologies was shared between a wide range of 
groups and committees run by W3C members and staff. The various roles and 
responsibilities of these bodies are clearly set out in the W3C ‘Process Document’, an 
ever-evolving list of rules and procedures which acts like the consortium’s constitution 
(W3C, 2017d).  
                                                             
9 Tim Berners-Lee has in recent years rejected the suggestion that his decision to release the web 
freely was motivated purely by altruistic or anti-commercial reasons. Instead, he has admitted that 
the decision had far more to do with ensuring that the web remained flexible and open to 
decentralised innovation. As Berners-Lee himself explained, ‘If I had tried to capitalise on the web 
initially, it probably would not have taken off… The internet community would have dropped the 
web like hotcakes' (Berners-Lee quoted in Garfinkel, 1998, p. 42). 
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By far the largest and most influential stakeholder group within the W3C is the Advisory 
Committee, which is composed of a single representative from each of the W3C’s 
members. The Advisory Committee has a number of important roles as part of the W3C 
process, which include reviewing and approving the charters of Working Groups and 
technical specifications that reach the status of a ‘Proposed Recommendations’ (see 
figure 5.1). In addition to its review roles, the Advisory Committee is also responsible for 
electing members to two other important W3C groups, the Technical Architecture Group 
(TAG) and the Advisory Board. 
TAG deals mainly with questions related to principles of the web’s technical architecture. 
According to the W3C’s Process Document, its responsibilities include, documenting and 
building consensus around principles of web architecture; resolving issues involving 
general web architecture; and helping coordinate cross-technology architecture 
developments inside and outside W3C (W3C, 2017d). TAG also hears appeals when 
member submissions are rejected for technical reasons related to web architecture.  The 
Advisory Board meanwhile, provides on-going guidance on legal issues as well as matters 
related to management, process, and conflict resolution (W3C 2017d). The Advisory 
Board also manages the evolution of the W3C’s Process Document and hears any 
appeals which are unrelated to questions of web architecture. 
Much of the actual technical work of the W3C is carried out by a wide range of Working 
Groups, chartered by the Director in order to produce ‘deliverables' such as technical 
reports, software test suites or reviews of the deliverables of other groups. Working 
Groups are led by Chairs (appointed by the Director) who are responsible for managing 
the development of technical reports including, soliciting drafts, encouraging participation, 
setting agendas and judging items as either in or out of scope for the Working Group.  In 
addition to technical Working Groups, the W3C also hosts a wide range of Interest Groups 
and Community Groups which acts as general fora for members and staff to discuss 
potential web technologies and policies (W3C, 2017d).   
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Although W3C members are themselves expected to actively participate in Working 
Groups, their activities are also supported by a team of permanent W3C staff members 
who provide ‘technical leadership’ and administrative support (W3C, 2017d). The W3C is 
also responsible for communicating with members and the public about the W3C’s 
activities and web technologies. In some cases, these staff members can also occupy 
important and influential positions such as Working Group Chairs or Domain Leads. The 
activities of Working Groups can also be supported any number of external experts who 
are invited by the Chairs to participate in order to provide ‘expertise in specific areas’ 
which would not otherwise be available to the Group (W3C, 2017a). 
In addition to establishing the roles and responsibilities of the various groups and 
stakeholders within the W3C, the process document also outlines the W3C’s standards 
development process as well as policies and procedures for the resolution of conflict and 
appeals.  
Although the W3C does occasionally standardise existing technologies, the impetus for 
much of the W3C's work comes from its members who are expected to work 
collaboratively to identify potential areas of common interest or requirements. The 
approval of any new activity can only be provided by the Director who is responsible for 
chartering new Working Groups and approving the publication of Working Drafts. Once a 
Working Draft had been approved it then proceeds through various stages maturation 
along a standards track set out in the Process Document (see figure 5.1). Progression 
along the standards track is subject to the consensus of the Working Group participants 
and the approval of the Director. At the final stage of the process, specifications are also 




Figure: 5.1: Summary of the W3C standards development process (W3C, 2017d) 
Status Description 
Working Draft A Working Draft is a technical report that W3C has 
published for review by the community, including W3C 
Members, the public, and other technical organisations.   
Candidate 
Recommendation 
A Candidate Recommendation is a technical report which 
following an extensive review is believed to satisfy the 
Working Group’s technical requirements. Documents are 
published as Candidate Recommendations in order to 
gather implementation experience. 
Proposed 
Recommendation 
A Proposed Recommendation is a mature technical report 
which has received the approval of the Director. Proposed 
Recommendations are submitted to the Advisory 
Committee for review. 
W3C Recommendation A W3C Recommendation is a technical report or 
specification which has received the endorsement of W3C 
members and the Director. The W3C recommends its wide 
deployment as a standard for the web.  
 Given that the W3C lacks the kinds of regulatory power needed to enforce its 
standards, each stage of the development process is designed to maximise consensus10. 
                                                             
10 According to the W3C Process Document, ‘To promote consensus, the W3C process requires 
Chairs to ensure that groups consider all legitimate views and objections, and endeavour to resolve 
them, whether these views and objections are expressed by the active participants of the group or 
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In cases where a Working Group is unable to reach consensus, the Process Document 
empowers Working Group Chairs to record a decision. While preference is given to 
proposals which generate the weakest objections versus proposals that are supported by 
a large majority but that cause strong objections, the Process Document nonetheless 
states that a small group of dissenters ‘cannot stop a group's work simply by saying that 
they cannot live with a decision’ (W3C, 2017d). As such, when a Chair believes that ‘the 
group has duly considered the legitimate concerns of dissenters as far as is possible and 
reasonable’, the Process Document advises that the group ‘should move on’ (W3C 
2017d).  
In circumstances where participants have strong objections to a Working Group decision, 
they can submit a Formal Objections. In the context of the W3C process, a Formal 
Objection to a group decision is ‘one that the reviewer requests that the Director considers 
as part of evaluating the related decision (e.g., in response to a request to advance a 
technical report)' (W3C, 2017d). Working Groups must provide a public record of all 
Formal Objections and are expected to provide substantive responses to the issues 
raised11. However, the ultimate authority for determining the outcome of Formal 
Objections resides with the Director, whose decision is final.  
Thus, despite certain procedural affinities with the ‘rough consensus’ ethos of standards 
development, the W3C can be said to operate much more like a constitutional monarchy 
than a grassroots democracy, with power over the development of the standards-setting 
process carefully balanced between the Advisory Committee comprised of W3C 
members, and the Director. The adoption of this more hierarchical form of governance 
was not driven by ideology or personal ambition, but – as described above - by a 
pragmatic recognition of the commercial realities of web development and the need to 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
by others (e.g., another W3C group, a group in another organisation, or the general public)’ (W3C, 
2017d). 
11  The W3C Process Document states that ‘a substantive response is expected to include rationale 
for decisions (e.g., a technical explanation, a pointer to charter scope, or a pointer to a 
requirements document)’ (W3C, 2017d). 
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ensure procedural efficiency. Over the past 25 years, the W3C’s institutional structure has 
enabled the consortium to remain responsive to changes in the marketplace but has also 
been the subject of much controversy and criticism. In what follows I demonstrate how 
these critiques have led the W3C to implement a number of reforms designed to enhance 
its transparency and procedural legitimacy.  
The Patent Policy controversy and reform 
Following its creation in 1994, the W3C's unique melding of idealism and 
pragmatism, as well as hierarchal and decentralised control, allowed it to successfully 
navigate the potential pitfalls of the web’s commercialisation and establish itself as a well-
respected and trusted institution of internet governance. However, as public use of the 
web continued to increase, the work of the W3C steadily began to encroach on an ever-
greater number of policy issues from safeguarding and intellectual property to privacy and 
freedom of expression. These developments soon sparked calls for greater openness and 
transparency and raised concerns about the precariousness of entrusting responsibility for 
the defence of open web principles and interests of users to one man (Davidson & Morris, 
2002). Within this context, the centralisation of procedural power and restrictions on 
participation, which had been so crucial to the consortium's early success, began to be 
perceived as increasingly problematic. Thus, while the W3C could still rightly be said to 
exhibit high levels of substantive legitimacy - in the sense that its standards were widely 
implemented - concerns began to be raised about the consortium’s procedural legitimacy 
(Garfinkel, 1998).   
Central to many of the critiques of the W3C during the period, were accusations that the 
consortium had been captured by corporate elites and, as a result, was neglecting the 
interests and opinions of the ordinary users and the wider web community12. As Jeffery 
                                                             
12 In a W3C press release about its controversial PICS standard for example, the consortium 
proudly announced that the specification had received input from 23 organisations. Of these, 
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Zeldman argued, “beholden to its corporate paymasters who alone can afford 
membership, the W3C seems increasingly detached from ordinary designers and 
developers” (cited in Malcolm, 2008, p. 67). 
Frustrations at the W3C’s exclusivity and perceived neglect of open web principles were 
most notably brought to a head in 2001 during a highly fractious dispute over a proposed 
amendment to the W3C’s patent policy, which would, for the first time, allow inclusion of 
patents in W3C recommendations. Outraged at what they perceived to be betrayal of the 
web’s founding principles, developers, programmers and free and open source software 
advocates united in opposition to the planned change. Venting their displeasure on the 
W3C’s mailing lists, opponents of the proposals threatened to boycott the organisation if 
the proposal was approved. Faced with an avalanche of criticism and the chastened by 
the ‘potentially fatal consequences of a rank-and-file mutiny’, the W3C eventually backed 
down and reaffirmed its commitment to royalty-free standards (Russell, 2011, p. 167). 
While Berners-Lee and the W3C survived the dispute, for many, the patent policy 
controversy proved to be a watershed moment for the consortium, which, more aware 
than ever of the risks of excluding the viewpoints of the broader web community, soon 
after instigated a series of reforms designed to enhance the transparency and openness 
of its process (Russell, 2003).  
Among the most notable of these changes have been attempts to become more actively 
inclusive of policy experts and other relevant actors, including lawyers, policy-makers, 
academics, and civil society groups. This has been achieved partly through a greater use 
the consortium’s invited experts policy as well as changes to public access to the W3C’s 
mailing-lists (Russell, 2003, 2011). Broader engagement with public policy experts has 
allowed the W3C to draw upon a much wider pool of expertise, helping inform its 
development of policies on issues such as privacy and freedom of expression. Public 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
however, all except one – the Centre for Democracy and Technology (CDT) – were ISPs, media or 
software companies (Malcolm, 2008). 
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access to mailing lists meanwhile has helped the consortium to enhance its transparency 
and provided a channel through which a much wider of range of individuals, including 
members of the public can be consulted and express their opinion on the W3C’s work.  
Alongside changes to policies around inclusion, the W3C has also attempted to take a 
more explicit approach in its consideration of public policy issues as part of the standards 
process. Such efforts have included the creation of several domains and Working Groups 
designed to consider the connections between public policy and the W3C’s broader work 
on standardisation (W3C, 2015c). In the late 1990s, for example, the W3C created the 
Technology & Society Domain, the first - and to the best of the author’s knowledge only - 
formal structure created by a web standards organisation to explicitly consider matters 
related to the development of “techno-policy” standards. According to the W3C’s website, 
the mission of the domain is to ‘augment existing web infrastructure with building blocks 
that assist in addressing critical public policy issues affecting the web’. It continues to 
explain that it is not the expectation of participants to ‘solve policy problems entirely’, but 
to design technical tools that ‘can lead to policy approaches that are more consistent with 
the way the web should operate’ (W3C, 2015c). 
More recently the W3C demonstrated its commitment to due process and openness by 
joining the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Internet Society 
(ISOC), Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and IETF in affirming its commitment to the 
newly compiled ‘OpenStand principles’. The principles – which are described by their 
authors as a ‘Modern Paradigm for Standards’, outline a series of guidelines by which 
organisations are expected to abide in order to for their standards to be classified as 
‘open’. Although many of the principles relate to the effects of the standards produced, 
including, for example, the requirement that standards ‘enable global competition’ and 
‘provide global interoperability’, the list also outlines a series procedural principles, 
including, the need to ensure due process, broad consensus, transparency, balance, and 
openness (OpenStand, 2017).    
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For some, the consortium’s proactive efforts to overcome its own procedural deficits and 
address the public policy implication of its work, signifies a decisive shift towards a more 
consensus-driven and inclusive approach to standardisation, which is reflective of the 
‘rough consensus and running code’ model pioneered by the IETF (Crocker, 1993). As 
Russell (2003, p. 23) observed, ‘The W3C stands as a model for other industry-driven 
internet standards consortia as it demonstrates the need for formal mechanisms to 
facilitate participation from a broader public that might not be at the table in any given 
standards meeting’.  
Others, however, question the extent to which the procedural reforms of the previous 
decade have had any notable effect on the capacity of the W3C’s to effectively deal with 
the types of complex and divisive issues raised by the development techno-policy 
standards, noting how the consortium still retains many of the procedural features which 
raised concerns about its procedural legitimacy in the first place (Weber, 2010; Halpin, 
2013; Malcolm, 2013; McChesney, 2013; Schoechle, 2009).  
Firstly, despite ongoing efforts include more external experts, critics observe, how the 
technical objectives of working groups are still largely dictated by a narrow range of 
corporate members, who are more likely to privilege the pursuit of their own economic 
self-interest over the common good (Schoechle, 2009). Secondly, while many 
commentators praise the W3C for its work on issues such as accessibility and security, 
they nonetheless observe how the consortium’s engagement with public policy has tended 
to be restricted to a relatively small number of issues about which consortium members 
and participants share a degree of expertise (Halpin, 2013). Finally, critics note how the 
W3C’s on-going need to remain responsive an ever-changing technological marketplace, 
means that the consortium is unlikely ever to be able to host the kinds of broad-ranging 
and inclusive deliberations necessary to legitimise its substantive outputs (Weber, 2010).  
As such, the challenge facing the W3C remains how to maintain the kinds of hierarchical, 
top-down leadership and exclusive membership needed for effective and efficient 
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processes, while at the same time, satisfy the growing demands for greater participation, 
transparency and due process. Put simply, how to balance substantive legitimacy and 
procedural legitimacy. 
In the final chapter of this thesis, I examine how these tensions have been brought into to 
sharp focus by the W3C’s recent development of the Encrypted Media Extension 
specification (EME). Through an in-depth analysis of the consortium’s standards 
development process, I will show how participants and members of the consortium 
continue to contest the W3C’s role in relation to public policy. By framing the W3C as a 
purely technical organisation, I will show how proponents of the specification limited the 
scope of deliberations and undermined efforts to debate the public policy implications of 
the standard. As such, I argue that the findings of this research provide evidence to 
support concerns about W3C’s willingness and capacity to consider questions of public 











6. Case Study: Encrypted Media Extensions  
 In September 2017, the W3C announced that it had approved the transition of the 
Encrypted Media Extensions (EME) specification – an extension to the HTML media 
element which enables web applications to interact with content protection systems to 
allow playback of encrypted content - to the status of an official W3C recommendation. 
The decision signalled the end of a long and highly contested standardisation process 
which had seen staff members resign in protest, an unprecedented number of formal 
objections, and the legitimacy of the W3C to preside over the development of techno-
policy standards called into question.  
In this chapter, I will examine in detail the development of the EME specification. In doing 
so, I will argue that although the W3C exhibited many of the institutional features needed 
to demonstrate procedural legitimacy - including, a discursively inclusive and transparent 
development process - concerns nevertheless remain regarding the effects of commercial 
pressures and the consortium’s own techno-scientific bias on its capacity to adequately 
consider the public policy implications of its work.  
I will begin by situating the controversy over the development of EME within the broader 
context of debates concerning digital copyright and the use of Digital Rights Management 
technologies (DRM). Following this, I will provide a descriptive overview of EME’s 
development including discussions of some of the key areas of contestation. Next, I will 
present the findings of the research including analysis of the various indicators of 
procedural legitimacy included within the analytical framework described in chapter three 
(Inclusion, Transparency, Constructiveness, Deliberativeness, Respect, and Justification). 
Finally, I will discuss some of the key findings of the research as well as its broader 






 Today we live in an information society. The gradual transition of most developed 
economies away from the industrialised production of manufactured goods and towards 
the production and distribution of information has, since the 1970s, positioned knowledge 
(not labour) at as ‘the principal force of production’ (Lyotard, 1984, p. 5), dislocating its 
association with material commodities and elevating the status of information as a value in 
its own right (Castells, 2009; Drucker, 1995; Machlup, 1962). Over the past several 
decades, this transition to an informational mode of production has, somewhat inevitably, 
precipitated growing efforts by governments, multinational corporations, and 
intergovernmental agencies to build the technical infrastructures, legal frameworks and 
economic tools needed to protect information and support the growth of knowledge 
production. These efforts have found their most notable expression in the radical 
expansion of global intellectual property rights regimes designed to maximise the 
profitability of information through the creation of artificial scarcity (Boyle, 2003; 
Braithwaite, 2002; Kapczynski, 2008).    
At the heart of the information society, however, lies an intriguing paradox. At the same 
time that the commodification of information has prompted attempts to maximise its value 
by ensuring its scarcity, ICT technologies - which are themselves products of the 
information society - continue to undermine information’s value by making it increasingly 
abundant (Gillespie, 2007; Postigo, 2012; Vaidhyanathan, 2003). This paradox was 
famously captured by American writer Stewart Brand (1985, p. 49) when he observed 
how; 
 ‘on the one hand information wants to be expensive because it is so valuable. 
The right information in the right place just changes your life. On the other 
hand, information wants to be free, because the cost of getting it out is getting 




Thus, whereas historically the task of reproducing information may have been time-
consuming and costly, advances in computer processing speeds and digital compression, 
combined with a corollary decrease in data storage costs has increasingly enabled 
anyone with access to a computer to quickly reproduce digital content without quality loss 
and at zero marginal cost1. Furthermore, whereas the scope of intellectual property rights 
infringement may have previously been limited by the logistical constraints of material 
reproduction and real-world distribution, the growth of the internet has meant that, today, 
files can not only be easily replicated but also distributed across the world instantly using 
P2P file sharing websites, such as the ever-resilient “the Pirate Bay”. Thus, despite the 
rapid expansion of intellectual property regimes globally, in context of the growth of the 
web, control over the distribution and reproduction of digital content has been gradually 
eroded, challenging accepted norms around ownership and undermining the profitability of 
those industries whose business models are predicated upon scarcity (Berry, 2008; David, 
2010; Vaidhyanathan, 2003). 
Faced with these challenges, many of the digital content industries – including the digital 
publishing, motion picture, and music industries - have over the past two decades 
deployed a range of strategies to combat copyright infringement and protect their 
profitability. Among these strategies have been, the development of new economic 
models such as digital music sales and video streaming services, anti-piracy media 
campaigns designed to portray online file-sharers as criminals (David, 2010; Patry, 
2009)2, and extensive governmental lobbying efforts intended to advance far-reaching 
                                               
1 Before the digitalisation of media, copies made using analogue systems suffered from what is 
known as ‘generation loss’ - a gradual loss of quality after each subsequent copy (Lessig, 2008).   
2 In 2002, long-time president of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) Jack Valenti, 
declared that the industry was fighting its own ‘terrorist war against piracy’, a comment which was 
typical of a much broader media and public relations campaign fought by the content industries 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s which successfully promoted the notion of copyright as ‘property’ 
and all who make unlicensed use of copyrighted material are ‘pirates’ (Patry, 2009, pp. xxi-xxii). 
This discourse resonated with lawmakers and played an important role in easing the way to a 




extensions to copyright law in legislation including the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) in the US and the EU’s Copyright Directive (Congress, 1998; Parliament, 2001). 
In conjunction with these economic, social, and legal strategies, the content industries 
have also sought to counter the challenges posed by new technologies through the 
development of their own technical solutions. Foremost amongst such efforts has been 
the creation and deployment of various forms of digital rights management technologies 
(DRM), which use encryption to protect content from unauthorised access by enforcing 
certain restrictions on the functionality of digital content. Such restrictions may include, 
preventing users from copying and editing files or restrictions on the types of software or 
hardware that can be used to access the content (Gillespie, 2007).  
For many in the content industries, DRM represents a critical tool in the fight against 
copyright infringement and digital piracy. Specifically, proponents argue that the 
technology is essential in order to give creators control over the reproduction and 
distribution of their works. Without such protections, proponents argue, creators would 
lack the incentives to create and distribute new content, leading the internet to become 
simply ‘a collection of empty pipes’ (Litman, 2001, p. 93).  
In contrast to the content industries’ interpretation of the internet as a risk which needs 
neutralising, the growth of the web has also given rise to a broad range of social, political 
and creative movements which view the web’s radical connectivity not as an existential 
threat to the creative economy but rather as an opportunity to transition to a new 
networked, cooperative and participatory mode of cultural production. Inspired by the 
successes of the Free and Open Source Software movement (FOSS), as well as of 
cooperative enterprises such as Wikipedia and the rise of participatory forms of culture, 
what is sometimes referred to collectively as the ‘free culture’ movement3, interprets the 
                                               
3 Within the literature dozens of different terms have been used to refer to the numerous disparate 
but interconnected political, social and cultural movements, which here I have chosen to refer to as 
the ‘free culture movement’. Other widely used terms include, the access to knowledge movement 
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web not as a marketplace facilitating the exchange of commercial goods and service but 
instead as an information commons. As a result, free culture advocates reject the 
prevailing neoclassical economic discourses presented by lobbyists in favour of stronger 
copyright law and the use of DRM online, highlighting how the rapid rise in the use, power 
and accessibility of ICT has radically transformed the way in which we not only consume 
but also produce culture online. In doing so, they seek to challenge long-held assumptions 
about authorship and ownership and promote new economic models predicated not on 
the scarcity and control of information but rather its distribution and abundance (Bauwens, 
2005; Benkler, 2006; Jenkins et al., 2009; Lessig, 2008; Woodmansee & Jaszi, 1994)4.  
Quite apart from their general suspicion of the underlying economic arguments and 
discourses which emphasise the need for DRM, digital rights campaigners have also 
criticised what they perceive to be the technology’s collateral effects on a wide range of 
internet policy issues including, security, user rights, accessibility and interoperability.  
In relation to security, critics such as Von Lohmann (2010) note how the technical need for 
DRM systems to be opaque to end-users presents a variety of security risks since such 
‘black-boxes’ often contain security flaws which are invisible to users but which could be 
exploited by hackers to compromise and take control of devices. By leveraging the DRM’s 
                                                                                                                                              
(A2K) (Kapczynski, 2008), remix culture (Lessig, 2008), hacker culture (Von Busch & Palmås, 
2006), the copyleft movement (Berry, 2008), the public domain movement (Boyle, 2003), and the 
P2P movement (Bauwens, 2005). 
4 While it is important to try to contextualise the EME controversy within the broader debates on 
digital copyright and the use of DRM, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the nuances 
of these debates or the competing imaginaries of the internet as a public space which emerged 
from them. For more on these debates see: Berry, D. M. (2008). Copy, rip, burn: The politics of 
copyleft and open source: Pluto Press; Bollier, D., & Watts, T. (2002). Saving the information 
commons: A new public interest agenda in digital media. Washington, DC: New America 
Foundation and Public Knowledge, 26-32; Boyle, J. (2003). The second enclosure movement and 
the construction of the public domain. Law and contemporary problems, 66(1/2), 33-74; Jenkins, 
H., Purushotma, R., Weigel, M., Clinton, K., & Robison, A. J. (2009). Confronting the challenges of 
participatory culture: Media education for the 21st century: MIT Press; Kapczynski, A. (2008). The 
access to knowledge mobilisation and the new politics of intellectual property; Lessig, L. (2008). 
Remix: Making art and commerce thrive in the hybrid economy: Penguin; Ostrom, E., & Hess, C. 
(2007). Understanding knowledge as a commons: From theory to practice: MIT Press; Stallman, R. 
(2002). Free software, free society: Selected essays of Richard M. Stallman: Lulu. com. 
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capacity to disguise its operation from the user, malicious software can compromise 
computers or other devices without the intrusion being detected.  In a famous example of 
DRM being exploited in this way, rootkit copy protection, automatically and covertly 
installed onto user’s computers by Sony BMG CDs, was found to include several security 
vulnerabilities that were subsequently exploited by hackers. In addition, commentators 
note how these security risks are further compounded by the so-called anti-circumvention 
provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and its international 
equivalents, which make it illegal to circumvent or disable DRM technologies even for 
otherwise lawful reasons such as security research or auditing (Congress, 1998).  
Although intended to provide legal recourse for copyright holders against hackers who 
maliciously break DRM encryption, scholars observe how over the past two decades 
these provisions have made DRM technologies effectively unauditable, as security 
researchers are prevented from carrying out their work for fear of being prosecuted 
(Herman, 2011; Von Lohmann, 2010). 
In addition to the security problems associated with content protection, critics also 
highlight how DRM technologies have caused compatibility and interoperability problems 
which have contributed to the creation of an increasingly fragmented media landscape in 
which certain categories of content are only accessible using specific combinations of 
hardware and software. In particular, critics note how most forms of DRM do not merely 
prevent customers from copying digital files but also specify how files can be used 
including, for example, which types of software or media players they can be played on 
(Von Lohmann, 2010). For example, a DRM encrypted song purchased on Apples iTunes 
would not be playable on non-Apple devices, whereas songs purchase in a Window 
media format may not be compatible with Apple’s iPod. In addition to causing confusion 
and frustration among consumers, critics note how the compatibility issues caused by 
DRM also have the potential to lock consumers into certain platforms, limiting consumer 
choice and jeopardising competition between platforms and devices (Kasprowski, 2010; 
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Shernaman, 2011). In a related concern, Kramer (2007) observes how the restrictions that 
DRM technologies impose on the ways in which content can be consumed can often 
create compatibility problems with assistive accessibility tools such as screen readers and 
subtitling, thereby threatening the ability of disabled users to access or consume digital 
content.  
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, critics note how the blanket nature of the 
restrictions imposed on users by DRM technologies effectively curtail the rights granted to 
consumers by the category of copyright limitations known as fair use. Fair Use rights - 
which pertain to a broad range of acceptable uses of content beyond private personal use, 
including for example, the creation or editing of copies for educational or creative 
purposes – are designed to balance the interests of copyright holders with the public 
interest in the wider distribution and use of creative works by allowing for certain limited 
uses of copyrighted material without the need to acquire permission from the copyright 
holder (Gillespie, 2007; Postigo, 2012). By introducing technological barriers, which 
prevent users from exercising these privileges, critics argue that DRM effectively enforces 
a maximalist interpretation of copyright law, beyond that of even the most stringent 
intellectual property regime (Lessig, 2004). As a result, commentators such as Lessig 
(2008) argue that DRM negatively affects not only the ability of consumers to use and 
share digital content in a way that is consistent with norms of non-digital consumption but 
also on the flourishing of nascent forms of participatory digital culture which rely heavily on 
the rights granted under the fair use doctrine.  
In response to mounting consumer pressure, during the late 2000s a growing number of 
online platforms, including iTunes,  began to scrap the default use of DRM in its products, 
leading some commentators to optimistically declare the ‘death of DRM’ (Arrington, 2007). 
As will be demonstrated, however, the rise of video streaming services together with the 
decline of previous methods of implementing content protection online, have over the past 
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several years lead to growing demands from copyright holders and content producers for 
the creation of a standardised means of applying DRM protection to online video content.  
Encrypted Media Extension  
 From viral sensations on YouTube to satirical remix videos and glitch art5, online 
video content has over the past decade become an increasingly important aspect of 
modern life and an essential part of our digital culture. It is currently estimated that online 
video streaming accounts for approximately 73% of all consumer internet traffic, and with 
the recent exponential growth of popular streaming services such as Netflix and Hulu 
expected to continue into the near future, this number is only likely to grow (Cisco, 2012)6.   
Until quite recently, access to video content online has been largely reliant upon the use 
of third-party plugins such as Adobe Flash or Microsoft Silverlight which extend browser 
functionality to enable users to stream encrypted video content. Although widely used, 
these plugins have nevertheless been notoriously prone to security flaws and problems 
with interoperability. To address these problems and to provide a more effective and 
elegant solution to the challenge of providing video content online, in 2007 the W3C 
announced the addition of a video element to its flagship HTML standard, which would 
allow users to embed video content directly within the browser without the need for 
plugins.  
In response to the initial development and subsequent growth of HTML5 video as the 
preferred option for streaming video online, many browsers and web applications began to 
curtail their support for plugin applications. While the transition to HTML5 and the demise 
of the much-derided plugin architecture were widely celebrated, unlike conventional 
plugins, HTML5 video did not support the playback of encrypted content using DRM. For 
the millions of users who wished to share their video content freely via video hosting sites 
                                               
5 Glitch art involves the use of digital errors caused by the corruption or manipulation of digital data 
for aesthetic purposes.  
6 Current projections estimate that by 2021 video traffic will account for roughly 82% of total traffic 
(Cisco, 2012).  
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such as YouTube or Vimeo, this oversight was not an issue. For paid-to-view streaming 
services such as Netflix or Hulu, however, the lack of support for DRM in HTML5 video 
posed a significant problem, since their license agreements with content providers almost 
always required the use of robust content protection in their web applications to prevent 
piracy.   
In early 2011, amidst growing concern about HTML5’s lack of support for the playback of 
‘protected content’, the W3C’s Web and TV Interest Group7 convened the Media Pipeline 
Task Force (MPTF)8 to “discuss requirements placed on the HTML5 video, audio and 
media interfaces by media formats that are used for Web and TV applications”. Later that 
year, the Task Force under the leadership of CableLabs’ Clarke Stevens published a list 
of design goals and requirements that content protection should support for Web and TV 
applications. In the document, the authors highlighted concerns that while the majority of 
internet traffic is now video streaming, ‘there are currently no standards or common 
conventions in HTML to provide the level of content protection required by some content 
owners. As a result, content owners must support multiple, non-interoperable private 
content protection solutions’ (W3C, 2012)9. Echoing the content industries’ warnings about 
the risk of “empty pipes” over a decade earlier, the authors argued that without such a 
standard rights owners would be ‘less likely to produce the high-value content that drives 
the commercial video businesses’ or make their content available online (W3C, 2012).  
In early 2012, following the publication of the MPTF’s requirements document, Adrian 
Bateman (Microsoft), David Dorwin (Google) and Mark Watson (Netflix) submitted a 
                                               
7 Launched in February 2011, the Web and TV Interest Group was created to ‘provide a forum for 
Web and TV technical discussions, to review existing work, as well as the relationship between 
services on the Web and TV services, and to identify requirements and potential solutions to 
ensure that the Web will function well with TV’ (W3C, 2011). The groups charter can be found at: 
http://www.w3.org/2012/11/webTVIGcharter.html. 
8 More information about the Media Pipeline Tasks Force including its charter and a list of its 
members can be found at: https://www.w3.org/2011/webtv/wiki/MPTF/MPTF_Charter.  
9 The document affirmed that the MPTF did not seek to take a ‘position on the specifics of the legal 
agreements between users, content owners and content distribution service providers’, but instead 
‘identify requirements for the technical tools to enable the terms of those agreements’ (W3C, 2012). 
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proposal for an extension to the HTML media element (a subset of the HTML standard) to 
the public-html mailing list for comments (Bateman, 2012). The proposal entitled 
“Encrypted Media Extensions”, claimed to provide a standardised means of 
communication between web applications and digital rights management agent software 
to enable the use of HTML5 video to playback encrypted audio and video content10. The 
authors argued that the specification would replace the need for users to download and 
install "plug-ins" with a standard Application Programming Interface (API) that would 
automatically discover, select and interact with an unspecified third-party content 
protection systems - or what the specification termed a  “content decryption module” 
(CDM) – which could then be used to decrypt the content (W3C, 2016b).  
While proponents of the specification argued that the proposal was necessary to protect 
online video content from copyright infringement and promote the growth of the nascent 
streaming services industry, for opponents, the proposal represented a cynical attempt by 
the content industries and their commercial partners to protect their own business 
interests at the expense of users. Echoing many of the arguments that had been voiced in 
opposition to DRM during the 1990s and 2000s, critics raised concerns about the negative 
impact that the implementation of EME could have for accessibility, interoperability, user 
rights and security (Schoen, 2013). Others meanwhile, questioned the need for EME at 
all, noting its historical failure to prevent piracy and citing a general trend towards 
alternative business models which were not reliant on content encryption (Andersdotter, 
2013a). Furthermore, by standardising the capability to implement DRM natively digital 
rights activists claimed that content protection would become normalised and so, in time, 
lead to attempts to extend content encryption to other parts of the web (O’Brien, 2013). 
                                               
10 In the proposal, the authors sought to make clear that the specification itself would not create or 
impose a specific DRM system – or Content Decryption Module (CDM) as they referred to it - 
rather, it simply defined "a common API that may be used to discover, select and interact with such 
systems". As such, while the proposal would create a standardised means of communication 
between the web browser and content protection system, the actual decryption of the content 
would not be handled by EME but instead by a third-party DRM system (CDM), which the 
specification left unspecified (W3C, 2016b).  
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Whatever the specifics of their concerns, all critics of the proposal were united in the view 
that EME was fundamentally counter to the founding principles of the W3C and as such 
should form no part of the open web platform.  
 
In what follows, I discuss some of the key concerns raised by critics of the proposal. 
These issues were all identified as a result of the thematic analysis of web sources 
relevant to the EME controversy which was conducted as part of the preliminary stage of 
this research. Following a discussion of these issues, I will then proceed to provide a brief 
overview of EME’s development from a working draft to a W3C recommendation before 




 The notion that the web should be universal, and thus accessible to everyone 
regardless of ‘their hardware, software, network infrastructure, native language, culture, 
geographical location, or physical or mental ability’, is seen by many – including inventor 
of the web and Director of the W3C Tim Berners-Lee himself11 - to be one of the 
foundational and unquestionable principles of the open web (W3C, 2017b). As such, the 
promotion of equal access to web content for users with diverse abilities is today widely 
interpreted to be an important principle of web standardisation and a key metric against 
which the technical quality of specifications should be judged. Nowhere is the importance 
of web accessibility as a principle of web design more evident than at the W3C, where the 
                                               
11 Tim Berners-Lee’s widely cited observation that ‘the power of the web is in its universality’, is 
often used by accessibility advocates as an argument from authority in support of their demands for 
a greater emphasis on the importance of web accessibility (W3C, 2017c).  
177 
 
promotion of web accessibility - particularly through its Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI)12 
constitutes a major component of the consortium’s standardisation work (W3C, 2017c)13.  
Given the importance of accessibility as a key principle of web design and DRM’s 
reputation for poor compatibility with assistive technologies, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
during EME’s early development representatives of several accessibility interest groups 
expressed serious concerns about the specification’s potential effects on accessibility.  
Among the most notable concerns was the impact that the specification could have on the 
ability of disabled users to access encrypted content using assistive technologies such as 
screen-readers and captioning software. As Konstantinov Sergey (2014) observed; 
‘DRM systems usually prohibit any manipulations with content including 
displaying third-party subtitles, or (in case of e-books) reading a book using 
system voice-over engine, thus making content less accessible by disabled 
people. [EME] is thus totally incompatible with an effort to make Web more 
accessible'. 
While acknowledging concerns regarding the collateral effects of previous DRM 
technologies, the proponents and authors of the specification sought to reassure critics 
that during the development of EME, conscious efforts would be made to alleviate or at 
least minimise these issues. They noted, for example, how the initial proposal for the 
specification had been developed in line with existing W3C accessibility guidelines14 and 
                                               
12   Much of this work is conducted under the auspices of the W3C’s Web Accessibility Initiative, 
which ‘brings together people from industry, disability organisations, government, and research 
labs from around the world to develop guidelines and resources to help make the web accessible 
to people with disabilities including auditory, cognitive, neurological, physical, speech, and visual 
disabilities’ (W3C, 2017c).  
13 The W3C's commitment to accessibility is represented by their stated commitment to a ‘Web for 
All' (W3C, 2017b). On their website, the W3C cites the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities - which recognises access to information and communications technologies, 
including the web, as a basic human right - as a key motivation for their work on accessibility 
(W3C, 2017c). 
14 The WIA maintains a comprehensive list of general guidelines and recommendations regarding 
web accessibility (W3C, 2017c) (W3C, 2015b). In addition, in 2015 the W3C also published a 
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how in accordance with the W3C standards process the specification had been subject to 
an accessibility review by the Accessible Platform Architectures Working Group (APA 
WG), which following “repeated analysis and testing [had] shown no barriers to accessing 
captions, transcripts, or audio description of video” (Foliot, 2013a).  
Contrary to critics’ claims that work on any standard designed to implement DRM was 
inappropriate for the W3C, proponents argued that it was precisely because of the types 
of accessibility challenges usually associated with DRM that EME’s development within 
the W3C was so important. By acknowledging rather than ignoring the genuine content 
protection requirements of copyright holders and providing a collaborative forum within 
which solutions to those requirements could be pursued in an open and transparent way, 
supporters argued that far from jeopardising accessibility, the W3C was, in fact, helping to 
promote it by ensuring that any accessibility issues raised by EME’s development would 
be identified and formally addressed as part of the process. Such scrutiny, the authors 
claimed, would have been far less likely had EME been developed outside of the W3C 
process. As John Foliot (2013a) observed;  
“One of the benefits of working on this type of technology within the W3C is 
[the] invaluable "cross-talk" between SMEs of different backgrounds and 
expertise. Chasing this work out of the W3C eliminates (or significantly 
reduces) the ability to have fresh eyes and ears looking at the spec, and 
poking at it from unusual and different perspectives, such as 
"accessibility"…Working on this technology inside of the W3C is probably *the 
best thing* to happen to ensure accessibility issues are addressed’. 
  
                                                                                                                                              
comprehensive list of Media Accessibility User Requirements (MAUR), which describes necessary 






 In his announcement of the initial EME proposal to the HTML working group 
mailing list in January 2012, Adrian Bateman (2012) noted that ‘many content providers 
and application developers have said they can't use <audio> and <video> because HTML 
lacks robust content protection. Without this functionality, they cannot move their apps to 
the web platform’. Specifically, Bateman observed how the licenses that online streaming 
services such as Netflix held with copyright owners often required the use of content 
protection, meaning that the lack of HTML video support for content encryption threatened 
their ability to provide users with access to ‘premium content’. For Bateman and others, 
the development of EME was thus necessary not only as a tool to prevent piracy but also 
as a means of ensuring the growth of a content and media-rich web.  
For opponents of EME, however, many of the arguments mobilised by proponents of the 
specification in support of DRM were based on false premises. In contrast to proponents’ 
arguments that DRM was effective as a method of content protection, for example, 
opponents noted how almost every previous version of DRM had quickly been bypassed 
by hackers and had repeatable been shown to have little or no effect on rates of digital 
piracy. As Florian Bosch (2013) put it; 
 ‘It has been demonstrated over and over again that the bootleggers that DRM 
is supposed to stop always find ways to circumvent DRM… You don't need to 
out-obfuscate joe-average user. You're trying to out-obfuscate people who can 
read assembly in hex as well as you may read C++ or Ruby. Trying to 
outsmart the smarter has traditionally not worked very well… it only takes one 
single person to be smarter than the entire exposure area of your obfuscation, 
which by definition cannot be watertight… It's futile’.  
In addition, critics also insisted that the claim that content protection was needed in order 
to ensure the availability of high-quality content online was wildly overstated, highlighting, 
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in particular, the enormous range of amateur and professional content that was freely 
available online. As Bart Cornelis (2013b) observed; 
'Content needs to be protected' is an unproven assumption, not a known fact.  
The (open) web has, if anything, disproved that notion: there has never been a 
period in history where more content was more widely available, and that 
margin is getting wider every day.  Looking at historical evidence the amount of 
available content seems: - directly related to the easy of (re)production, 
distribution and access… Given that, why on earth would W3C through EME 
want to publicly support new technological means for restricting reproduction, 
distribution and access?’. 
Finally, critics also sought to reject what they saw as the dubious claim that content 
protection was the only effective means of ensuring fair compensation for content 
producers online, highlighting several examples of alternative technologies and business 
models which were not reliant upon encryption. As Duncan Bayne (2013) argued; 
‘There are many possible solutions - e.g. micropayment or payment framework 
integration with media playback - that could address the issue in a way that I'd 
wholeheartedly endorse as being compatible with Open Web goals. DRM is 
not one of them. The issue is that 'big media' have not come forward to say 
"we need a commerce standard that will allow us to monetise content", they've 
said "we want DRM, and here's how we'd like it implemented’.  
Interoperability 
 In many ways, the pursuit of interoperability can be seen as the raision d’etat of 
standards bodies such as the W3C whose mission statement outlines its ambition to ‘ lead 
the World Wide Web to its full potential by developing common protocols that promote its 
evolution and ensure its interoperability’(W3C, 2017b). In the context of the development 
of web technologies, interoperability can, at its most basic, be understood as the goal of 
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ensuring that digital content is accessible to all users regardless of the specific software or 
hardware that they use. By ensuring that its standards can demonstrate at least two 
independent interoperable implementations before progressing along the standards track, 
the W3C aims to ensure not only that specifications will be widely implemented but also 
that they avoid the kinds of incompatibilities seen during the ‘browser wars’ of the early 
1990s, when the optimisation of web content for specific browsers threatened to balkanise 
the web (Berners-Lee, 2000).   
According to the authors of EME, it was precisely this desire to maintain a universal web 
that motivated them to propose the specification’s development in the first place. During 
the 2000s the withdrawal of support for DRM plugins such as Microsoft Silverlight had led 
content owners to gradually migrate their content from the open web to proprietary native 
apps which provided built-in content protection. As such, in order to prevent further 
fragmentation of the web, proponents argued that a common standardised mechanism for 
implementing DRM in the browser was necessary.  
Issues with interoperability had plagued previous DRM plugin ecosystems, but proponents 
of EME insisted that their solution could be implemented in an interoperable way. 
Specifically, they argued that, contrary to some of the more hyperbolic claims of their 
critics, the purpose of EME was not to “standardise DRM for the web” but simply to define 
a JavaScript API which could be used to interact with DRM solutions. In this way, the 
authors of EME observed how - beyond a basic form of encryption known as ClearKey, 
which was expected to be implemented as a baseline - the specification document did not 
define any specific DRM technology. Proponents noted further that, in contrast to existing 
proprietary systems, this baseline CDM was fully interoperable meaning that content 
encoded using ClearKey would be playable across all platforms regardless of the users' 
software or hardware. By leaving the specification of the CDMs to individual 
implementers, proponents were not only able to argue that the specification was 
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necessary to avoid platform fragmentation, but also that it represented a substantive 
improvement on previous architectures, including much higher levels of interoperability.   
For opponents, however, claims that EME could be implemented interoperably using 
ClearKey encryption were at their best naïve and worst deceitful. Specifically, they noted 
that since the level of protection provided by EME’s baseline CDM fell far short of that 
specified by content owners in their license agreements with publishers, to be 
implemented in a way that would satisfy content owners - and thus fulfil its intended 
purpose of providing effective content protection for HTML5 video - EME would require 
the use of proprietary third-party CDMs. Unlike the baseline CDM defined by the 
specification document, these would be entirely closed source and as such prevent users 
from making any changes or auditing the code that was running within their browser.  
While necessary to meet the robustness requirements of content owners, critics observed 
how the closed source nature of these ‘approved’ CDMs meant that they would be 
incompatible with FOSS browsers, whose licenses require that all source code be 
available for inspection. As a consequence, critics claimed that the development of EME 
would inevitably jeopardise interoperability since the inability of FOSS browsers to 
implement EME would mean that content encoded with CDMs would not be universally 
available across all browsers. Thus, for many critics, EME represented not only a betrayal 
of the FOSS community but also an abandonment of one of the W3C’s own design 
principles. As Bart Cornelis (2013a) observed; 
‘I think the line can be drawn from W3C principles…Show me a DRM system 
that "premium" content creators are ready to run… on open source software 
running on an open source OS. [H]aving yet to see such a thing, I think enabling 
it on the Web would de-facto make the playing field less open for some 
hardware and software, failing a primary goal of our mission. The spec explicitly 
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allows restricting the use of content to specific hardware or software that's the 
anti-thesis of interoperability’. 
Security  
 As web users have increasingly begun to share more of their personal data online, 
either through social media platforms or e-commerce sites, the need for standards bodies 
to consider questions of privacy and security as part of web standardisation has inevitably 
grown. As a critical aspect of the web’s technical infrastructure, standard have, over the 
past decade, been increasingly viewed as playing important role in the promotion of a 
safer and more secure web, with a number of prominent standards – including the W3C’s 
own DoNotTrack and P3P recommendations - being developed explicitly for the purpose 
of enhancing user control of their privacy and security online (W3C, 2007, 2015d).  
Alongside these privacy and security specific web standards, the past decade has also 
seen the development of a number of standards, which as a consequence of their design, 
have had unintended negative consequences for online security and privacy. In a recent 
example, an extension to the HTML5 specification designed to allow site owners to serve 
low-power versions of web pages to users with little remaining battery life was shown to 
generate a pseudo-unique identifier which could be used to track users activity online 
(Hern, 2016).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the increased prominence and importance of security both 
as an explicit design goal and as a guiding principle of standards development, the W3C 
today hosts a large number of working and interest groups dedicated exclusively to the 
consideration of the privacy and security implications of W3C recommendations. These 
include, among others, the Privacy Interest Group (PING) the Tracking Protection Working 
Group (TPWG), and Web Security Interest Group, all of which are coordinated by the 
W3C’s Technology & Society Domain (W3C, 2015c). 
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Given the awareness and acceptance of the importance of privacy and security issues 
among the standards community and DRM’s chequered history when it comes to security, 
it was perhaps unsurprising that a proposal to standardise a means of implementing DRM 
within web browsers attracted criticism from W3C members and participants. Specifically, 
opponents of the specification noted how in order for EME to be implemented in a way 
that would satisfy the robustness requirements of content providers, proprietary CDMs 
whose functionality would be opaque to the user would need to be installed. While this 
‘black-boxing’ of the CDMs source-code was necessary to ensure that the content 
encryption could not be illegally bypassed or deactivated by users, opponents 
nonetheless observed how closed source implementations had long been recognised by 
security experts as potential risks, since they often contained security flaws that were 
invisible to users but which could be exploited by hackers to compromise and take control 
of devices15. As mailing list participant Jesús Leganés-Combarro (2013) noted; 
‘A closed implementation of WHATEVER can host anything inside it, from user 
activity loggers to keyloggers, backdoors, trojans... By definition, any box that's 
closed and you can't inspect, can store the cancer's cure or an activated 
nuclear bomb ready to explode’.  
For opponents, these problems were further compounded by the anti-circumvention 
provisions of the DMCA and other copyright laws, which make it illegal to circumvent or 
disable DRM technologies even for otherwise lawful reasons such as security research 
and auditing.  As a form of DRM, critics noted how bypassing CDM protections would 
invoke these provisions. As such, they warned that the development of EME could lead to 
a chilling effect on security research as security experts would inevitably avoid auditing 
                                               
15 Concerns surrounding the privacy implications of EME were heightened by Edward Snowden's 
2013 revelations about the extent of NSA surveillance, which had damaged trust in technology 
companies whom it was revealed had colluded with government bodies to provide so-called "back-
doors in their security systems (Ball, Borger & Greenwald, 2013). Within this context, many 




CDMs for fear of being sued. As Danny O’Brien (2016) of the EFF observed; 
‘the most damaging parts of DRM cannot be fixed through improved 
technology. DRM's technical flaws have been exacerbated by flawed law… 
Anti-circumvention statutes in countries across the world compensate for the 
weaknesses of DRM's protection model with harsh penalties for those who 
bypass it, even for perfectly reasonable aims… The end result is that DRM is a 
black box, a legal booby-trap embedded in more and more devices, which 
security researchers or those seeking to re-implement for the purposes of 
interoperability, can neither bypass or even fully discuss without legal risk’.  
By effectively mandating the use of CDMs, opponents argued that the specification not 
only directly jeopardised the security of users’ browsers but also the capacity of security 
researchers to carry out their increasingly vital work. As Joichi Ito (2016) put it;  
‘By allowing DRM to be included in the standard we 'break' the architecture of 
the internet by allowing companies to create places to store data and run code 
on your computer that do you not have access to… We will be left with a 
broken and fragile architecture, as well as browsers whose internals are off 
limits to security researchers, who face brutal punishment for trying to 
determine whether your gateway to the internet is secure enough to rely on.’ 
User Rights 
  Unlike the issues of accessibility, interoperability and security, all of which had for 
some time constituted a significant part of the W3C's work; there was very little precedent 
for the consideration of questions related to copyright or fair use as part of the 
consortium’s standards process. Nevertheless, given the widely recognised and highly 
controversial effects of DRM on fair use, consumer rights and participatory culture, the 
development of the EME specification inevitably attracted the critical attention of a wide 
range of digital rights activists and free culture advocates. Although many of the concerns 
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raised by opponents were reflective of those expressed in relation to previous versions of 
DRM, given that the proposal enabled the encryption of online content, critics argued that 
the specification would be likely to have a number of additional implications specific to the 
web. Among the most widely cited of these, were the specifications potential effects on 
user practices such as ‘bandwidth arbitrage’. As Cory Doctorow (2016a) explained; 
‘In the developing world, use of the web is strongly limited by the high cost of 
mobile data. What frees them to participate in the web is time- or place-shifting 
their usage. Throughout the global south, we see a widespread usage pattern 
of downloading large files while in Wi-Fi range, for later use. This "bandwidth 
arbitrage" enables the poorest internet users to approximate the kind of access 
to rich media assets that the rest of us take for granted. A tool to allow for 
offline storage and playback of EME-locked videos would fall afoul of many 
countries' equivalents to DMCA 1201’. 
Furthermore, whilst proponents of the specification insisted that the development of EME 
was intended solely for the purpose of encrypting what they described as ‘premium’ video 
content, many critics cautioned that the implementation of EME could be the start of a 
slippery slope that, in time, would lead to restrictions being placed on other categories of 
content. As Danny O’Brien (2013) warned;  
‘A web where you cannot cut and paste text; where your browser can't "Save 
As..." an image; where the "allowed" uses of saved files are monitored beyond 
the browser; where JavaScript is sealed away in opaque tombs; and maybe 
even where we can no longer effectively "View Source" on some sites, is a 
very different web from the one we have today. It's a web where user agents—
browsers—must navigate a nest of enforced duties every time they visit a 




By working on EME, therefore, critics argued that the W3C was putting the interactive and 
creative nature of the web at risk, paving the way for a proliferation of DRM technologies 
that, they argued, would overtime lead not to more web content, but less. As Laurel 
Russwurm (2013) put it; 
‘Strong copyright is bad for independent creators - if DRM can be used to 
shoehorn copyright maximalism into the very structure of the internet, if DRM 
becomes both the default and the norm, independent creators will be shut out, 
and the internet will stop being open and interactive and become the modern 
incarnation of television’.  
In response to arguments regarding the effects of EME on consumer rights, proponents 
countered by emphasising the rights of producers. In particular, they highlighted the 
repeated and consistent demands of content producers and copyright holders for the 
types of content protection that EME was designed to provide, and accused opponents of 
the specification of cynically attempting to deny content creators of the right to protect 
their own creations. As John Foliot (2013c) argued; 
‘Certain actors appear to be opposed to the work being done to address a 
business requirement and legitimate use-case, based upon their own personal 
philosophies with regard to "ownership" and copyright law, and the desire of 
some content creators to actually profit from the creation of their intellectual 
property… While my personal perspective tends to be very liberal… I also 
recognise the rights of creators of "entertainment media" to both profit from 
their efforts, as well as seek means to protect the marketability of that content’. 
In addition, proponents noted that since the application of EME enabled encryption would 
not be mandatory for sharing online videos, service providers who did not wish to impose 
restrictions on their content would not be forced to. As such, proponents argued that if 
EME’s critics objected to the use of content encryption, they would still be free to use 
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services which did not use DRM. In this way, over time the question of the appropriate 
balance between user’s rights and producer’s rights would itself be resolved by the power 
of the market. As John Foliot (2013b), argued;  
‘Vote with your feet….don't take a Netflix subscription, don't use a browser that 
supports EME/DRM/ABC/DoeRayMe. There are choices of open source 
browsers, so take one, and ship it minus EME support: if that is truly what the 
market wants, that browser will succeed’. 
 
EME from FPWD to Recommendation  
 Initially published in early 2012, the EME proposal quickly prompted lengthy and at 
times heated debate on the several of W3C’s technical mailing lists16, however, it was not 
until January of the following year when a Call for Consensus (Cfc) for the publication of a 
reworked version of the proposal as a First Public Working Draft (FPWD) was announced 
on the html-admin mailing list that EME attracted much attention or controversy. 
Publication as an FPWD would position the proposal on the first step of the standards 
track to become an official W3C recommendation. As such, it sparked outrage and 
opposition both inside and outside the W3C. Most notably this included a coalition of civil 
society organisations, including the Creative Commons, Open Knowledge Foundation, 
Free Culture Foundation, Open Technology Institute, and several national pirate parties, 
who submitted a joint letter to the W3C urging the consortium’s members not to proceed 
with the specifications development. In it, they argued that; 
‘DRM restricts the public's freedom, even beyond what overzealous copyright 
law requires… ratifying EME would be an abdication of responsibility; it would 
harm interoperability, enshrine non-free software in W3C standards and 
                                               
16 Early discussions of the proposal were contained mainly to a few technical HTML working group 
mailing lists. Among the fiercest criticism of EME during this period, came from Google employee 
and WHATWG HTML editor Ian Hickson, who, in a much-circulated blog post, described the 
proposal as "unethical" (Hickson, 2012).  
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perpetuate oppressive business models. It would fly in the face of the 
principles that the W3C cites as key to its mission, and it would cause an array 
of serious problems for the billions of people who use the web’ (cited in 
Rogoff, 2012). 
Acknowledging the negative feedback to the proposal both inside and outside of the W3C, 
the Chairs of the HTML Working Group initially judged that the Cfc did not pass. In making 
their decision, however, the Chairs also determined that contrary to those who felt that 
EME was not the type of work that belonged at the W3C, the specification was in their 
view ‘within scope’ for the W3C and the HTML Working Group. As such, they requested 
that in future participants refrain from making principle-based arguments and that all 
further discussions of the proposal be restricted to technical matters concerning the 
specification document. At the same time, the Chairs also clarified that since the W3C 
processes requirements for the progression of a proposal to FPWD were quite low, 
consensus would not be a prerequisite for the approval of the proposal once the decision 
was reviewed17. As such, following a brief period of deliberation during which the authors 
of the specification sought further technical feedback, in early May 2013 the Chairs 
announced that having reviewed the efforts of authors to address technical bugs raised 
against the proposal, they had decided to approve the publication of the EME proposal as 
an FPWD.   
In response to the Chairs’ decision to declare EME as in-scope and subsequently approve 
the specification’s publication as an FPWD, criticism of the proposal both inside and 
outside the W3C escalated. Within the mailing lists, Andreas Kuckartz registered a Formal 
Objection18 to the Chairs’ decision, citing what he believed to be the proposal’s 
                                               
17 The current W3C process sets a relatively low bar for the publication of FPWDs. According to the 
W3C process document, ‘consensus is not a prerequisite for approval to publish; the Working 
Group MAY request publication of a Working Draft even if it is unstable and does not meet all 
Working Group requirements’ (W3C, 2017d). 
18 Within the context of the W3C process, a  Formal Objection to a group decision is ‘one that the 
reviewer requests that the Director consider as part of evaluating the related decision, for example 
190 
 
incompatibility with the principles of the open web. Outside the W3C, the Free Software 
Foundation (FSF), through its anti-DRM campaign ‘defective by design’, launched a 
petition to stop the development of EME (see figure 6.1) as well as a social media 
campaign ‘#cancelnetflix’ which encouraged its supporters to cancel their Netflix 
subscriptions in protest at the company’s sponsorship of the specification.  At a meeting of 
the European Commission’s European Multi-Stakeholders Platform on ICT 
Standardisation, Pirate Party MEP Amelia Andersdotter raised concerns about the 
potential effects of EME on consumer rights. Andersdotter also questioned whether, given 
the Commission’s declared intention to revisit copyright legalisation, it was appropriate for 
a ‘standards consortium run by private actors to make decisions that could prevent or 
side-track political decisions’ (Andersdotter, 2013b)19.  
Figure 6.1: Posters produced by the FSF as part of their campaign against EME20 
 
                                                                                                                                              
in response to a request to advance a technical report along the standards track’. A record of each 
Formal Objection is made publicly available on the W3C website. Consensus in the W3C is defined 
as the absence of Formal Objections, the submission of a Formal Objection thus represents an 
important intervention since it officially demonstrates dissensus among members.  
19 The European Multi-Stakeholders Platform on ICT Standardisation is an Advisory Expert Group 
convened to advise the European Commission ‘on all matters related to European ICT 
Standardisation and its effective implementation’. For more information see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2758  
20 For details of the FSF's Defective by Design campaign see: https://www.defectivebydesign.org/ 
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In the face of mounting criticism of the EME specification and the W3C itself, in October 
2013 Director Tim Berners-Lee broke his silence on the topic in order to address the 
Formal Objection to the proposal, registered three months earlier. While acknowledging 
the strength of feeling within the community as well as his own misgivings about DRM as 
a solution to content protection, Berners-Lee nevertheless announced that he had decided 
to overrule the Formal Objection and reaffirmed his support for the Chairs’ previous 
decision to determine content encryption as “in-scope" and publish the specification as an 
FPWD. Explaining his reasoning in a blog post on the W3C website, Berners-Lee 
emphasised the challenges faced by the W3C in trying to balance the competing 
demands of its stakeholders and argued that;  
‘We’re together in wanting a robust, rich, open web. We want a web open to 
inventors and tinkerers, to media- makers and cultural explorers. We want a 
Web which is rich in content but also a two-way, read-write web. We want a 
web which is universal in that it can contain anything. To be universal, the web 
has got to be open to many different sorts of businesses and business 
models… We put the user first, but different users have different preferences… 
some web users like to watch big-budget movies at home, some web users 
like to experiment with code. The best solution will be one that satisfies all of 
them, and we’re still looking for that’ (Berners-Lee, 2013). 
Berners-Lee’s decision to support further work on the proposal was rece ived with 
consternation by opponents to EME, many of whom accused Berners-Lee of 
compromising his principles in defence of a narrow set of incumbent commercial interests. 
More importantly, Berners-Lee's decision also represented a significant setback for 
opponents of the specification, most of whom had considered the potential of a personal 
intervention from the Director (as had happened previously in case of the patent policy 
dispute) as the most likely means of preventing further development of the standard.  
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Figure 6.2: Timeline of EME’s development 
Nov 2011  MPTF Content Protection Requirements published 
Feb 2012 
 
Initial EME proposal submitted 
Jan 2013  Candidate FPWD published 
 
 Cfc to publish FPWD 
Feb 2013  Cfc publish FPWD does not pass 
 
 
Chairs and Berners-Lee rule EME as 'in-scope' for the HTML WG 
Mar 2013  Restricted Media Community Group created.  
Apr 2013  A coalition of civil society organisations submit a joint letter to W3C 
May 2013 
 
HTML WG Decision to publish FPWD 
 
 Formal Objection to HTML WG charter EFF 
 
 Formal Objection to the publication of FPWD 
Jun 2013 
 
Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus submit a joint letter to W3C 
 
 FSF begin #cancelnetflix campaign 
Sept 2013 
 
W3C Director approves new HTML WG Charter 
Oct 2013  Workshop on EME at European Parliament 
Jan 2014  MPAA joins W3C 
May 2014  Firefox adopts EME with "sandboxing" solution 
Dec 2015  HTML WG renamed HTML Media Extension WG and charter extended  
 
 EFF Object to rechartering of HTML Media Extensions WG charter 
Feb 2016  HTML Media Extensions charter extend until 31st March 2016 
Mar 2016  Advisory Committee meeting and protests in Boston 
Apr 2016  HTML Media Extensions charter extended to September 31st 2016  
May 2016  Proposal to make 'covenant' an exit condition 
 
 EFF Submit open letter to Advisory Committee 
Jun 2016  Cfc to publish Candidate Recommendation 
 
 Formal Objection to Candidate Recommendation 
 
 HTML Media Extensions WG publish Candidate Recommendation 
Aug 2016  Three Formal Objections to Proposed Recommendation 
Sept 2016  HTML Media Extensions WG charter expires 
Oct 2016 
 Rechartering of HTML Media Extensions WG referred to the Advisory 
Committee 
Nov 2016  FSF starts #whatwouldtimdo campaign 
Jan 2017  W3C solicits opinions on guidelines for vulnerability disclosures 
 
 HTML Media Extensions charter extended until 2017-04-30 
Feb 2017  Harry Halpin Quits W3C in protest  
 
 W3C publishes a draft of security disclosure guidelines 
Mar 2017 
 HTML Media Extensions WG publish Proposed Recommendation 
and call for review 
May 2017  HTML Media Extensions charter extended until 2018-04-30 
Jul 2017  W3C approves EME as a Recommendation 
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 Several months later, opponents of the specification’s development were dealt a 
further blow when the Mozilla Foundation announced that after careful consideration it had 
decided to implement EME within its widely used Open Source browser Firefox. As an 
open-source browser developer and advocate of FOSS more generally, Mozilla had long 
objected to the development of EME, which it considered to be incompatible with the open 
web and open source principles. Following the implementation of the specification in other 
popular browsers including Google’s Chrome and Apple’s Safari browsers, however, it 
became increasingly apparent that a failure to implement EME risked preventing Firefox 
users from accessing encrypted content and thus Firefox’s competitiveness in the browser 
market. As Chief Technology Officer Andreas Gal (2014) explained in a blog post;   
‘With most competing browsers and the content industry embracing the W3C 
EME specification… We have come to the point where Mozilla not 
implementing the W3C EME specification means that Firefox users have to 
switch to other browsers to watch content restricted by DRM…This makes it 
difficult for Mozilla to ignore the ongoing changes in the DRM landscape. 
Firefox should help users get access to the content they want to enjoy, even if 
Mozilla philosophically opposes the restrictions certain content owners attach 
to their content’. 
In announcing their decision to implement EME, Mozilla revealed that they would be doing 
so in a  way that would minimise the risk to the user by wrapping the CDM in a so-called 
‘sandbox’ which would isolate its functionality from the rest of the browser. Although 
Mozilla’s use of a sandbox implementation helped to allay some fears, particularly around 
security issues, for others including digital rights activist Cory Doctorow, Mozilla’s 
perceived capitulation to pressure from content producers and its competitors still felt like 
a betrayal of the open source community. As Doctorow (2014) himself wrote: 
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‘The Mozilla Project has been one of the internet’s most hopeful success 
stories, and the people who do Mozilla’s good works have been personal 
heroes of mine for more than a decade. The decision to produce systems that 
treat internet users as untrusted adversaries to be controlled by their 
computers was clearly taken out of a sense of desperation and 
inevitability….[but] like many of Mozilla’s supporters – and like many of the 
Mozillans I know and respect – I am devastated by this turn of events. The free 
and open web needs an entity like Mozilla to stand on principle, especially 
when the commercial internet world so manifestly stands on nothing but 
profits.’ 
Mozilla’s decision to implement EME within their Firefox browser, together with the 
expression of support for the specification by Tim Berners-Lee a few months earlier, acted 
to notably dampen opposition to the proposal as it became increasingly apparent that the 
proposal’s supporters would not be swayed by principled objections alone. Thus, while the 
technical development of the specification within the W3C’s working groups continued, 
between mid-2014 and early 2016, vocal opposition to the specification largely subsidised.  
All this changed, however, when in March 2016 the charter for the HTML Media Working 
Group expired. Under the terms of the W3C process document, working groups need to 
be chartered in order to carry out technical work and publish specifications. Working group 
charters specify the scope of a working group’s activities as well as the objectives of its 
technical outputs. Charters are usually granted for a limited period only, following which 
working groups must seek approval for an extension from the Director. Following two 
temporary extensions to the working group charter from September to December 2015 
and then for a further three months to March 2016, W3C members were due to convene 
for the W3C’s annual F2F Advisory Committee meeting at MIT in Boston. On the agenda 
for the annual meeting, was the re-chartering of the HTML Media Working Group as well 
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as the future of the development of the EME specification - including its potential 
progression to Candidate Recommendation status.  
By coincidence, on the same weekend that the AC meeting was due to take place, FSF 
was also holding its annual FOSS conference – Libreplanet – at MIT. Conscious of the 
opportunity to influence the re-chartering process by applying external pressure on 
Berners-Lee and the working group participants, attendees to the Libreplanet conference 
announced their intentions to hold a demonstration in opposition to EME outside of the 
W3C offices in MIT. Publicity in the build-up to the protest quickly revitalised the public 
debate around the development of the specification. Within the HTML Media Working 
Group itself, opponents of the specification sought to capitalise on the renewed public 
interest and the uncertainty of the re-chartering process by requesting that a variety of 
requirements to be attached to the specification prior to its progression to Candidate 
Recommendation status. Most notably, these included an anti-circumvention covenant 
proposal from the EFF which would require W3C members to agree not to sue security 
researchers who circumvented EME enabled encryption for security reasons.   
Figure 6.3: Scenes from the demonstration against EME March 2016 (Higgins, 2016) 
 
 Despite the demonstrations against the W3C and renewed dissent by working 
group participants, shortly after the Advisory Committee meeting, the consortium 
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announced that it would approve a further extension of the HTML Media Working Group 
charter and that it would progress the EME specification to the status of Candidate 
Recommendation without inclusion of the EFF’s covenant as an exit condition.   
The rejection of the EFF’s proposal and the progression of the EME proposal along the 
standards track prompted further outrage from community members many of whom began 
to express growing frustration at what they perceived to be the W3C’s failure to 
acknowledge or address their concerns.  In addition to the outrage of community 
members outside of the W3C, within the working group the decision the publish EME as a 
Candidate Recommendation instigated an unprecedented number of Formal Objections, 
several of which referenced counter-proposals including, the suggestion that EME be 
disabled on users’ devices by default. While some of these proposals received 
expressions of interest, none managed to achieve consensus.  
In January 2017, it was announced that having weighed the opinions of all sides the 
Director had decided to overrule all Formal Objections to the proposal21. Explaining his 
decision in a blog post, Berners-Lee reiterated he earlier point that DRM was required if 
the web was to be capable of hosting all forms of content, arguing that; 
The web has to be universal, to function at all. It has to be capable of holding 
crazy ideas of the moment, but also the well-polished ideas of the century. It 
must be able to handle any language and culture. It must be able to include 
information of all types, and media of many genres. Included in that 
universality is that it must be able to support free stuff and for-pay stuff, as they 
are all part of this world. This means that it is good for the web to be able to 
include movies, and so for that, it is better for HTML5 to have EME than to not 
have it’ (Berners-Lee, 2017).  
                                               
21 In response to Berners-Lee’s decision to approve the progression of the EME specification to a 
‘Proposed Recommendation’, W3C staff member Harry Halpin resigned from his position at the 
consortium in protest having earlier threatened to do so if the specification was approved.  
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Following Berners-Lee’s decision to overrule the Formal Objections, in March 2017, the 
EME specification finally progressed to the status of ‘Proposed Recommendation’. In 
doing so, it prompted a final formal review period, during which the views of Advisory 
Committee members were collated and submitted to the Director, whose responsibility it 
was to assess whether there was sufficient consensus to publish the specification as an 
official W3C recommendation. After several months, Berners-Lee’s decision to approve 
the specification was announced on the public-html mailing list in July 2017.  
The decision sparked an instant appeal by the EFF, who, having successfully received the 
support of the 5% of paid members required by the appeals process managed to force an 
appeal vote on the issue - the first and only time in its history that the W3C had held an 
official “vote” on a specification. In the vote held in mid-September 2017, 108 members of 
the Advisory Committee supported the Director's decision to advance EME to W3C 
Recommendation, while 57 opposed it and 20 abstained.  
In total, from the publication of the initial proposal to its approval as a W3C 
recommendation, the EME development process lasted for nearly six years. For 
supporters of EME, the length of the process alone demonstrated the seriousness with 
which they had taken the objections raised and stood as proof of both the W3C’s 
procedural quality and rigour. Following EME’s final approval as a recommendation, W3C 
CEO Jeff Jaffe reflected on the process as a whole, arguing that; 
 ‘We have had an incredibly respectful debate… There were hundreds of posts 
with many points of view professionally stated on all sides of the issue. Each 
side contributed understanding to the other side. That doesn’t mean that 
people with passionate viewpoints were swayed. But the W3C played its role 
as the venue for an open debate in the public square… My personal reflection 
is that we took the appropriate time to have a respectful debate about a 
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complex set of issues and provide a result that will improve the web for its 
users’ (Jaffe, 2017). 
For opponents, however, the experience of EME’s development had revealed serious 
limitations to the W3C process. For some, the perceived failure of the authors to 
adequately address principled based objections, particularly in relation to questions of 
user rights, called into question the capacity of the W3C to deal adequately with the social 
and political implications of its standards. For others, the willingness of Tim Berners-Lee 
and the working group chairs to repeatedly overrule formal objections and persist with the 
development of the specification in the face of significant dissent from stakeholders both 
inside and outside the process, raised concerns about the reliance of the W3C on its 
corporate membership as well as the appropriateness of a system of decision-making that 
centralised so much power in the hands of one man.  
Having provided an overview of the EME controversy as well as some of the main areas 
of contestation, in what follows, I present the findings of the empirical analysis of the 
procedural legitimacy of the W3C’s development of the EME specification using the 
analytical framework outlined in chapter three.  
Data Analysis 
 
 In order to assess the procedural legitimacy of the W3C in the context of its 
development of the EME specification, a total of 205 web sources and 867 mailing lists 
messages from 66 threads across eight mailing lists were analysed.   
Below I present the findings of this analysis, beginning with a discussion of the indicators 
of input legitimacy (inclusion and transparency), followed by an analysis of the indicators 
of throughput legitimacy (constructiveness, deliberativeness, respect, and justification). In 
doing so, I argue that despite demonstrating some evidence of input legitimacy, the 
W3C’s development of EME was characterised by a worrying range of procedural deficits. 
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Specifically, I will show how the presence of hegemonic deliberative frames relating to the 
nature of the W3C’s process as well as its role as an institution of internet governance led 
to several instances of ‘internal exclusion’ which severely limited the scope of discussions 
and undermined attempts by participations reach consensus. The effects of these frames 
will be shown to have been particularly evident in the context of discussions of content 
protection and user rights. I conclude by arguing that the findings of this research call into 
question the procedural legitimacy of the W3C and its capacity to preside over the 




 Historically, most critiques of the legitimacy of the W3C have been expressed in 
terms of a lack of inclusivity, with many commentators raising concerns about the effects 
of the W3C’s membership rules on the ability of civil society groups and other user 
representatives to participate in the process (Schoechle, 2009).  
Given the implications of the EME for issues as diverse as user rights, security and 
accessibility, the development of the specification attracted the interest of a wide range of 
stakeholders, including consumer advocacy groups, free software activists, browser 
developers, artists, and content producers. For the W3C to be considered legitimate, it 
was therefore essential that the views and interests of all these groups were represented 
either directly or indirectly as part of the process. In order to assess the consortium’s 
inclusivity, this study adopted a multi-faceted methodological approach, examining the 
representativeness of the W3C’s membership, participation in working group discussions, 
and the ‘discursive inclusion’ of the mailing lists.  
Representation 
 To assess the representativeness of the consortium, the W3C’s members list was 
analysed and its 423 members (as of December 2016) categorised by their stakeholder 




Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the W3C’s status as an industry consortium, a sectoral 
analysis of the W3C’s members list revealed that its membership was heavily skewed 
towards the private sector with nearly three-quarters of members (n=292) representing 
corporate interests (W3C, 2016a)22. For the most part, these companies included browser 
developers and software companies. However, notably – given the impact of EME of 
issues related to copyright – the list of members also included a significant number of 
representatives from content producers, including, the BBC and the Walt Disney 
Company, many of whom had been participants in the Web and TV Interest Group which 
had first published the requirements for the EME specification (W3C, 2011, 2012).  
 
Figure 6.4: W3C Members by stakeholder group, 2016  
 
 Most controversially, the W3C’s list of members also included the Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA), which joined the consortium in 2013 at the height of the 
controversy. For many opponents of EME, the MPAA – who had played a pivotal role in 
promoting strong intellectual property rights during the so-called ‘copyright wars’ of the 
                                               
22 Analysis of the W3C member list was conducted in late 2016. At the time of writing, the W3C has 
a total of 468 members. A full list of members can be found at:  
https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Member/List (W3C, 2016a).  
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1990s and 2000s – represented the antithesis of everything the W3C stood for (Patry, 
2009). As such, their membership drew consternation from opponents of EME and helped 
to reinforce the perception among the specification’s critics, that the W3C had become 
captured by corporate interests. As Maneesh Pangasa (2013) put it; 
‘Unfortunately, the MPAA's push for DRM in HTML5 is being entertained 
without asking users what they think. There are 377 organisations in the W3C 
but over a billion internet users. No one is asking us what we want? This is a 
betrayal of trust. In politics, those with power get heard and get to influence 
policy, and everyone else gets screwed. All the stakeholders from Google to 
Microsoft and Netflix pushing this I say shame on you for not listening to your 
customers/users'. 
While corporate actors represented by far the largest portion of members, the list of W3C 
members also included representatives from a range of academic and research 
organisations such as Nanjing University and the Meraka Institute, South Africa (n=64) as 
well as various governmental bodies and departments, the Indian Government 
Department of Information Technology (n=32). More importantly from the perspective of 
this research, the W3C members list also included a small but significant number of 
members from non-profit and civil society groups (n=35). Among these organisations were 
a number of groups with direct relevance to the issues raised by the development of EME, 
including digital rights campaigning groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(EFF) and Centre for Democracy and Technology (CDT), Free and Open Software 
advocacy organisations such as the Free Software Foundation (FSF), as well as a large 
number of accessibility groups, such as the Royal National Institute for Blind People, 




Figure 6.5: W3C member list analysis by region, 2016  
  
Region Number % 
Africa 5 1.2 
Asia 89 21 
Australia and New Zealand 12 2.8 
Europe 146 34.5 
North America 157 37.1 
South America 14 3.3 
Total 423 100 
  
 In terms of the geographic distribution of the W3C’s membership, analysis of 
the consortium’s members list revealed that the organisation counted among its members, 
representatives from all regions of the world including, South America (n=14), Africa (n=8) 
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and Asia (n=89). Among these were also a total of 69 representatives from non-OECD 
countries, including Morocco, Senegal and Uruguay. However, despite this regional 
diversity, the analysis also demonstrated that the consortium is still nevertheless 
predictably dominated by Western stakeholders (n=315) and in particular US 
organisations, which alone represented approximately 35% (n=148) of the W3C’s total 
membership23.  
Although these findings seem to support the common perception of the W3C as an 
organisation dominated by corporate and Western interests, the figures are nevertheless 
not inconsistent with other comparable standards organisations. Updegrove (2008) for 
example, notes how high levels of commercial interest in standards development, driven 
by speedy technological obsolesce and fast-moving marketplaces, has previously seen 
corporate actors represent upwards of 90% of some standards consortia. Studies of other 
institutions of internet governance including ICANN, meanwhile, reveal that the 
underrepresentation of stakeholders from the developing world is by no means a problem 
exclusive to technical standards consortia (Prakash, 2016). Furthermore, while civil 
society groups continue to represent only a small minority of the W3C’s total membership, 
their presence does nevertheless contradict the view that the consortium’s membership 
requirements represent an unassailable barrier to entry for non-commercial stakeholders.  
Despite these caveats, however, the global and long-lasting nature of the consortium work 
means that such inequities remain unacceptable, and it is clear that much more needs to 
be done to encourage the participation of non-commercial and non-western groups before 
the W3C can consider itself to be representative of the whole web community. As such, 
although the findings do not provide strong evidence to suggest that the W3C 
membership rules significantly limited access to standardisation in a way that is noticeable 
                                               
23 During the controversy the JustNet Coalition accused the W3C of “digital colonialism”, claiming 
that EME excluded those in the Global South who were struggling for access to information at the 
expense of North American and European Corporations (Bollow, 2017).  
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inconsistent with other web standards organisations, nor do they suggest that the W3C is 
sufficiently representative to legitimise its development of techno-policy standards. 
Participation 
In addition to the analysis of the composition of the W3C’s current membership list, the 
indicator of inclusion was also assessed in relation to participation. In order to assess 
participation, the authors of the mailing list messages were categorised on the basis of 
their gender, region and stakeholder group.  
Figure 6.6: Mailing list participants by gender 
Gender Number of participants Number of messages % 
Female 4 35 1.1 
Male 76 2989 98.9 
Total 80 3024  
 
 Firstly, with respect to gender, analysis of the data revealed that of the 80 
participants that posted 5 or more messages on the mailing lists, only 4 were women. In 
total, these women posted only 35 messages across all mailing lists, a figure which 
represented a mere 1.1% of the total number of messages posted (n=3024).  These 
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results support the findings of previous studies which demonstrate a significant 
underrepresentation of women in standards processes as well as the ICT sector more 
generally (Graham, M., Straumann, & Hogan, 2015). 
Figure 6.7: Mailing list participants by region 
 
Region No. of participants 
Africa 0 
Asia 1 
Australia and New Zealand 5 
Europe 31 
North America 42 
South America 1 
Total 80 
 Similar disparities were also demonstrated in relation to the regional distribution of 
participants. In total, of the 80 participants that posted 5 or more messages on the W3C 
mailing list, only two were from non-western countries (Europe, North America, Australia 
and New Zealand), with no participants from Africa and only one from South America. 
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Surprisingly given a large number of member organisations headquartered in Asian 
countries, only one participant in the mailing lists was based in Asia.  
Aside from the fact that the specification itself was authored and proposed by three US 
companies (Google, Microsoft, and Netflix), this trend may partially be explained by a 
more prominent US tradition of civil society engagement in issues related to DRM and fair 
use, particularly in the context of the perceived excesses of the DMCA. Nevertheless, the 
limited regional distribution of participants remains a concern, particularly since the 
implementation of the EME specification would impact media consumption and encryption 
on a global scale.  
Figure 6.8: Mailing list participants by stakeholder group 
 
 On a more positive note, the analysis of participants by stakeholder group 
demonstrated extensive participation in the mailing list discussions from a broad range of 
sectors (see figure 6.8). Crucially from a legitimacy perspective, contributors to the mailing 
lists included representatives from a range of consumer and user interest groups as well 
207 
 
as unaffiliated individuals and members of the public. The diversity and breadth of 
participation in mailing lists can in part be explained by the decision of working group 
chairs to keep relevant mailing lists open to the public. As a result, there were very few 
barriers to participation for individuals who wished to express their views on the standard. 
As above, these findings contradict the popular view of the W3C as a highly insular and 
exclusive organisation and suggests that the consortium may be more open to public 
participation than many assume.   
Despite the positive findings in relation to the sectoral distribution of participants, taken 
together, the analysis of participation in the EME development process, highlights a 
number of concerns related to diversity which are consistent with broader trends in the 
sector (Prakash, 2016; Updegrove, 2008). The findings of this research thus support 
growing calls for the W3C and other standards bodies to do more to promote greater 
involvement of women and stakeholders from developing countries in standardisation.   
Discursive inclusion 
Finally, in addition to representation and participation, discursive inclusion was also 
assessed as an indicator of inclusivity. To analyse discursive inclusion, a thematic 
analysis of sampled sources from the web corpus was conducted in order to identify the 
key discourses and issues of concern (accessibility, content protection, interoperability, 
security and user rights). Messages from the mailing lists were then coded for the 
presence of these topics, after which the relative frequency of occurrence for each issue 
was compared across both datasets.  
Analysis of the mailing list coding revealed that all areas of concern which were present 
within the web corpus (public space) were also present within the mailing list deliberations 








 In addition to being represented indirectly, analysis of the mailing list revealed that 
many of the ideas expressed in the public space (web corpus) were also directly 
referenced by mailing list participants who would often include hyperlinks to external 
sources including blogs and articles in the body of their messages. These links were often 
used to strengthen the arguments being made or to demonstrate support for a position 
from the wider community, Perhaps the most notable example of this kind of hyperlinking 
was the first Formal Objection raised against EME, submitted by Andreas Kukartz in May 
2013. In that case, an article published on the EFF’s website a few days earlier was 
referenced by Kukartz in lieu of a formal explanation for the submission of his Formal 
Objection.  
The use of hyperlinks in this way is an example of what Stromer-Galley (2007) termed 
‘sourcing’, a deliberative practice in which external information is introduced into a 
deliberation in order to support the arguments being made. This prominence of this 
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practice within the mailing lists suggests that participants were not only aware of the 
external controversy but were also open to the idea that those views should inform the 
discussions that were taking place within the mailing lists24.  
Although all issues present within the web corpus were also present within the mailing 
lists, the analysis did reveal a few minor variations in the relative weighting of issues 
between the two datasets (see figure 6.9). Specifically, the findings showed that the 
issues of interoperability, and to a lesser extent security, were discussed more extensively 
on the mailing lists than within the web corpus, whereas the issue of user rights was 
discussed much less on the mailing lists than it was outside of the W3C. As will be 
discussed in more depth below, these findings are partly a reflection of the fact that the 
discussions of interoperability and security were more constructive, and so required far 
more extensive discussions in order to accommodate the elaboration of mediating 
proposals. Conversely, the relative brevity of the discussions on user rights can in part be 
explained by the unwillingness of some participants to actively engage in non-technical 
discussions which were beyond their field of expertise. 
Despite these minor variations, on the whole, these findings indicate a high level of 
discursive inclusion within the mailing lists. This suggests that W3C members were 
effective in their role as political trustees and were successful at facilitating the 
‘transmission’ of discourses from the ‘public space’ to the ‘empowered space’ of the 
mailing lists (Dryzek, 2000). The findings, thus contradict previous characterisations of the 
W3C as somehow isolated or detached from the interests and concerns of ordinary users 
and developers. As above, these findings are a reflection of the openness and publicity of 
the process as well as the relative ease with which individuals were able to contribute to 
discussions. 
  
                                               
24 In total 35 out of the 205 web corpus sources analysed were linked to from the mailing lists at 




 As discussed in chapter four, within the W3C, the publicity of documents and 
mailing lists is governed by a classification system in which content is marked as either, 
public, member-only, or team-only. In order to assess the transparency of the W3C’s 
process, the confidentiality classification of key documents and mailing lists were 
monitored for the duration of EME’s development. To be considered as legitimate it was 
expected that all mailing lists and documents relevant to the development of EME would 
be classified as ‘public’.  
The findings of the analysis revealed that for the duration of EME’s development all 
information relevant to the specification including, the specification document, requirement 
documents, and minutes from teleconference meetings were classified as ‘public’ and 
were therefore freely available to access via the W3C website. In addition, the discussions 
concerning the specification’s development took place entirely on public mailing lists, 
meaning that anyone with an internet connection could contribute. All contributions to 
discussions were made available through the W3C’s mailing list archives. Furthermore, as 
a condition of EME’s transition from one stage of the development process to the next, the 
HTML Media Working Group was required to provide public documentation of all 
amendments to the specification, a statement that all Working Group requirements had 
been met, and a record of all Formal Objections raised.  
While the information and discussions concerning the initial development of the EME 
specification were made public, it should nonetheless be noted that in line with W3C 
procedures, once the EME specification reached the stage of a ‘Proposed 
Recommendation’ it was subject to review by the Advisory Committee before being 
published as an official W3C recommendation. Unlike most other working group mailing 
lists, the deliberations of Advisory Committee are classified as member-only and are 
therefore confidential. Although the W3C did provide a dispensation of committee 
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members’ comments, following the conclusion of the formal review in July 2017, no publ ic 
record of which organisations had supported the proposal was published. Furthermore, 
despite the unprecedented nature of the Advisory Committee vote on EME – prompted by 
the EFF’s decision to appeal against the approval of EME as a recommendation – no 
formal voting record was made public.  
For many commentators, this lack of transparency at the crucial decision-making stage 
was highly concerning, as Bryan Lunduke (2017) commented; 
‘[this lack of transparency] makes [the W3C] a country club—organisationally 
speaking. Would you trust the verdict of secret votes coming out of a country 
club that you can't be part of because you can't afford it? I mean, if I'm going to 
let a country club decide things for me, at least let me know how the members 
vote so I can choose whom I high-five and buy a burger—and those who don’t 
deserve the high-five or the burger. This sort of transparency is critical’.  
While the lack of transparency regarding the Advisory Committee’s activities and the 
voting record does raise concerns, on the whole, the findings of this research 
demonstrated relatively high levels of transparency, with discussions conducted in public 
view and with all information relevant to the development of EME made freely available. 
As such, this research did not find evidence to support previous characterisations of the 
W3C as a mostly closed process (Vincent and Camp 2004).  
Constructiveness 
 The W3C process as with other forms of deliberative governance is premised on 
the idea that through rational discussions of relevant issues, participants will be able to 
identify shared values and determine an agreed course of action. In the context of the 
W3C, consensus (or more precisely "rough consensus") can be understood not in terms 
of unanimous support for proposals but rather by the absence of strong objections or 
widespread dissent (W3C, 2017d). As such, when assessing the constructiveness of 
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working group discussions the goal of this research was not to assess the extent to which 
discussions yielded a unanimous consensus, but rather the extent to which participants 
engaged in constructive dialogue orientated towards the identification of common values, 
objectives or ideals (see chapter 3).  
To analyse the constructiveness of discussions concerning EME, examples of 
constructive speech within sampled mailing list messages were coded. A matrix analysis 
was then performed to highlight variations in constructiveness across the five policy areas 
studied.  
Figure 6.10: Constructiveness by issue node 
 
Issue Node Constructive (%) 
Accessibility 75 
Content Protection 15 
Interoperability 38 
Security 63 
User Rights 13 
  Average 41 
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The findings of this analysis revealed significant variations in the constructiveness of 
deliberations, with discussions of accessibility, security, interoperability performing well 
and discussions of user rights and content protection performing very poorly.  
The high levels of constructiveness exhibited within the discussions of accessibility, 
interoperability and security can in part be explained by widespread acceptance of the 
importance of these issues as metrics of substantive quality (normative meta-consensus) 
as well as their relevance to the EME standards development process (epistemic meta-
consensus). On the one hand, the existence of a shared understanding and interpretation 
of the importance, meaning and value of the concepts of security, accessibility and 
interoperability – what Stevenson and Dryzek (2012) would refer to as ‘normative meta-
consensus’ - allowed contributors engage each other in productive dialogue since the 
pursuit of these objectives were already understood to be desirable. On the other hand, 
the mutual recognition of the relevance of these issues to the development of EME – what 
Stevenson and Dryzek (2012) would term ‘epistemic meta-consensus’ - helped to ensure 
that participants made genuine attempts to find solutions, since the beliefs about the 
potential impact of specification on these issues were widely accepted to be credible. 
Thus, despite some differences in the emphasis or importance that contributors ascribed 
to particular values, discussions of these topics were successful in yielding a wide range 
of technical and non-technical proposals intended to address or at least alleviate the 
issues raised.  
While participants widely accepted the importance and relevance of these topics, analysis 
of the mailing lists revealed that there nevertheless remained strong differences in 
participants’ interpretation of the range of options which were available to the W3C to 
resolve the issues identified - or what Stevenson and Dryzek (2012) refer to as 
‘preference meta-consensus’. As such, although a large number of mediating proposals 
were initially suggested, only a small number of these were able to generate sufficient 
interest or consensus to be actively pursued or implemented. 
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In the case of security discussions, for example, critics argued that since, in practice, 
implementations of EME would require integration with a CDM, the W3C should do more 
to specify a CDM which could be implemented safely. By leaving the specification of the 
CDM to third-parties, critics argued that the W3C was effectively mandating the 
implementation of proprietary software as a standard, something which opponents argued 
was fundamentally counter to the W3C’s principles and the values of the open web. As 
Danny O’Brien (2013) argued; 
 
‘EME and other protected media proposals are different from other standards. 
By approving this idea, the W3C has ceded control of the "user agent"… to a 
third-party, the content distributor. That breaks a—perhaps until now 
unspoken—assurance about who has the final say in your web experience, 
and indeed who has ultimate control over your computing device'. 
 
In response, proponents argued that it was not the place of the W3C to dictate the manner 
in which its standards were implemented within browsers. For them, decisions regarding 
the implementation and the specification of CDMs should be left to the browsers 
themselves, arguing that marketplace competition between different browsers would be 
sufficient to ensure that the standard was implemented in a way that would minimise risks 
to users. As Mark Watson (2013a) put it;  
‘Market competition will lead to browsers developing more security systems 
since consumers will have a choice… which through the operation of 
competition pushes these vendors towards honesty and transparency’.  
In addition to demands that the W3C specify a standard CDM, the EFF and its supporters 
also argued that in order to mitigate the risks posed to security researchers by the anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA, members of the W3C should enter into a covenant 
promising not to sue security researchers who circumvented CDM protections to audit 
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them for security flaws. Although the proposal initially received expressions of support 
from within the working group, after being referred to the Advisory Committee for approval 
it was determined that the proposal lacked the consensus needed to be introduced as an 
exit condition of the specifications progression to recommendation status. As a 
compromise, the W3C announced that it had begun work on a set of voluntary guidelines 
for the responsible disclosure of security flaws, according to which companies would 
promise not to seek prosecution under the DMCA, so long as ‘researchers provide a 
“reasonable” time period for the company to address the issue, include enough 
information to reproduce the issue, and make a reasonable effort to avoid service 
disruption’ (Porup, 2017). Whilst this move was welcomed as a positive step by some, 
others, including the EFF, dismissed the proposed guidelines as woefully inadequate and 
criticised the W3C for what they perceived to be the consortium’s reluctance to stand up 
for the interests of users and researchers, As Cory Doctorow observed in comments 
made to Ars Technica technology news website; 
 "The entire supposition that the W3C should engage in work to create a right 
to sue over embarrassing disclosures, and then mitigate this by offering an 
optional set of guidelines for when companies would exercise that right, is 
totally illegitimate’ (Doctorow cited in Porup, 2017).  
This lack of agreement agreement regarding the range of solutions which were available 
to the W3C or ‘preference meta-consensus' was also evident in discussions on the topic 
of user rights, where the perceived incompatibilities of DRM with open web principles led 
critics to demand that the W3C take a principled stance in opposition to the development 
of content protection (Stevenson & Dryzek, 2012). While few critics genuinely anticipated 
that ruling EME as out-of-scope for the W3C would seriously help stymie the proliferation 
of DRM, it was nevertheless argued that by adopting a principled position, the W3C could 
nonetheless score an important symbolic victory or at the very least deprive proponents of 
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DRM the legitimacy that a W3C recommendation would bestow. As Zak Rogoff (2017) 
explained; 
‘Of course, a refusal to ratify could not immediately stop the use of DRM, but it 
could meaningfully weaken the position of DRM in the court of public opinion, 
and put EME proponents Netflix, Microsoft, Apple, and Google on notice that a 
very prominent figure was willing to stand up to them on behalf of users. 
Changes in society's technological infrastructure require political movements, 
not just technological arguments, and political movements benefit greatly from 
the support of prominent figures’. 
In response to these demands, proponents of the specification denied that the W3C could 
have a tangible effect on, what they argued was, the inevitable development of content 
protection for the web. In contrast to opponents’ view of the W3C as a strong and 
influential body, proponents instead portrayed the W3C as ultimately powerless to stop 
content providers from using encryption for HTML5 video. In this way, proponents sought 
to downplay the importance of the W3C’s decision to accept the work on EME as ‘in-
scope’. Instead, they argued that the choice faced by the W3C was not one between DRM 
or no DRM, but given that copyright holders were unlikely to accept unencrypted 
streaming of their content, simply whether it would be better for the technology to be 
developed through an open, transparent and collaborative process, or not.  For 
proponents, therefore, it was only through active engagement with the work on content 
protection within the W3C that genuine concerns regarding security, accessibility and 
interoperability could be addressed. As Director Tim Berners-Lee (2013) insisted; 
‘We want a web which is rich in content. We want a web which is universal in 
that it can contain anything. If, in order to be able to access media like video on 
the web, we are required to have some form of content protection we feel it is 
better for it to be discussed in the open at W3C. We feel it would be better for 
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the technology to be in a browser and better for everyone to use an 
interoperable open standard’. 
 Together, the examples above, demonstrate not only differences in how 
participants believed that the W3C should handle public policy concerns but also 
competing interpretations of the role of the consortium as an institution of internet 
governance. Although proponents of the specification acknowledged the 
importance of addressing issues such as accessibility, interoperability and security 
as part of the standards process, most nevertheless interpreted the W3C’s role in 
the resolution of such matters as limited. Commentators such as Foliot (2013d) for 
example, noted how the consortium's status as voluntary consensus organisation 
meant that it lacked any regulatory power with which to enforced its standards and 
so sought to downplay the influence that the organisation could be expected to 
exert over its members. As Foliot (2013d) himself insisted; 
 ‘The W3C are not the internet police - they are a standards body. They have 
an important, perhaps critical, role to play in guiding the development of the 
web, but they do not define business rules or policies for their membership, or 
for the wider world-wide-web, nor do they "enforce" these standards: they put 
them out there, and implementers are free to use them, or not’. 
In contrast to this perspective, opponents of the specification perceived the W3C as 
wielding considerable ‘soft power’ and insisted that the consortium be willing to use its 
influence over members to ensure the implementation of its web technologies in a way 
that was secure and consistent with its own values and founding principles. As John 
Sullivan (2013) put it; 
‘[DRM] would fly in the face of the principles that the W3C cites as key to its 
mission … The W3C can't *stop* companies from pushing DRM, but it can join 
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us in condemning it, and it can refrain from making it easier for companies to 
work against the principles of the web’. 
In addition to a lack of preference meta-consensus regarding the W3C’s role, discussions 
of user rights and content protection – both of which performed poorly in terms of 
constructiveness – were also characterised by a series of more fundamental 
disagreements relating to the validity of competing values (normative meta-consensus) 
and beliefs (epistemic meta-consensus). 
Firstly, whereas the potentially harmful effects of the EME on the accessibility, 
interoperability and security were recognised or at least considered to be feasible, the 
impacts of the specification on the fight against online copyright infringement and 
principles such as fair use and access to knowledge were far more contested. 
Discussions of content protection for example, repeatedly focussed on the issue of DRM's 
effectiveness in preventing piracy, with participants deeply divided about the specifications 
expected benefits. 
For proponents, the specification would provide a necessary and effective tool to allow 
content creators to take control of the distribution of their creative works online. As David 
Singer (2013) argued;  
‘You might be surprised at how difficult to break some schemes have proved. 
The goal of DRM is basically to alter the balance between honesty and 
dishonesty… People used to talk a lot about 'friction-free copying' -- it's way 
easier to copy an eBook than photocopy a paperback. DRMs fundamentally 
add friction.  
Critics, however, denied that the specification would deliver the benefits that its authors 
claimed. In particular, they highlighted past failures of DRM to prevent copyright 




‘Everyone recognises that DRM doesn't actually work, and no matter what you 
do, the media will be available DRM-free on filesharing networks soon after 
release (or quite often, before official release). This is *at most* a picket fence 
that some people honour out of a sense out of respect.’  
This lack of agreement regarding the feasibility of competing beliefs, or ‘epistemic meta-
consensus’, severely limited the capacity of participants to develop mediating proposals 
since both sides believed that each others counter-claims were unrealistic. 
Secondly, and perhaps more fundamentally discussions of user rights and content 
protection were also characterised by a general lack of consensus regarding the range of 
values and principles that should be considered as relevant to the development of EME 
(normative meta-consensus).  In the case of user rights, for example, participants were 
deeply divided about precisely whose rights and interests the W3C should seek to protect.  
Authors and proponents of the specification argued that it was the W3C’s responsibility to 
promote a web that is rich in content. For contributors such as Jeff Jaffe, this could only 
be achieved if the consortium helped to protect the rights of content creators and 
owners.  As Jaffe himself (2013) argued; 
 ‘We all aspire for a rich web experience. Principled arguments for content 
protection begin by pointing out that the web should be capable of hosting all 
kinds of content and that it must be possible to compensate creative work. 
Without content protection, owners of premium video content – driven by both 
their economic goals and their responsibilities to others – will simply deprive 
the open web of key content’.  
In contrast to this view, critics argued that the W3C’s role was, first and foremost, to act in 
the interests of web users and consumers and to protect open web principles against the 
collateral effects of DRM. As Kornel Lesinski (2012) argued;  
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‘I don't know how much member companies are entitled to, but I was under 
the impression that W3C is driven by ideology, not by business requirements 
of 3rd parties and that W3C's ideology was much more aligned with FOSS's 
than RIAA/MPAA's.’ 
In many ways, the pattern of these discussions of content protection and user rights 
followed those of the fractious debates which took place during the ‘copyright wars’ of the 
1990s and 2000s (see above) (Patry, 2009). Now, as then, discussions were 
characterised by a central division between two competing and contradictory imaginaries 
of the web as a ‘marketplace’ and a ‘commons’ (Bollier & Watts, 2002; Stallman, 2002). 
These imaginaries reflected not only competing beliefs about the appropriate balance 
between intellectual property rights, fair use and access to knowledge online but also 
distinct interpretations of the nature and value of property, creativity and ownership 
(Boyle, 2003; Lessig, 2004). As with disagreements regarding the feasibility of competing 
beliefs, differences over the interpretation of these values and whether or not they should 
be considered as part of the process, severely limited participants’ ability to achieve 
consensus. 
Since the notion of meta-consensus does not require that participants reach unanimous 
consensus on the variety and weighting of values to be considered, the presence of such 
disagreements should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence of deliberative failure 
(Stevenson & Dryzek, 2012). Indeed, given that the debates concerning fair use and 
copyright have become so polarised and deeply ingrained over the past two decades, the 
failure of the process to yield consensus on these issues should come as no surprise. 
However, what is more concerning is that the findings indicate not only a failure to reach 
consensus but a noticeable unwillingness on the part of some participants to actively 
engage with the concerns of their opponents or to consider mediating proposals.   
While the failure of the process to generate consensus on these issues could be 
interpreted as evidence of the limitations of deliberative approaches in the context of 
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highly polarised debates (Mouffe, 1999), here I argue that it was, in fact, symptomatic of a 
much broader failure of the process to facilitate engagement with the principled or non-
technical objections to EME, as I shall now explain. 
Deliberativeness 
 The second indicator used to assess the throughput legitimacy of the W3C 
process was deliberativeness. In order for the process to be considered procedurally 
legitimate, it was expected that the arguments presented within the mailing lists would be 
responded to and addressed. To assess the deliberativeness of the process, quoted text 
within the body of reply messages was coded to one of several issue-specific "QUOTED" 
nodes. The number of messages which included text coded to a specific issue node, i.e. 
"SECURITY" was then compared with the number of messages which included text coded 
to that issue's corresponding "QUOTED" node, i.e. "QUOTED SECURITY".  




Analysis of the deliberativeness of the mailing lists revealed similar findings to the analysis 
of constructiveness, with discussions of security, accessibility and interoperability 
performing well and discussions of content protection and user rights performing poorly. 
As above, the relatively high levels of deliberativeness exhibited within discussions of 
accessibility, interoperability and security can in part be explained by mutual acceptance 
of the importance of these issues as metrics of substantive quality as well as their 
relevance to the development of EME.   
In addition, discussions of these issues also benefited from the existence of clearly 
defined and delineated policies and procedures for handling concerns. In the case of 
accessibility, for example, concerns raised by critics were quickly referred to Accessible 
Platform Architectures Working Group (APA WG), chartered by the W3C specifically to 
consider the effects of its standards on the ability of people with disabilities to access the 
web. The experience and expertise of the W3C and its staff in dealing with questions 
related to these issues meant that the consortium could draw on well-established 
procedures as well as the input of experienced individuals and specialist working groups 
to provide expert advice and assistance in the resolution of any concerns raised. As a 
result, mailing list participants could be assured that their concerns would not only be 
listened to but also appropriately addressed.  
Unlike the issues of accessibility, interoperability and security which could all largely be 
considered as the unintended consequences of specific implementations of content 
protection - and so potentially resolvable through the application of technical fixes – the 
issues of content protection and user rights explicitly concerned the validity of the DRM’s 
intended purpose; namely, to place limitations on personal uses of digital content as a 
means of preventing copyright infringement and encouraging the creation of new content. 
By raising these issues, critics sought not to comment upon how the technical 
specification might be improved but rather to call into question the very need for DRM as 
well as the validity of its inclusion as part of the open web platform. Put another way, by 
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referencing these issues, critics attempted to question not how the specification could be 
implemented but rather whether - given outstanding questions regarding the effectiveness 
of DRM as well as its incompatibility with user rights – it should be implemented at all.  
In order to address these questions, critics argued that it was imperative for the W3C 
process to be orientated not only towards the administration and fulfilment of technical 
requirements, but also the critical scrutiny of those requirements. This would require the 
W3C and its members to look well beyond the technical details of the proposal to 
contemplate its significance for the broader social and economic and cultural issues such 
as freedom of expression, access to knowledge and the nature of creativity, property and 
ownership. As Emmanuel Revah (2013) noted: 
‘The W3C does not exist in a vacuum, and it’s reasonable to consider the 
consequences of our decisions within W3C on the wider world’.  
In contrast to other topic areas, these were issues about which there was far less 
consensus among participants. Furthermore, unlike the issues of accessibility, 
interoperability and security these were also topics with which the W3C had little 
experience of dealing with, and for which the consortium had no established policies or 
procedures. Given the novelty of these issues for the W3C and its members, critics 
argued that engagement with these topics would thus also require participants to reflect 
upon the consortium's mission statement and the kind of web that they wanted to create.    
In response to these demands, most proponents of EME sought to distance deliberations 
from questions concerning public policy, arguing that such ‘philosophical’ or ‘legal’ issues 
were matters for ‘Congress’ or ‘the courts’ and not a standards organisation (Watson, 
2013b). Instead, the specification’s authors and supporters attempted to refocus the 
debate around technical questions regarding the delivery of the stated requirements. As 
John Foliot (2013c) argued; 
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‘If you are concerned that this FPWD has technical holes, or you have an 
alternative idea to satisfy that requirement, I urge you and others to either a) 
provide further details on the technical problems, or b) start your own 
alternative extension specification that meets the use-case requirements. 
Throwing up our collective hands and declaring "DRM is evil" is not the 
answer’. 
This narrow view of the W3C as a purely technical organisation was repeatedly endorsed 
by the Chairs of the working groups, who, in their capacity as the moderators of the 
mailing lists, regularly intervened in discussions to request that participants refrain from 
making comments about ‘non-technical’ matters or at least attempt to reframe their 
queries in terms of technical bugs which could be directly addressed. As this comment 
from HTML Working Group chair Paul Cotton (2013) demonstrates;  
‘Please do NOT start email threads on this list arguing that EME or DRM is out 
of scope for the HTML WG.  If you want to discuss such matters, please take 
them somewhere else’. 
While notable even during the early stages of EME’s development, this insistence by 
working group chairs that contributors refrain from expressing principled based objections 
to the specification became far more prominent following Berners-Lee’s (2013) decision to 
declare content protection as ‘in scope’ for the HTML Working Group. For supporters of 
the specification, this was interpreted as a tacit acceptance by the Director of the principle 
of DRM. For opponents, however, Berners-Lee's decision to allow the working group to 
explore potential solutions to content protection requirements did not make observations 
regarding the collateral effects or effectiveness of DRM invalid, and should not have been 




Quite often contributors who cited principled objections to EME were referred to the 
Restricted Media Community Group mailing list – established in 2013 to consider 
alternative solutions to copyright holder’s content protection requirements. While this 
group hosted some of the more productive and deliberative exchanges on EME’s 
implications for user rights and content protection, as a ‘community group’, it lacked any 
official status within the W3C process and so did not influence the standard's 
development. As a result, some opponents of the specification expressed frustration at 
working group chairs' repeated requests that they use the restricted-media mailing list 
rather than the main HTML mailing lists to voice their concerns; feeling, that these 
requests were an attempt to marginalise their views. In one instance, these concerns even 
led group contributor Fred Andrews to request that the community group be closed down 
to prevent dissenting voices in the main HTML mailing lists from being silenced. As 
Andrews (2013b) himself argued;  
This Community Group has been abused by some members of the HTML 
working group to divert discussions that they do not agree with away from the 
HTML working group. This includes the Chairs, and they have not been rained 
in by the W3C, and in fact, the W3C has stated that the views expressed here 
will not be considered until a later stage in the process and the W3C has 
refused to define how they will be considered… I propose closing down this 
community group and directing the HTML working group to accommodate the 
members within the working groups as voting invited experts. 
By framing the deliberations as purely technical, the chairs of the working groups acted to 
limit the scope of discussions within the mailing lists to a few core technical issues. As a 
result, discourses which attempted to challenge assumptions regarding the requirements 
for content protection or question the appropriateness of EME’s inclusion as part of the 
open web platform from a non-technical perspective were judged to be ‘out-of-scope’. 
Thus, although expressions of principled based objection to content provider’s 
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requirements were present in the mailing lists, the unwillingness of proponents of EME to 
justify these requirements or engage with non-technical counter-discourses, meant that 
despite their apparent inclusion, opportunities for participants to reframe the deliberations 
were for the most part curtailed.  
Contrary to most contemporary critiques of the W3C, these findings suggest that the 
consortium not only exhibits signs of ‘external exclusion' but also from what Young (2002) 
described as ‘internal exclusion’, whereby discourses transmitted to the ‘empowered 
space’ of the mailing lists are marginalised, ignored or otherwise excluded by participants. 
These findings also provide evidence to support the view that ‘deliberative frames’ can 
play a significant role in limiting the scope of deliberations and the range of possible 
deliberative outcomes (Barisione, 2012). More generally, the failure of participants to 
actively engage with concerns related to content protection and user rights raises serious 
concerns about the willingness and capacity of W3C to adequately address public policy 
issues, and in particular those which fall outside of its conventional field of expertise. 
Respect 
 In addition to the indicators of constructiveness and deliberativeness, throughput 
legitimacy was also assessed in relation to respectfulness – which for the purposes of this 
study was taken to mean an absence of abusive language or ad hominem attacks. In 
order to assess respectfulness content coded to a specific issue node, for example, 
"SECURITY" or "USER RIGHTS", which also contained disrespectful or abusive language 
was coded to a "DISRESPECT" node. A matrix coding analysis was then conducted to 
identify overlaps between the coding of each issue node and the "DISRESPECT" node. 
Analysis of the respectfulness of the mailing list discussions revealed a very similar trend 
to the analysis of deliberativeness and constructiveness, with discussions on accessibility, 
interoperability and security scoring the highest in terms of the respect and content 
protection and user rights scoring the lowest.  
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Figure 6.12: Respect by issue node 
Issue Node Respectful (%) 
Accessibility 90 
Content Protection 85 
Interoperability 90 
Security 95 
User Rights 73 
  Average 86 
 As with deliberativeness and constructiveness, the respectful nature of the 
discussions of accessibility, security and interoperability can largely be attributed to a 
shared understanding of the importance and relevance of the topics being discussed as 
well as shared definitions of key terms and the objectives to be realised. Although the 
heated nature of the deliberations more generally meant that participants would 
occasionally be provoked into the use of disrespectful language - especially in the context 
of discussions regarding proposals such as the EFF’s covenant in the case of security or 
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the need for a CDM specification in the case of interoperability - on the whole, these topic 
areas were characterised by professional and respectful conduct.  
In contrast to discussions of security, accessibility and interoperability where participants 
could frame their arguments in terms of commonly shared values, beliefs and objectives, 
discussions concerning user rights and to a lesser degree content protection, were 
characterised by heated exchanges in which participants often expressed frustration with 
the perceived failure of their fellow contributors to acknowledge or accept the validity of 
the arguments they presented. As the controversy developed, proponents of the 
specification also became increasingly exasperated at the apparent intransigence of their 
opponents as well as their refusal to express objections in technical terms. As this 
message from Glenn Adams (2013) demonstrates;  
‘I don't recognise any of your arguments as technical, nor do I recognise your 
comparison about cost/benefit as having a technical or substantive basis. You 
cite no methodology for evaluating proposals for new features; you offer no 
metrics that demonstrate excessive cost or lack of benefit. You cite no 
established policies or recognised precedents from which guidance could be 
obtained. You merely repeat your opinion ad infinitum that EME is DRM, DRM 
is evil, and therefore EME is evil. We've heard that argument, and though 
there may be some who are persuaded by it, we are not. So why keep 
repeating it?’ 
This irritation at the intransigence and apparent indifference of opponents and proponents 
respectfully, led to highly fractious and ill-mannered exchanges, with some participants 
receiving warnings from chairs and moderators about their language and professional 
conduct.   
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Figure 6.13: Posts from the ‘W3C memes’ Tumblr page   
 Disrespectful comments often took the form of ad hominem attacks and included 
references to contributor’s motivations, religious beliefs, and professional competence. 
Most commonly though,  disrespectful messages related to the characterisations of 
participants as either;  corporate ‘sell-outs’, who were willing to abandon the principles of 
the open web in the pursuit of financial gain, or, conversely, as naïve and anti-commercial 
‘hippies’ who did not understand the commercial realities of the content industries (see 
figure 6.13). As the selected comments below demonstrate:   
‘I've lost trust and faith in the W3C… When I came-up with the catch-phrase 
"The Hollyweb", I thought that perhaps I was being a little extreme. But, now 
that I've seen how far Jeff and the W3C will go to defend and help Hollywood 
in their "plight," I realise that I did not go far enough. So, for *this* issue, I will 
now be focusing my efforts entirely on raising awareness about the corruption 
within the W3C and why they are doing more for the special interest than for 
what's in the public interest.’ (Gay, 2013) 
 ‘All of this ongoing teeth gnashing and wailing about DRM is all just 
noise…  The primary interest of *any* business is to a) stay in business, b) 
make a profit in business… Everything else is fairy dust: wishing and hoping 
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for a better world where everyone sings Kumbia and has free everything ain't 
gonna happen. It simply won’t. Why is this so hard to understand?’ (Foliot, 
2013b) 
Although these types of personalised attacks were present throughout the mailing list as a 
whole, they were noticeably more prominent in discussions concerning user rights and to 
a lesser extent content protection, which would occasionally strayed onto broader and 
more contentious topics such as the digital economy, access to knowledge, free culture 
and the nature of creativity. The prevalence of ad hominem attacks within threads on 
these topics is telling since it clearly indicates failure of the process to facilitate respectful 
and productive discussions in circumstances where there did not already exist a degree of 
consensus.  
Justification 
The final indicator used to assess the throughput legitimacy of the W3C was justification.  
In order for the process to be deemed legitimate, it was expected that participants would 
be able to provide evidence or reasons to support their positions. In order to assess 
justification, content from sampled mailing lists messages was coded for examples of 
supporting evidence or reasons. A matrix coding analysis was then conducted to identify 
variations in the level of justification between policy issues. 
Analysis of levels of justification revealed that while there were no substantial variations 
between the topics of accessibility, interoperability, security, or user rights, the levels of 
justification in discussions of content protection were significantly lower.    
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Figure 6.14: Justification by issue node  
 
Issue Node Justified (%) 
Accessibility 48 
Content Protection 33 
Interoperability 40 
Security 46 
User Rights 47 
  Average 43 
 
 These findings can in part be explained by the failure of content providers to justify 
their requirements for content protection. Although participants well understood the 
contractual requirements for web platforms such as YouTube and Netflix to provide robust 
content protection as part of their license agreements with content providers, the 
underlying reasons for the license agreements themselves were rarely explained by 
supporters of the specification. Indeed, while proponents frequently presented the 
requirements of copyright owners as an explanation for why the specification was needed, 
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the actual benefits of content protection were not outlined by the representatives of the 
content providers themselves (very few of whom actively participated in the discussions). 
For critics of EME who questioned the efficacy of DRM as a means of preventing piracy 
and promoting the production of creative content, the unwillingness of proponents to 
provide justifications for their requirements was highly problematic. As contributor to the 
mailing lists Cobaco (2013) put it; 
‘What's missing is the reasoning that establishes DRM as a valid charter. Both 
your post and the director's mail you link to basically boil down to: "this was 
requested by [sic] the Web and TV Interest Group, and we accepted that 
without further justification" … What makes you think there is broad agreement 
that some form of content protection is needed?’ 
More generally, it was noted during the analysis that some participants used shorthand 
terminology or failed to provide complete justifications for their positions in the expectation 
that their fellow contributors were experts in the field or were sufficiently knowledgeable 
about the specification and related technologies to understand the issues being 
discussed. Although there was no evidence to suggest that this practice had an adverse 
effect on the ability of contributors to comprehend the discussions, it is nevertheless worth 
noting that some deliberative theorists have previously warned that the use of highly 
technical language by experts and practitioners may have the effect of excluding 
laypersons or non-experts who may not have the requisite knowledge to adequately 
understand and assess the arguments being made (Brown, 2009).    
In circumstances when participants did provide clear justifications for their arguments, 
analysis of the mailing lists revealed the use of a wide range of discursive strategies and 
styles, including the use of storytelling, anecdotes, and even humour (see figure 6.13). 
However, as described above, principled arguments including the use of moral 
justifications were widely rejected by working group chairs who insisted that critics 
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articulate their objections in technical terms only. The enforcement of these restrictions on 
the manner in which participants could express themselves limited the scope of debates 
and acted to exclude some participants, including members of the public who lacked the 
expertise to comments on the technical specificities of the standard. These findings thus 
support the view of Hamlett (2003), Mansbridge et al. (2012) and others who warn of the 
coercive effects of specifying certain forms of discourse as ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’.     
Key Findings 
 
 For much of the past decade, discussions concerning the procedural legitimacy of 
the W3C have been framed almost exclusively in terms of the consortium’s lack of 
inclusivity and transparency, problems which critics claim to have been caused by the 
W3C’s restrictive membership policies and commercial focus (Schoechle, 2003).  
In contrast to those who have portrayed the W3C as a fundamentally closed and insular 
organisation, this research has demonstrated that the W3C process exhibits some 
evidence of input legitimacy. Specifically, the findings of the research have demonstrated 
how the mostly open and public nature of the W3C process meant that there existed very 
few barriers to participation for those wishing to actively contribute to discussions. This 
openness, it has been argued, led to high levels of discursive inclusion and facilitated the 
participation of a diverse range of stakeholders, from representatives of multinational 
corporations and academics to digital rights activists and members of the public. 
Furthermore, the research has also shown how despite previous characterisations of the 
W3C as insular and secretive, the process through which the W3C develops its standards 
is in fact largely transparent, with key documents including the minutes of F2F and 
telecom meetings all made publicly available.  
Despite these positives, however, the overall findings of this research support the view 
that the W3C lacks sufficient levels of input legitimacy to justify its development of techno-
policy standards.  Specifically, analysis of the W3C’s membership and participation in the 
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mailing lists revealed that stakeholders from non-western countries and women were 
massively underrepresented within the process. Although such disparities are not unusual 
for technical bodies, given the economic, social and political implications of the standards 
being developed, these levels of representation are far below what should be expected 
(Prakash, 2016; Updegrove, 2008). 
In addition to the concerns regarding input legitimacy, the research has also raised 
questions about the deliberative quality of the W3C’s standardisation process itself. 
Specifically, an in-depth analysis of the mailing lists demonstrated that a large number of 
discussions - particularly those related to content protection and user rights - were 
characterised by a noticeable lack of reciprocity and an ultimate failure to reach 
consensus. Although the precise cause of these deliberative failures varied across the 
topic areas analysed, broadly speaking, conflicts between participants arose as a 
consequence of competing attempts to frame the nature of the W3C process and the role 
of the W3C as an institution of internet governance.  
In relation to the nature of the process, analysis of the mailing list discussions revealed 
that participants held very different perspectives about the kinds of valid discourses and 
arguments that should be considered as part of the W3C standards development process. 
On the one hand, opponents of the specification argued forcefully that the W3C process 
should accommodate discussions concerning the relationship between consortium’s 
standards and the broader social and political values and principles which inform its 
mission. On the other hand, proponents of the specification largely rejected the notion of 
the W3C as a ‘political’ process, suggesting instead that contributions to the mailing lists 
be of a technical nature only. As John Foliot (2013c) argued;    
‘I believe that it should be out of scope for a technical committee 
and a standards body to favour one philosophical perspective 
versus the other: leave the politics of politics to the politicians – this 
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is (should be) an engineering forum and an engineering 
discussion’. 
In some instances, attempts to frame the process in this way were motivated by pragmatic 
concerns about the effect that broader public policy discussions would have on procedural 
efficiency. In this way, it was argued that any attempt to integrate ‘philosophical debates’ 
into the standards process would inevitably jeopardise the consortium’s ability to respond 
to market demands by substantially prolonging deliberations. For them, the focus of the 
W3C should first and foremost be the efficient delivery of technically robust standards 
which meet the technical requirements of the community, regardless of their social or 
economic implications. As El Mekki (2013) put it, the ‘W3C should certainly not get implied 
in corporate vs. users, because that's politics and W3C doesn't do politics - it does 
standards’. 
Such interventions highlight not only the commercial pressures faced by the W3C but also 
the underlying tensions between substantive and procedural legitimacy which are implicit 
in the consortium’s process (see chapters two and five). By emphasising the importance 
of efficiency and technical quality over procedural rigour, therefore, proponents of the 
specification were not only expressing a preference for how the standards process should 
be conducted but also the types of legitimacy that the W3C should enact. While, such 
substantive claims to legitimacy continue to be important factors in determining the W3C’s 
legitimacy as a whole, in the case of EME, the emphasis of some participants on 
procedural efficiency at the expense of due process, undermined the deliberative quality 
the process and led ultimately to the exclusion of counter-discourses which did not 
concern the delivery of technical requirements.  
In other instances, objections to the discussion of matters of public policy were motivated 
not by technical pragmatism but rather by an apparent ambivalence to the political nature 
of the standards process itself. Indeed, while some accepted the policy implications of 
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EME as self-evident, others attempted repeatedly to distance the W3C’s work from 
questions of politics, portraying the consortium, instead, as an objective and politically 
neutral organisation and driven exclusively by the pursuit of technical compatibility. As 
John Foliot (2013e) put it, ‘the W3C operates using a consensus process which is not a 
"vote", nor is it a popularity contest - it is based upon consensus around *technical* 
matters, not policy’. 
By framing the discussions in this way, proponents acted to exclude from deliberations 
any non-technical arguments or value-based judgements as well as any areas of concern 
that could not be directly addressed by technical proposals. Put simply, while the mailing 
lists discussions offered participants an opportunity to determine how the specification 
should be designed, the framing of the discussions in techno-scientific terms meant that 
questions of whether or not the consortium should develop the specification in the first 
place were largely marginalised. These findings would thus appear to support the view of 
STS scholars, who warn of the potential for technological design processes to uncritically 
reflect prevailing ideological positions to the exclusion of counter-discourses (Hamlett, 
2003).  
In the small number of instances when participants agreed that a particular public policy 
concern should be considered, analysis of the mailing lists revealed that the deliberations 
were halted further by disagreements regarding the role that the W3C should take in 
addressing the issues identified. While opponents of the specification believed strongly 
that the W3C should adopt a principled stance against the inclusion of any form of DRM in 
the open web platform, proponents of EME rejected suggestions that the W3C should 
seek to influence the business decisions of its members or impose on them any particular 
vision of the web. 
For some contributors, their rejection of the more progressive and regulatory impulses of 
the specification’s opponents can be viewed quite straightforwardly as a reflection of a 
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laissez-faire interpretation of standardisation. For contributors such as John Foliot 
(2013d), the role of the W3C as a regulator or political agent within the standards 
marketplace should be minimised and responsibility for the identification of requirements 
and development of web technologies be left as much as possible to individual members 
and implementers of the technologies themselves. Thus, in contrast to opponents 
understanding of the W3C as a regulator, many members sought to position the W3C as a 
purely coordinative organisation, whose primary role was first and foremost as a facilitator 
of private sector cooperation and administrator of its members’ technical requirements. As 
Foliot (2013d) himself said; 
‘The role and goal of the W3C, as I see it, is not to prescribe philosophy, but to 
work towards technical interoperability. That means balancing the needs of 
both the FOSS and Commercial content communities, not favouring one over 
the other’. 
For other contributors, their opposition to suggestions that the W3C take a more proactive 
approach in the pursuit of public policy objectives was driven by their belief that the 
consortium lacked both the capacity and expertise to adequately comprehend the legal or 
policy implications of its work. Despite the consortium's invited expert policy, which is 
designed to facilitate the participation of relevant experts from outside the web community, 
contributors observed how the vast majority of participants were engineers or web 
developers, most of whom lacked the legal experience necessary to speak knowledgeably 
about the legal issues raised by EME25.  
Finally, for others, the rejection of opponents' demands that the W3C take a principled 
stance against EME was motivated not out of a libertarian sensibility, concerns about 
procedural capacity or even support of the specification itself, but rather what they 
perceived to be a pragmatic realism regarding the influence and power of the W3C. For 
                                               
25 Participants’ uncertainty over many of the legal issues surrounding the implementation of EME 
was evidenced by the fact that many prefixed their contributions with the disclaimer “IANAL”, which 
in the parlance of the standards community stands for “I am not a lawyer”.   
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Berners-Lee (2017) for example, the W3C’s status as a voluntary consensus organisation 
limited the pressure that the consortium could realistically be expected to exert over 
content providers and other vendors. Thus, while many proponents of EME sympathised 
with the objections expressed by critics of the proposal, they nevertheless argued that the 
W3C lacked the kinds of regulatory power necessary to prevent the spread of DRM. As 
Berners-Lee (2017) himself put it:  
‘If the Director of the Consortium made a Decree that there would be No More 
DRM, in fact, nothing would change. Because the W3C does not have any 
power to forbid anything’. 
Intriguingly, this view of the W3C as a mostly passive and coordinative organisation is in 
many ways counter to the popular perception of the consortium as a powerful and 
influential custodian of open web principles and an exemplar of effective internet self-
regulation (Russell, 2003). If, as many contributors suggested, the W3C’s role is limited, 
even in cases were there is widespread opposition to proposals, then this raises the 
question of when, if ever, the W3C would be willing or capable of opposing the interests of 
its corporate members. As such, the findings of this research undermine the view of the 
W3C as an effective advocate of user rights and calls into question the capacity of the 
W3C to defend open web principles against the demands of an increasingly powerful and 
centralised industrial lobby.  
Whatever participants reasons for rejecting suggestions that the W3C adopt a more 
proactive approach in defence of its principles, their unwillingness to engage fully with 
difficult questions related to user rights and content protection once again highlights the 
contested nature of the W3C mission and its role as an institution of internet governance. 
The W3C, thus, continues to face the challenge mediating between the conflicting 
interpretations of its work.  In the case of EME, the W3C’s outright refusal to endorse a 
more progressive approach to the policy issues raised demonstrated its failure to do so 
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successfully and positioned the consortium in opposition to a significant proportion of its 
membership and the wider web community who interpret its role and legitimacy differently.  
As Baldur Bjarnason (2017) put it; 
‘No matter which side is right, the W3C faces an existential crisis. Either: 
The W3C is a shepherd of the web for all, the web on everything, and a web of 
trust. But now it is fundamentally compromising its own principles in the name 
of maintaining industry relevance. 
Or, the W3C is merely an industry body for browser vendors to collaborate and 
its mission statement is nothing more than PR to increase buy-in from the 
smaller, largely powerless, members. 
Both can’t be true. Neither is good news for the organisation.’ 
In conclusion, while this research appears to substantiate existing concerns about the 
procedural legitimacy of the W3C, in contrast to much of the contemporary commentary 
on the W3C, the findings suggest that these deficits are not merely the result of ‘external 
exclusion' or a lack of input legitimacy, but are also caused by forms of ‘internal exclusion’ 
which result from specific deliberative framings of the W3C and its process. The effect of 
these hegemonic frames - which attempted to deemphasise the consortium’s policy-
making role and restrict discussions to a narrow range of technical matters - was to 
exclude from the standardisation process non-technical discourses, and as a 
consequence limit the range of apparently valid deliberative outcomes (Barisione, 2012). 
As such, while the W3C process performed well in some areas, the overall finding of this 
research is that the W3C currently lacks the levels of procedural legitimacy necessary to 







“Let all men know how empty and worthless is the power of a king.”1 
 (Huntingdon, 1996, p. 199) 
 In 1992, senior MIT research scientist David Clarke (1992) delivered a speech 
entitled, “A Cloudy Crystal Ball: Apocalypse Now”, to a plenary meeting of the IETF. In it, 
the long-time leader of the technical community famously attempted to define the 
underlying ethos and shared values of the standards community, describing their 
approach as one of ‘rough consensus and running code’.  The phrase was an instant 
success with Clarke’s audience for whom it provided the perfect slogan to articulate the 
uniqueness of their community and to differentiate themselves from their rivals at the ISO. 
It has since been adopted enthusiastically by commentators and scholars alike to describe 
what is commonly regarded as the standards community’s uniquely deliberative and non-
hierarchical approach to standards making and legitimacy (Russell, 2014). 
Today Clarke’s comments are widely quoted, but what is often less well cited is the 
context in which he made them. Delivered amidst the early stages of the internet’s 
commercialisation, Clarke’s speech (1992) was intended not merely as a celebration of 
the community’s values but also as a warning of the challenges that the community would 
likely face as they attempted to ‘manage the process of change and growth’.  Highlighting 
the pressures that commercialisation would inevitably bring to bear on their community 
and its principles, Clarke outlined a series of values that he believed the IETF would need 
to balance as the internet and its user community continued to grow. These included the 
need to ensure an open and inclusive process which left participants ‘time to think’, but 
                                                             
1 Excerpt from the tale of King Canute and the waves, see: Huntingdon, H. (1996). Historia 





also the need for the community to ‘make progress’ or as he put it ‘keep up with reality’ 
(Clark, 1992).  Thus, as much as Clarke’s speech was intended to remind its audience of 
their shared values, in delivering it, Clarke was also seeking to prepare his colleagues for 
the compromises and challenges that would undoubtedly lie ahead.   
As this thesis has demonstrated, the challenge of achieving this balance between 
procedural efficiency and rigour, that is, between substantive and procedural legitimacy is 
for contemporary web standards bodies such as the W3C as difficult today as it was in 
1992. Specifically, through the analysis of the development of the EME specification, this 
research has demonstrated how despite the W3C’s recent efforts to reform its procedures, 
the consortium failed to adequately consider the policy implications of its work or ensure 
the type of open and deliberative process necessary to legitimise its development of the 
specification.  
Firstly, although the findings of the research showed that the W3C process was both 
transparent and discursively inclusive, they also provided evidence to support existing 
characterisations of the consortium as a body lacking in diversity and dominated by 
commercial interest groups. Secondly, the findings also revealed very low levels of 
throughput legitimacy, particularly in relation to discussions of more novel policy issues 
such as user rights and content protection. Close analysis of the mailing lists 
demonstrated that, in many cases, these deliberative deficits were the product of 
hegemonic deliberative frames relating to the nature of the W3C process as well as the 
role of the consortium as an institution of internet governance.   
From a theoretical perspective, the findings of this research have highlighted the vital 
importance of deliberative framing as a form of coercive power within deliberative fora. 
Specifically, the findings showed how despite the apparent inclusion of a diverse range of 
actors and discourses within the discussions, repeated attempts to frame the W3C 
process as purely technical and coordinative acted to constrain the scope of the 
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discussions and in the process limit the range of deliberative outcomes that were 
considered possible. As such, the findings of this research contribute to an emerging body 
of literature within deliberative democratic theory which emphasises the need to consider 
the ways in which framing effects can introduce discursive distortions and bias into 
deliberative processes (Barisione, 2010, 2012).  
From a more practical perspective, the findings of this research highlight several 
procedural deficits which the W3C must address if it is to preside over the development of 
techno-policy standards legitimately.  
Firstly, although the W3C should be commended for what the analysis revealed to be 
relatively high levels of input legitimacy, some concerns regarding inclusivity and 
transparency nonetheless remain. In relation to transparency, critics raised concerns 
about the opaque nature of the work of the W3C’s Advisory Committee, and specifically 
the failure of the W3C to publicly release a record of the votes cast by W3C members in 
response to the EFF’s formal appeal. The W3C justified its decision not to publish a 
record of individual votes on the basis of member confidentiality. However, given the 
exceptional nature of the appeal vote – it was the first vote taken on a specification in the 
W3C’s history - as well as the public interest surrounding EME, it would not have seemed 
unreasonable for an organisation that claims to be open, to have introduced a policy that 
would have allowed for a public voting record to have been published.  
In addition to concerns regarding transparency, the analysis of the process also raised 
concerns about the underrepresentation of women and participants from non-western 
countries. Although the underrepresentation of these groups is not uncommon within 
internet standards bodies or the ICT sector more generally, it was nonetheless felt that an 
organisation that purports to represent the interests of all web users should be doing more 




In January 2018, W3C Advisory Board member and co-chair of the W3C Web Platform 
Working Group Léonie Watson launched the W3C Women Community Group. The stated 
mission of the group was to increase the presence of women in standards development, 
by providing ‘a space to share experiences and information’; producing ‘best practices and 
use case documents’; and advising the Advisory Board  and Advisory Committee about 
‘potential enhancements to [the W3C] working environment to better support inclusion and 
diversity’ (W3C, 2018). In November 2018, the group was renamed the Inclusion and 
Diversity Community Group and the scope of its mission statement broadened to include 
the promotion of all under-represented groups within the W3C. Although community 
groups do not have any official status within the W3C, these developments are 
nevertheless encouraging and demonstrate an awareness of the problem of diversity 
among W3C members.  
Secondly, although the W3C has recently demonstrated a greater awareness of the social 
and political implications of its work, persistent attempts by some members to portray the 
consortium as a purely technical and coordinative body indicated a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the wider role that the W3C plays as an institution of internet 
governance. Given the limiting effects that such deliberative frames had on the process, it 
is suggested that participants and working group chairs would benefit greatly from much 
clearer guidance on how non-technical issues should be expressed and addressed within 
working group discussions. This work should form part of broader efforts by the W3C and 
its members to reflect upon and clarify the consortium’s values and mission statement and 
to consider how these should be interpreted in relation to the policy issues affected by its 
work.  
Finally, analysis of the mailing list discussions revealed widespread concern about the 
W3C’s procedural capacity to manage public policy discussions. Although many 
participants were not necessarily opposed to addressing broader social and political 
questions as part of the consortium’s work, some nonetheless questioned the ability of the 
244 
 
W3C to do so effectively without jeopardising its procedural efficiency or responsiveness 
to market demands. Such concerns were expressed most prominently in the context of 
discussions of user rights and content protection. At the time of EME’s initial development, 
the consortium had little previous experience of dealing with these kinds of policy issues; 
a factor which undoubtedly contributed to participants’ concerns about procedural 
efficiency. Intriguingly, the policy issues which the W3C had much greater experience of 
handling (accessibility, interoperability, security) performed comparatively well in the 
analysis. As such, in attempting to consider how the W3C might better accommodate 
discussions of user rights and content protection, it is important to see what lessons can 
be learned from the discussions of the other policy issues studied.   
Firstly, analysis of the mailing list data revealed that discussions of accessibility, 
interoperability and security were supported by the on-going work of a wide range of 
specialist working groups and domains designed specifically to provide expert feedback 
and advice on the technical and policy implications of proposals.  By contrast, no such 
working groups existed for the consideration of policy issues related to user rights or 
content protection. The restricted media community group2 - created by opponents of the 
specification to assess alternative solutions to members’ content protection requirements - 
provided a useful forum for some of the more productive discussions on these topics. 
However, unlike initiatives such as the Technical Architecture Group (TAG) or the Web 
Accessibility Initiative (WAI), which are empowered by the W3C process document to 
develop official guidelines and assist in the resolution of technical issues, as a “community 
group” restricted-media had no official status as part of the W3C process and so was 
unable to exert any significant influence over the development of EME.  
The lack of established procedures for dealing with issues related to content protection 
and user rights meant that discussions were often characterised by uncertainty regarding 
                                                             
2 Information regarding the restricted media group including its charter and activities can be found 
at: https://www.w3.org/community/restrictedmedia/  
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how these issues should be interpreted in relation to the W3C’s values and mission. 
Participants also expressed uncertainty about the roles and responsibilities of the working 
group chairs in the resolution of concerns and most crucially whether discussions of these 
issues should be considered as ‘in-scope’ for the mailing lists. Uncertainty on these 
matters prompted heated but largely unproductive discussions about the nature of W3C’s 
process and so significantly contributed to the protracted and fractious nature of the 
deliberations overall.  
In order to provide greater clarity about the ways in which user rights concerns can be 
identified and addressed, it is recommended that the W3C charter a Policy Advisory 
Group to establish policies and procedures for developing standards which have public 
policy implications. In 2016, W3C member Jean-François Abramatic submitted a proposal 
for the creation of a similar group. The Technology and Policy Group (techpolig), as it 
would have been known, was intended to ‘explore issues at the intersection of technology 
and policy-making’. According to its proposed charter (W3C, 2016c), the group would 
have functioned as ‘a forum for W3C members to analyse technical considerations that 
the W3C sees as relevant to policies and governance decisions… [and] to reach 
consensus on descriptions of varying views of those considerations’. The proposal was 
rejected by the Advisory Committee in September 2016 following concerns that such an 
Interest Group would be a recipe for ‘an ineffectual and frustrating talking-shop’ 
(Doctorow, 2016c). Among the proposal’s critics, were digital rights activist Cory Doctorow 
(2016c), who noted that ‘members who wish to scuttle an IG project need only sit out its 
discussion, then declare their objections to its conclusions, and thus take them off the 
table’. As a result, Doctorow (2016b) observed how the proposal’s participation framework 
was likely to ‘yield dead-on-arrival policy recommendations’ that could be easily ignored or 
denied by members who simply abstained from the group’s work. 
To avoid these issues, here it is suggested that the Policy Advisory Group be modelled on 
the successful TAG, which currently develops guidelines and recommendations on 
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technical matters for the Advisory Committee and Working Groups. Members of the Group 
would be elected from the W3C’s membership; the Group would meet regularly and take 
up items suggested by its members and by relevant Working Groups and Interest Groups. 
By mimicking the structure of TAG, the group would be empowered to make policy 
recommendations and place items on the agenda at meetings of Working Groups and the 
Advisory Committee. As such, although it would not have the power to set policy, it would 
be able to ensure that policy questions were properly considered and framed in 
accordance with the consortium’s stated principles and mission.  
An initial priority for the Advisory Group should be the clarification of the consortiums 
policies in relation to online copyright and content protection and the development of 
procedures for handling standards which impinge upon users’ fair use rights. As EFF 
Senior Staff Technologist Seth Schoen (2013) observed, ‘the W3C needs to develop a 
policy regarding DRM and similar proposals, or risk having its own work and the future of 
the Web become buried in the demands of businesses that would rather it never existed in 
the first place’.  
Finally, although discussions of security and accessibility benefitted from the contributions 
of a range of experts, with a few notable exceptions3, discussions of user rights and 
content protection lacked any substantive participant from policy experts or lawyers with 
expertise in the areas of copyright and fair use. In some instances, this lack of expertise 
led to uncertainty over the potential legal implications of the specification’s 
implementation, including for example, whether or not security researchers who chose to 
circumvent the EME encryption would be liable for prosecution. As such, it is 
recommended that the W3C make greater use of its invited expert policy to encourage the 
                                                             
3 W3C Strategy Lead and Policy Counsel Wendy Seltzer acted as the chair of the restricted-media 
community group during the development of EME. As an American attorney with extensive 
experience of intellectual property and technology law, her contributions to the discussions were 
invaluable and helped to clarify many of the legal questions related to the implementation of EME.  
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participation of a broader range of individuals including those with legal and policy 
expertise and professional experience in the areas of intellectual property and copyright. 
The recommendations outlined above should help the W3C to address some of the 
procedural deficiencies identified during the analysis of its development of EME. However, 
the competitive nature of the market for ICT standards means that the consortium’s 
willingness and capacity to actively pursue due process and ensure procedural rigour will 
inevitably always be weighed against its need to satisfy the technical demands of a 
marketplace increasingly dominated by a handful of powerful companies, without whose 
compliance and financial support, the W3C would effectively be obsolete.  
For the past thirty years, responsibility for striking a balance between the W3C’s 
substantive and procedural claims to legitimacy has lain almost entirely with the 
‘benevolent dictator’ of the web, Tim-Berners Lee. Through his strategic use of soft power 
and sincere engagement with a broad range of stakeholders, Berners-Lee has largely 
succeeded in ensuring conformity to open web principles and safeguarding his original 
vision of a universal web accessible to all. However, as commercial pressures on 
standards bodies have increased and influence over the web standards marketplace has 
become progressively more centralised in the hands of a few powerful corporate actors, it 
is clear that the consortium’s capacity and willingness to constrain the monopolising 
tendencies of the market has gradually diminished.  
At no point has the impotence of the W3C been better illustrated than during the 
development of EME, where, despite the reservations of staff members (including 
Berners-Lee himself) and widespread grassroots opposition to content protection, the 
consortium was seen to be ultimately powerless to prevent the development of the 




‘W3C does not have any power to forbid anything… W3C is not the US 
Congress, or WIPO, or a court… W3C is a place for people to talk, and forge 
consensus over great new technology for the web. Yes, there is an argument 
made that in any case, W3C should just stand up against DRM, but we, like 
Canute, understand our power is limited.’4 
In the context of an increasingly fast-paced and commercially orientated standards 
environment, it is clear that many participants believe that the W3C must learn to pick its 
battles and to use the influence that it still retains to carefully and strategically to achieve 
its goal of protecting the open web. Clearly, in the case of EME, the calculation of many 
within the W3C was that given the apparent inevitability of content protection online, 
opposition to the specification would be unlikely to achieve any substantive or lasting 
benefits.  
Given the widespread support for EME from several important browser vendors, such a 
position may not have been unreasonable. However, as the gradual commercial 
enclosure of web standardisation continues, it nevertheless becomes increasingly difficult 
to envision a situation in which a principled stance taken by the W3C in opposition to a 
well-supported web technology would be sufficient to prevent its development.   
To the extent that such a circumstance is still possible, the power of the W3C to exert 
significant influence over the standards it develops will almost certainly depend on the 
consortium’s continued ability to command the respect and admiration of the broader 
internet community. For the past quarter of a century, the reputation of the W3C as a 
trusted custodian of the open web has been carefully nurtured by Tim Berners-Lee and 
W3C staff through their unquestionable commitment to the long-term development of the 
open web as well as their openness and responsiveness to the interests and opinions of 
the ICT community. As a result of the controversy over EME, and in particular the 
                                                             
4 Tim Berners-Lee’s refusal to ‘play the role of Canute’ was ridiculed and criticised by opponents of 
EME who saw the Director’s acceptance of the inevitability of DRM as defeatist (McCarthy, 2017). 
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perceived failure of the W3C to adequately consider the policy concerns of its members 
and the public, this reputation has over the past five years suffered serious and potentially 
lasting damage as many influential stakeholders, including the EFF, have begun to 
publicly express doubts about the competence of the consortium and its capacity to 
represent the interests of end users (Doctorow, 2017).  
Thus, whilst some members may continue to lament the impotency of the W3C’s to resist 
corporate violations of its values, here I argued that it is only through genuine 
acknowledgement and consideration of the broader social and political implications of its 
work that the W3C can begin to rebuild its reputation, and thus rediscover the ‘moral 
authority’ needed to fulfil its mission of ‘leading the web to its full potential’. Without it, the 
W3C is destined to find itself increasingly at the mercy of market forces, and thus, like 
Canute, powerless to defend its values against a tide of corporate enclosure that, in time, 
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